The British Jewish community has faced an unprecedented number of attacks in recent weeks, including multiple arson incidents and a terrorist attack. As the UK government grapples with how to respond, this ISD policy brief offers a strategic framework for confronting a range of antisemitic threats. These threats encompass mainstream and extreme actors, state- and non-state-linked activity, online and offline environments, and both violence and latent cultural antisemitism. It urges a cross-government strategy, led by the UK Prime Minister’s Office, centred on the online environment and designed to address the diverse actors, tactics and harms targeting the Jewish community. This brief builds on ISD’s research and policy development on the diverse harms landscape, covering threats such as terrorism, extremism, hostile state activity and targeted hate including antisemitism.

The rapidly evolving antisemitism threat environment

In recent weeks, the UK Jewish community has faced a wave of violence. This includes five arson attacks targeting synagogues and Jewish buildings, and a stabbing attack against two Jewish individuals in Golders Green (an area with a large Jewish population).

This violence has occurred against the backdrop of an unprecedented and sustained rise in antisemitic activity since the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023. In 2025, the Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 3,700 antisemitic incidents, the second-highest total reported in a single calendar year. Parallel to this, 2025 JPR research showed that 82 percent of British Jews now see antisemitism as a ‘very big’ or ‘fairly big’ problem.

The attack on Heaton Park synagogue in October 2025 marked a decisive turning point, as targeted hate escalated into deadly violence against the Jewish community. In the week that followed, CST recorded 181 additional antisemitic incidents. This compounded the impact of violence on already vulnerable communities.

Since the Heaton Park attack, antisemitism in the UK has escalated to the point that the government’s terrorism advisor described it as a ‘national emergency’. A previously unknown group calling itself Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (also known as Ashab Al-Yamin and HAYI) has claimed responsibility for these arson and stabbing attacks; the group is likely part of a cover for Iran or one of its proxies. The legitimacy of these claims and their link to hostile states remains unclear.

The attacks emerge within a broader ecosystem of antisemitic activity across decentralised online networks operating in both public and private forums. This has been amplified by social media algorithms and malign foreign state influence operations. Furthermore, the spike in antisemitism spans the ideological spectrum among both extremist and mainstream communities. It ranges from the Islamist violence seen in recent attacks to far-right plots and far-left incitement. This reflects how offline violence and online ecosystems are mutually reinforcing, encouraging further hostility in both spaces. For example, three days after the 7 October attacks, analysts recorded a 50-fold rise in the absolute volume of antisemitic comments on YouTube videos about the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The antisemitism threat landscape in the UK and beyond is increasingly shaped by hostile state involvement. In October 2025, Director General of the Security Service Sir Ken McCallum reported that the security services tracked “more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots” during the previous year. On 18 March 2026, two men were charged under the National Security Act for alleged surveillance of locations and individuals linked to the Jewish community in the London area.

This worsening threat picture has a very real impact on Jewish communities, threatening their physical safety and building a palpable environment of fear. The inability of Jewish communities to express their identify and practice their religion without fear is a threat not just to them but to the health of British democracy.

The responsive policy landscape remains fractured

Since October’s Heaton Park attack, the UK government has focused on physical security responses: this includes bolstering funding for law enforcement and Jewish communal security by allocating up to £10 million after the Heaton Park attack, and another £25 million after the Golders Green attack. The UK terror threat level was raised to ‘severe’ in April and specialist police units were created to combine neighbourhood policing with counter-terror functions.

In the aftermath of the April and May arson and stabbing attacks claimed by Ashab Al-Yamin, the government has placed renewed emphasis on disrupting hostile state threats. This month, the government announced new plans to prosecute individuals acting on behalf of foreign powers, bringing forward legislation first announced in 2023. Their plans will also allow proscription-like powers to ban state groups such as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These powers will be integrated into the National Security Act and build on steps already taken to respond to a multifaceted hostile state threat.

