The prospect of post-election conspiracy-motivated violence

1 November 2024

By: Jared Holt and Cody Zoschak

Several conspiracy theorists, including some who may be prospective White House hires in a second Trump administration, have spent the months ahead of the US 2024 Election speaking to election denialist audiences in existential terms, promoting conspiracy theories, and promising ‘retribution’ against the subjects of those theories – up to and including execution. If their preferred candidate loses the election, these promises could inspire a small subset of their supporters to take matters into their own hands. 


The threat to public officials perceived as being part of the “deep state” under a second Trump administration has been well examined. Less discussed has been the threat that, should Trump not win the election, a small subset of his supporters who expected retributive violence to be enacted by the government might take matters into their own hands.

Prominent supporters of former President and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump are taking violent rhetoric a step further this election cycle, promoting promises that supporters will see retributive persecution and violence against their perceived political enemies should Trump win a second term in the White House.

This Dispatch examines rhetoric espoused by two notable examples – retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn and activist Ivan Raiklin – whose promises of retributive violence have garnered a substantial audience. They promote conspiracy theories about the “deep state,” and have recently begun to discuss how they plan to target their enemies in a new Trump administration.  

Figures like Flynn and Raiklin justify their hateful and extreme rhetoric by arguing that the individuals and organizations they lambast are existential threats to the safety and health of Trump supporters. They have even evoked religious terms, claiming their enemies are “demons.”  

If Trump loses, a subset of followers who have been exposed to these messages and are convinced of a need to “drain the swamp” by extreme measures may feel inclined to take matters into their own hands. Much of this potential activity may be peaceful political behaviors, like protests, but the violent fantasies promoted by these figures and their like-minded peers could also drive individuals toward criminal and violent actions. 

Influencers excite fantasies of violence against political foes 

Raiklin has encouraged fantasies of retaliation, explicitly, both online and offline. For example, he has compiled a target list of public officials, journalists, and politicians as a self-appointed “Secretary of Retribution.” In a video filmed inside the US Capitol, Raiklin said he plans to impose “legal, moral, and ethical consequences … to include the maximum punishment for treason.” (The maximum punishment is execution.) He has spoken about his desire to kill Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg via drone strike and told followers he would have sympathetic sheriffs deputize them so they could legally dole out punishments. 

At October’s Rod of Iron Freedom Festival, an annual pro-gun religious event hosted by a far-right church at which support for candidate Trump was particularly apparent, Raiklin told journalists present that a Secretary of Retribution “coordinates the national, state, and local governmental officials and people to create maximum consequences to our belligerent actors within government,” and that he didn’t need Trump to support his actions because he’s “already doing it.” 

You tell your sheriff to conduct the precedent already set by Michael Byrd, US Capitol Police officer, and the precedent set by Lila Morris, Metropolitan Police Department officer on Ashli Babbitt and Roseanne Boyland,” Raiklin explained, referring to two law enforcement officers who used violence against Capitol rioters. 

Flynn also spoke at the event, where he was asked by an attendee whether he would “sit at the head of a military tribunal to not only drain the swamp, but imprison the swamp, and on a few occasions, execute the swamp.” Putting aside the lack of jurisdiction of tribunals over U.S, civilians, his answer seemed to affirm the question’s violent premise: an endorsement of retaliatory punishment against political rivals. Furthermore, the attendee’s choice to raise this topic suggests that these ideas of retributive violence are resonating with a subset of Trump supporters, like those at the event. 

“There’s a way to get after this, but we have to win first,” Flynn said. He added, “We win, and then Katy, bar the door. OK? Believe me, the gates of hell – my hell – will be unleashed.” 

Flynn’s remarks could carry extra weight on account of his status as a folk hero among many Trump supporters and conspiracy theorists, as a collaborator with leading election denialist activists, and as a potential  member of a second Trump administration. Though often less explicit than his peers, Flynn is a leading voice in media ecosystems expressing violent ambitions. Flynn appeared aware of this dynamic, admitting in his answer that the questioner’s sentiment was “like a lot of people [he speaks] to around this country, and for years now.” 

A look at violent rhetoric among Flynn and Raiklin’s followers on X 

ISD’s social media analysis found that Flynn and Raiklin’s followers on X have shared millions of posts containing violent rhetoric, potentially reflecting the vision for the future promoted by the pair. A keyword analysis on all posts from the 1.8M X users who followed Flynn or Raiklin at the time of analysis, suggests the media they consumed on the platform was eliciting strong reactions. 

ISD used social listening tools to compare the rhetoric of users who follow Flynn and Raiklin on X against a keyword list of 40 terms associated with violence and retribution/ revenge fantasies. Analysts filtered results to exclude irrelevant subjects – namely the Israel-Hamas war – and reposts. In a two-year window, the number of posts per month containing those keywords showed a steady increase, mirroring increases in followers to Flynn and Raiklin’s accounts. 

