The foundations of violence: The growth of far-right hate in the UK

7 August 2024

Introduction

On July 29, 2024, a stabbing attack in Southport, UK killed three young girls and injured ten others. False claims spread rapidly on social media, alleging the perpetrator was a Muslim who had illegally entered the UK and was known to security services. Although authorities later revealed the attacker was Welsh of Rwandan descent, far-right actors had already instigated a wave of anti-Muslim and anti-migrant attacks across the UK, including attempts to burn down two hotels being used to house asylum seekers.

This article examines three key dynamics underpinning these events: the transformation of far-right extremism, increased targeting of migrants, and rising anti-Muslim hate.

UK Far-Right Extremism Landscape

The extreme right-wing (ERW) poses the most dynamic extremism threat to the UK, with youth participation particularly concerning. Recent arrests data show 95% of minors charged under counter-terrorism offences associate with extreme-right ideologies. The Israel-Gaza conflict has energized many ERW groups, while also splitting civic nationalists (who largely support Israel and advance Islamophobic positions) from white nationalists (many of whom have opportunistically supported Hamas for their attacks on Jews).

Terrorism threats

At the most violent end of the spectrum, six ERW groups are currently proscribed as terrorists in the UK, with the Terrorgram Collective, a neo-fascist online network, the most recently banned earlier in 2024. Over the past decade, the Community Security Trust has recorded 13 extreme-right terror attacks and 13 foiled plots. Between January 2017 and March 2022, 12 of 32 late-stage foiled plots related to ERW ideologies.

In 2021, just over 40% of terrorism arrests related to suspected ERW terrorism. As of June 2023, 27% of people in custody for terrorism-related offences were categorized as extreme-right. The young profile of ERW offenders is particularly alarming, with 19 of 20 children arrested for terrorism offences in 2021 associated with extreme-right ideologies. However, recent UK far-right attacks have also seen a growth in older perpetrators. Videos from the riots across the UK which followed the Southport stabbing attack show perpetrators of various ages.

ERW cases constitute the largest category in the UK government’s voluntary counter-radicalization program Channel (42%). While these figures should be interpreted cautiously – many turn out not to be clear examples of violent radicalisation but symptomatic of complex underlying needs – they indicate a concerning trend.

Online Networking

Online platforms play a crucial role for ERW actors to spread ideologies, recruit members, and organize offline actions. They occupy various digital spaces, from niche platforms like 4chan and Telegram to mainstream platforms such as X and Facebook. Recent ISD research conducted for Ofcom shows the British far right can reach audiences in the hundreds of thousands across these forums.

The August 2024 riots highlighted the power of these online networks, with groups using messaging apps to promote protests, social media to spread information, and video platforms to upload livestreams of events.

ERW actors exploit online platforms to promote violence against opponents. Following the Southport attack, they targeted Muslims, migrants, critics of the far right, and researchers tracking extremism. Many calls to violence were explicit, urging protesters to carry petrol bombs or assassinate opponents.

‘Post-organisational’ Dynamics

The decentralised nature of recent violence reflects a global trend where extremism increasingly involves interactions with amorphous online communities rather than specific organisations. This shift is evident in groups like the anti-Muslim English Defence League (EDL), now largely defunct although some supporters were galvanised by pro-Palestinian protests in November 2023.

In August 2024, a loose network of football hooligans promoted protests and supported violence against migrants and police, united by xenophobia rather than formal group structures with clear leadership. This decentralised approach complicates efforts to disrupt ERW movements and reduces the impact of shutting down individual online groups.

British far-right groups continue to organise into distinct factions, including neo-Nazi, Identitarian, and other hate-motivated movements. While most have small memberships, larger organisations like Patriotic Alternative can mobilise hundreds of activists. These groups engage in various activities, from banner drops to leafleting campaigns, and opportunistically exploit broader societal issues to expand their reach.

Conspiratorial underpinnings

ERW ideology significantly overlaps with radicalised conspiracy movements, which gained significant momentum during the COVID-19 pandemic. This organisational infrastructure has since pivoted to new topics and tactics, increasingly promoting far-right extremist content within online spaces. Conspiracy theorists often attended demonstrations alongside far-right extremists, though rifts exist between these movements. Conspiracy movements can also facilitate violent radicalisation. According to a survey by the BBC, nearly two out of three individuals who identify with the protests of conspiracy movements also consider violence to be legitimate.

Although ERW movements remain fringe, their arguments have become increasingly mainstreamed. Research shows that even academics, writers, and politicians have spread white nationalist conspiracy theories like the Great Replacement.

The contemporary far-right also has a substantial transnational element, drawing inspiration from mobilisations in other Western countries. In the wake of the Southport attack, many accounts promoting anti-migrant hate and civil disobedience on Telegram were from North America, Europe, or Australasia.

Anti-Migrant Mobilisation

Misinformation about the Southport attacker’s origins fueled existing anti-migrant activism driven by extreme right-wing and anti-minority actors. This mobilisation manifested most violently in attempts to burn down asylum seeker hotels and alleged ‘race checkpoints‘ where rioters questioned drivers about their ethnicity.