These recent announcements are consistent with measures introduced after the Heaton Park attacks, including funding for counter-antisemitism education, and an enquiry into antisemitism in the NHS and other public services, set out in the April 2026 social cohesion action plan. But while these actions are very welcome, they do not rise to the scale or complexity of the contemporary antisemitic threat. A more strategic response is needed to respond to the multi-faceted nature of the threat facing British Jewish communities.

Towards a strategic response to the lifecycle of antisemitism

The proposals below provide a framework for both responding to antisemitic violence and building an integrated strategy which incorporates the range of harms from antisemitism impacting British Jews. These recommendations recognise the significant role of online platforms in facilitating the spread of antisemitism and centre a robust regulatory response.

Ensuring the success of digital regulation

Data from the Institute for Jewish Policy Research identifies social media as the most common location that Jewish people experience antisemitism in the UK. ISD has long evidenced the interconnectivity between online activity and real-world harms, including the mobilisation of antisemitic terrorism. Despite this, responses from civil society and government often contain insufficient focus on the central role of social media in mobilising antisemitic hate and extremism. Social media is often included as an afterthought rather than the lynchpin of a response. It is vital that the UK’s social media regulatory regime is quickly and effectively implemented and enforced to respond to these identified challenges. The success of the Online Safety Act (OSA) should be seen as a central pillar of a counter-extremism and counter-antisemitism strategy.

In the context of the UK’s diverse threat landscape, ISD has long advocated for regulation to address the full lifecycle of online harms and the systems which facilitate them. This includes mitigating the role of digital technology in the production of antisemitic content (including generative AI), distribution (such as recommender algorithms) and consumption (addressing the exposure of vulnerable users to this content).

In addition to requiring the removal of illegal antisemitic content, the OSA must be enforced in a way that also requires platforms to employ a safety-by-design approach, intervening in the spread of antisemitic content at all stages. A number of measures must be taken to improve the efficacy of the OSA framework to mitigate the spread of antisemitic content. These include strengthening risk assessments, protecting users and addressing systemic issues in the regulatory process.

Platform design has been found to contribute to the spread of antisemitic content. For example, children in the UK have been shown to be served content glorifying the IRGC within only 90 minutes of creating an account. The role of platform systems, designs and certain functionalities in incentivising and boosting antisemitic content must be addressed through regulation and integrated into wider counterstrategies. This is particularly important for platforms known to host fringe and extremist communities including Telegram and Discord.

Perhaps the most important question is whether enforcement action by Ofcom—the UK regulator responsible for the OSA—is sufficient to fundamentally change platforms’ incentives and behaviours regarding online safety. This is especially pressing for platforms whose ideological positions are opposed to any attempts at content moderation for hateful speech, even when potentially illegal in the UK. Initial enforcement decisions from Ofcom show the opportunities the OSA provides for systemic change. These measures take significant time, capacity and expertise to implement. However, Ofcom must ensure that lengthened timelines do not cause communities to lose faith in the ability of the regulation to effect change. Transparent communication about the regulator’s progress and accountability on timelines is vital.

As the OSA’s focus extends more broadly to illegal content and harms to children, it may be insufficient to address in a more holistic way the mainstreamed, legal and everyday nature of antisemitic content that contributes to feelings of insecurity within British Jewish communities. The vast majority of antisemitic content is legally permissible: the OSA contains fewer provisions to reduce adult’s exposure to ‘legal but harmful’ content compared than to illegal hate speech. Child safety duties could also be strengthened further to ensure they aptly include antisemitic content as Priority Content. This would help to address both the most egregious forms of antisemitism and passive exposure to its more mainstream expressions.

The OSA is a vital piece of the necessary response. However, efforts to counter online antisemitism must also look beyond regulatory frameworks for comprehensive solutions. Treating the online and offline worlds as siloed is a mistake: a holistic counter-antisemitism strategy requires connecting digital regulation to wider violence prevention, hybrid threat responses and counter-extremism efforts.