Figure 1: A graph shows violent rhetoric appeared in more posts by X followers of Michael Flynn and Ivan Raiklin over time.

 

Keywords associated with retributive violence and terms associated with revenge fantasies were used by accounts that follow Flynn or Raiklin in more than 720,000 posts per month, on average. Since July 2024, their followers have posted messages containing the same keywords more than a million times per month. The number of posts containing identified keywords spiked in July after the failed assassination attempt against Trump. The volume of concerning posts dropped slightly in the following months, but the numbers of posts remained higher than levels prior to the assassination attempt. 

This kind of analysis cannot determine causation or directionality, but it does provide evidence that the sampled audience for Flynn and Raiklin’s social media followers is primed to support violent rhetoric and is cognizant of revenge fantasies. Though ISD’s findings show increased violent rhetoric over time by analyzed accounts, there are multiple potential explanations for the surge, including increased activity by those accounts and the fact that Flynn and Raiklin’s accounts accumulated followers over the period analyzed. According to SocialBlade metrics, Raiklin has gained hundreds of thousands of X followers in the last two years; Flynn has almost doubled his following in that time. 

Conspiracy driven extremism’s violent record 

Extreme rhetoric and conspiracy theories from pro-Trump figures have not motivated major incidents of violence or civil unrest in the 2024 electoral cycle thus far, but they have done so in prior election years. After the 2020 elections, these risks culminated in a climax of political violence: the January 6 riot at the US Capitol Building. But prior to chaos at the Capitol, that election period had already seen a host of demonstrations and political violence – much of which was motivated by election conspiracy theories. Though this year has seen fewer mobilizations by the same constituencies that were active in 2020, significant threats of political violence still loom over the election period. 

Conspiracydriven extremist movements pose a unique risk of engaging in political violence, the FBI assessed in a 2021 intelligence bulletin. This finding was echoed in the DHS’ 2024 threat assessment. The FBI argued that some political conspiracy theories “tacitly support or legitimize violent action” committed by the theories’ believers, and that the growth of those theories online increased the potential risks they posed to public safety. Specifically, the FBI noted that “anti-government, identity based, and fringe” theories were “fostering anti-government sentiment, promoting racial and religious prejudice, increasing political tensions, and occasionally driving both groups and individuals to commit criminal or violent acts.” 

Conspiracydriven extremists, like those who supported the QAnon movement, have engaged in a host of criminal and violent actions in recent years, including murders. Law enforcement has alleged that extreme conspiracy theories have motivated individuals to make threats against political figures and law enforcement officials, and attack private businesses and government facilities. Hyper-conspiratorial beliefs have also motivated followers to commit kidnappings, attacks, a major bombing, and murders. 

The promises of retributive violence espoused by figures like Flynn and Raiklin have several similarities with core tenets of QAnon theories, primarily the demonization of “deep state” operatives. However, the core tenets of QAnon placed constraints on its followers that often prevented them from mobilizing to violence. 

QAnon mythology taught that patriotic members of the military were in charge and that any perceived setbacks they were seeing (e.g. Hillary Clinton clearly being alive and free when Q claimed she would be executed or imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay) were part of a well-orchestrated plan. Though the apocalyptic rhetoric and appalling claims made by Q appear tailor-made to inspire violence, followers were told to “trust the plan,” therefore removing the implied need for QAnon adherents to take action or carry out an act of violence themselves. Should Trump lose the election in November, his supporters who have been influenced by Flynn and Raiklin’s reference to ‘retributive violence’ could feel obligated to carry out acts of violence that they believed would be otherwise imminent against their political enemies.  

Annex:

Methodology/Scope 

Individuals featured in this article – Flynn and Raiklin – were chosen with considerations for several forms of influence, including: the audience sizes of their online personas; the proximity they have to political power; and the specificity of their violent and extreme rhetoric. These judgements were informed by ISD’s daily analysis of online threats and political mis- and disinformation. The individuals named exist within broader online ecosystems of concerning content and are not exclusively responsible for the risks identified in this article. Rather, they are major contributors to the observed dynamics shared in this article. 

To conduct keyword analysis ISD identified over 40 terms intended to identify threats of retributive violence that mirror the language used by Flynn and Raiklin. Posts containing an additional twenty terms, mostly related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, were excluded as researchers found they were contained in a large number of non-relevant posts that included the abovementioned keywords.    

Investigation: Political violence, harassment, intimidation & threats during Ireland’s 2024 general election campaign

30 November 2024 A joint investigation by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and Hope and Courage Collective (H&CC) documented 55 incidents encompassing politically motivated violence, threats, harassment, targeting and smears across a spectrum of activity in the five weeks leading up to the Irish General Election on 29 November. These included 4 incidents of offline violence; 13 incidents related ...