Three key developments have shaped recent anti-migrant activity:

1. The increase in Channel small boat crossings since 2018 and increasing asylum backlog;
2. Tactical evolution of activist groups, often through digital media;
3. Growth of harmful conspiracy worldviews cemented by COVID-19.

COVID-19 exacerbated the asylum decision-making backlog, straining accommodation systems. The dispersal of asylum seekers to hotels, including in areas with little diversity, further strained public services. Two such hotels in Rotherham and Tamworth were attacked and set ablaze in August 2024, with protesters spraying racist and anti-migrant graffiti.

Models of Anti-Migrant Activism

Anti-migrant activism has evolved through several phases over the last five years:

1. Coastal patrols by far-right political party Britain First in 2019;
2. Self-described ‘migrant hunters’ filming boat arrivals and asylum accommodation;
3. Protests orchestrated by Patriotic Alternative, peaking in early 2023.

The ‘citizen journalism model’ of far-right activism blurs lines between digital and physical activity. Offline activities by groups such as Patriotic Alternative often aim to create content for social media. Meanwhile, a digital drip-feed of allegations linking sexual crime to migrants has fuelled offline protests.

Global events reinforce domestic anti-migrant sentiment. UK protests in early 2023 drew inspiration from demonstrations in Ireland, with cross-pollination across the Irish Sea driven by UK anti-immigrant figures such as EDL founder Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley-Lennon). Activists’ social media feeds amplify reports of violence and crime attributed to migrants across Europe.

Anti-migrant narratives increasingly intertwine with anti-democratic ideas about Western society’s alleged decline and the so-called failure of multiculturalism, captured by hashtags circulating in the context of the August 2024 rioting like #EnoughisEnough. Far-right accounts have promoted the message that there is ‘no going back’ in the face of law enforcement efforts to control civil unrest.

Violent Mobilisation

The August 2024 riots, while unprecedented in scale, form part of a longer violent history. Previous incidents include a far-right terrorist attack on a Dover migrant processing centre in October 2022 and a terrorist attack targeting a Yorkshire hotel, reportedly connected to its housing of asylum seekers.

The Israel-Hamas conflict has further amplified anti-migrant sentiment. Cultural nationalists focus on the supposed threat of Muslim migration, while ethno-nationalists and white supremacists frame their anti-migration arguments in terms of antisemitism. These hatreds are not mutually exclusive: one of the Telegram groups which promoted and supported riots in the wake of the Southport stabbing notably featured both antisemitic and anti-Muslim content.

Anti-Muslim Hate

The false claim that the Southport attacker was a Muslim tapped into a rising current of anti-Muslim hate. Over the last decade, incidents of anti-Muslim hate have more than doubled, with Islamophobic narratives mobilising targeted hate against Muslim communities and gaining traction in mainstream politics. In the immediate aftermath of the Southport attack, rioters targeted a local mosque, with plans for further attacks.

From March 2021 to 2022, Muslim communities were the largest target of religiously motivated hate crimes, comprising 42 percent of incidents. The past year has seen almost 90 percent of mosques experience hate crimes, ranging from threatening letters to acts of violence and vandalism.

The Israel-Palestine conflict triggered a sharp rise in anti-Muslim bigotry. Islamophobia monitoring charity TellMAMA reported a tripling in anti-Muslim incidents in the four months following the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack on Israel, totalling more than 2,000. ISD research showed significant increases in anti-Muslim content across various online platforms during this period.

Key Anti-Muslim Narratives

Notable Islamophobic tropes fuelling anti-Muslim hate in the UK include:

1. Attributing cases of child sexual exploitation to perpetrators’ Asian heritage, leading to demonstrations and violent attacks targeting Muslims;
2. Claims that mosques are replacing churches and Muslims are developing ‘no-go zones’ where Sharia law prevails;
3. Conspiracy theories like “Eurabia” that portray Muslims as a homogenous, violent or illiberal invading force;
4. The “Great Replacement” theory, which claims high birth rates among Muslim communities aim to destroy the white race.

The views are seeping into mainstream discourse. A 2021 University of Birmingham survey found 25.9 percent of the British public feel negative towards Muslims, while a 2020 Savanta ComRes poll found one in five young white non-Muslims believed “British culture” is “under threat from invasion”.

Mainstreamed Islamophobia is widespread across mainstream social media platforms, particularly where content doesn’t meet the threshold for hate speech. Alternative social media platforms often host more radical right networks engaging in violent anti-Muslim hate, producing conspiracy theories that filter through to mainstream discourse.

While key anti-Muslim movements like the English Defence League (EDL) and British National Party (BNP) have largely dissipated, their influence persists. Stephen Yaxley-Lennon continues to spread anti-Muslim narratives to a significant audience on the encrypted messenger app Telegram. A rally held by Robinson in Trafalgar Square just days before the Southport stabbing resulted in several arrests.

Conclusion

The August 2024 riots following the Southport stabbing highlight the potential for localized incidents to trigger widespread violence when exploited by extremist actors, representing some of the most notable mobilisation of ERW organising in decades. While shocking, these events did not come out of a vacuum, and instead emerge from a context when the UK faces a complex and evolving threat from far-right extremism, characterized by increasingly decentralized networks, online radicalisation, and the mainstreaming of anti-migrant and anti-Muslim hate.