An integrated approach to violence prevention

The spate of recent attacks on the British Jewish community is emblematic of the hybrid threat landscape. They appear to have been motivated by a range of hostile state-linked networks as well as Islamist group-inspired lone actors. Existing counter-terrorism frameworks—including those geared towards prevention, protection and proscription—have an important role to play in mitigating antisemitic violence. However, the ability of the UK government to adequately respond to antisemitic violence cannot be dictated by the ideological motive of the perpetrator, or the extent to which violence can be attributed to a designated state or non-state actor. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s promise to bring forward legislation to expand proscription powers to state-backed groups would help address the gap that currently exists between counter-terrorism policy, legal powers concerning foreign interference such as the National Security Act 2023, and transparency efforts such as the Foreign Influence Registry Scheme (FIRS).

However, the current counter-terrorism policy system is struggling to meet the needs of the present environment. Rather than creating a mirror image of an outdated system, the current moment offers an opportunity to ensure that responses are appropriate, agile and future proof.

For example, counter-terrorism legislation remains focused on identifying and banning formal groups. But threats increasingly emanate from decentralised, overlapping online networks without a formal leader, group structure or membership. Recent attacks targeting Jewish people and Jewish institutions—including Heaton Park synagogue—have been characterised by individuals inspired by groups but with no formal affiliation or operational support. Iran has targeted the UK through a network of state-backed militias, proxy groups and by leveraging local low-level criminal networks. While calls to ban the IRGC may be a useful first step, a group ban alone will not capture the nature of the threat facing Jewish communities.

The UK should instead integrate approaches to counter hostile state-linked activity into a wider violence prevention system focused on behaviours rather than narrow conceptions of extremist ideology. This would also better capture the range of threats from hostile states beyond targeted violence: for example, transnational repression (in which foreign states or their proxies intimidate, harass or target diaspora communities, dissidents and journalists). Such activities may not fit traditional counter-extremism models but involve a similar set of harms to communities and behaviours including security threats and violence.

While not specifically antisemitism focused, Lord Anderson’s Lessons from Prevent, the Home Affairs Committee’s findings and the first phase of the Southport Inquiry (alongside ISD’s own policy proposals) all call for a holistic approach to countering violence: one which connects the full range of ideological threats with those motivated by a wider range of factors. State-linked threats should also be an important piece of this puzzle: government and law enforcement must have appropriate powers to respond to antisemitic violence regardless of the ideology or state link of its proponent.

The Jewish community faces a diverse set of threats including individuals linked to formal groups, those motivated by state actors and those with more complex motivations and affiliations. To respond, we need a system to join up approaches against all forms of antisemitic violence, regardless of their ideological motivation or modus operandi. By knitting together the violence prevention system across ideologies and tactics, government can close the gaps in the current approach.

Integrating antisemitism efforts within robust counter extremism and hate crime strategies

The recent violent attacks on Jewish sites and people are a visceral demonstration of the lethality of antisemitism. However, they must be understood in the wider context of verbal abuse and harassment, graffiti, and latent antisemitic culture. The impact of antisemitic attacks is compounded by parts of civil society which justify, excuse or celebrate them. This range of harms contributes to more than the security threat: they also produce a chilling effect, eroding Jewish people’s ability to participate fully and freely in British society.

The 2024 Government definition of extremism aptly articulates the link between extremism, the erosion of fundamental rights and the undermining of democracy, and addresses the broader long tail of harms associated with extremism beyond violence alone. But the definition was never followed up by a comprehensive cross-government strategy for tackling extremism. The government’s recent social cohesion plan offers a welcome set of initial measures to strengthen cohesion, recognising that much more needs to be done in the long term. Building on this, a holistic strategy must connect the more ‘upstream’ prevention of the cohesion plan with the ‘downstream’ protection needed to counter extremism.

A counter-extremism strategy is vital to connecting approaches to counter the range of threats facing the UK. Iran and its proxy groups have targeted the UK through violent attacks, coordinated influence operations and hacktivist collectives. Rather than narrowly focusing on violence prevention, a holistic strategy must address the diverse manifestations of antisemitism-related harm (such as hate crimes, wider threats to rights, freedoms and democracy) and an increasingly mainstreamed extremism threat across the ideological spectrum. This requires close collaboration across numerous policy areas including extremism, cohesion, health and social care, education, international affairs, digital regulation, intelligence, and law enforcement. This should take place under robust oversight from the Prime Minister’s office.

Despite indications from the government before the 2024 general election, there has been no updated strategy on addressing hate crimes (which are key to the spread of extremist narratives). Enforcement gaps in hate speech legislation have left a permissive and enabling environment for the normalisation of antisemitic rhetoric. The ongoing review of hate crime legislation is vital to understanding the gaps in current approaches. Any amendments should consider their potential application in the online as well as offline context; consideration of their threat must be integrated into platforms’ risk assessments under the OSA. Focusing narrowly on banning individual words and phrases allows new phrases to rise in popularity. Instead, a hate crime strategy must consider whether the law is able to adequately identify and respond to the types of hateful discourse proliferating, and whether law enforcement is effectively equipped, funded and trained to enforce it.

Moving from protection to prevention

Responding to the broad range of impacts of antisemitic extremism will demand a much stronger and more strategic approach to preventing not just violence, but the conditions and broader societal factors that motivate it. The £7 million for antisemitism education announced by the previous Conservative government in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 attacks provides an opportunity for testing innovative approaches. However, as only half of the funding is currently administered, prevention efforts are far too limited. This budget is only a fraction of that given to security funding after both the Manchester and Golders Green attacks: new protection measures have seven times the amount of funding as prevention measures. Strengthening upstream prevention could reduce the long-term need for such security measures, curb the spread of antisemitism before it appears, and build a more cohesive society writ large.

Given the range of ways in which people engage in antisemitism, no one idea or programme can be a ‘silver bullet’. Rather, a strategic framework should offer an ecosystem of complementary programmes, encouraging factors which protect populations vulnerable to radicalisation and reducing risk factors. These programmes can fit together to address the lifecycle of engagement in extremism, from preventing mainstream manifestations to mitigating the impacts of violent extremist antisemitism. This can make prevention programming more effective in responding to both antisemitic violence as well as more mainstream and pervasive forms of antisemitism. Programmes which focus on broader antisemitic behaviours rather than specific ideologies could be sufficiently agile to respond to current and future evolutions of antisemitism across the political spectrum.

Antisemitism presents a very specific threat. However, approaches to target it need not start from scratch. Two decades of best practices and learnings from counter-extremism interventions should be incorporated into the response. This includes a more strategic approach to primary prevention that is fit for the digital age: pre-bunking and inoculation strategies have shown promise in building resilience to extremist ideas, while digital literacy and citizenship programmes equip young people with the tools to recognise manipulation by harmful online actors. Although there are many pilot stage programmes, there is an urgent need to scale and tailor them to needs and experiences of target communities. This includes building a new coalition of actors to engage hard-to-reach communities. This can be achieved through hyper-localised responses, providing local authorities with the tools and opportunities to build cohesion with appropriately targeted programming (a good example of this can be seen in Barnet). A new era of more digitally-appropriate interventions can look to respond to the harms facilitated by social media at both a national and local level.

Conclusion

As threats towards the British Jewish community continue to grow and evolve, government must go beyond short-term quick fixes: it should also bring together disparate action plans into a strategic and systematic policy framework. The current set of announced measures following recent arson attacks do not meet the challenge posed by a diverse range of threat actors, tactics and resultant harms. Policy plans such as the government’s social cohesion paper offer promising stepping stones. However, they must be integrated into a wider apparatus challenging both upstream harms and downstream impacts.

Rather than relying on an outdated system of sporadic group bans or occasional announcements of security measures, government must fix the system which has failed to keep Jewish people safe. The Prime Minister’s office must pull together the necessary components of violence prevention, digital regulation, education and democracy protection to create a holistic, concrete and future-proof response to antisemitism in the UK.