Investigation: How Russia Today is evading sanctions and spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda in Italy

13 May 2025

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has restricted access to the Kremlin-funded broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) in the bloc. However, research has consistently shown that RT and other sanctioned Russian outlets have been actively circumventing these restrictions for years through networks of proxy websites and spin-off outlets targeting European countries. ISD found that pro-Kremlin operations in Italy have increasingly combined on- and offline components, maximising their reach and effectively breaching EU sanctions on the “transmission or distribution by any means” of RT content. 

Analysts found pro-Kremlin accounts promoting pro-Russian propaganda films and posters across Italy. These accounts are part of a network that includes Italian ‘independent journalists’ reporting from Russian-occupied Ukraine, former anti-lockdown groups, and both Italian and Russian officials. Content with this network reached almost two million users over the 60-day period from 1 January to 1 March 2025.  

Introduction 

ISD research has found that RT’s online content continues to reach EU member states, including Italy, despite sanctions. This Investigation shows how sanctions evasion extends into the offline space through a series of RT-sponsored documentary screenings taking place across Italy. Though portrayed as independent journalism, these screenings are an extension of Russian influence efforts: they aim to promote false narratives about the war in Ukraine and bolster support for Moscow’s agenda in Italy. 

EU sanctions prohibit RT from broadcasting or distributing content across any platform within the EU, including via television, online streaming services and social media platforms. These measures were implemented to prevent RT and other outlets from disseminating propaganda and disinformation to European audiences following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. RT is therefore in violation of the restriction against distributing its content “through transmission or distribution by any means”: in this instance, via in-person events and third-party networks.  

The latest iteration of this campaign is the screening of the film Voci dal Donbass (“Voices from Donbas”). This film has been showcased as part of a broader tour of pro-Kremlin documentaries across Italy, promoted online by Donbass Italia (an account that consistently amplifies Russian state propaganda), alongside two other groups known for disseminating Kremlin-aligned messaging: ControNarrazione and InfoDefense.   

Image 1: A poster shared online with official RT branding and co-branding alongside that of Donbass Italia, InfoDefense and ControNarrazione.

Images 2 and 3: Posts from the Donbass Italia (left): “Goodmorning, from the People’s Repubic of Luhansk. Wishing you all a good and fruitful day! Against censorship, subscribe to our channelsto watch videos and read the most important news from RT and Sputnik” and ControNarrazione (right): “Material seized from a protest against Zelensky in Rome on the occasion of the Dynamo Kiev match,” Telegram channels.

The role of sanctioned media, pro-Kremlin journalists and Russian officials 

Despite extensive sanctions placed on RT by the EU, the broadcaster’s brand has been found in various film screenings around Italy. ISD found a range of films that align with Moscow’s longstanding tactic of framing Ukraine as the aggressor to justify Russia’s military invasion and ongoing conflict in the country. All of them explicitly feature RT branding. 

• Voci dal Donbass (“Voices of Donbas”), described above, 
• Io Sono Vivo (“I am alive”), a documentary purporting to show the Russian ‘liberation’ of Mariupol, 
• Bambini del Donbass (“Children of the Donbas”), a film presenting testimonies from those who allegedly “live under the bombs of Kiev”, 
• Maidan, la strada verso la guerra (“Maidan, the road towards war”), which presents the 2013 Euromaidan protests and the 2014 ousting of President Yanukovych as a Western-backed coup, while highlighting efforts to censor the dissemination of the film in Italy. 

The screenings are being organised and promoted by two well-known Italian pro-Kremlin figures based in Russian-occupied Donetsk, Andrea Lucidi and Vincenzo Lorusso. They have been instrumental in laundering Russian state narratives into European discourse. While both operate under the banner of ‘independent journalism’, they consistently promote narratives that align with Kremlin interests.   

A screening of Voci del Donbass which took place in Genoa in March featured an interview with Anna Soroka. Soroka refers to herself as the “human rights commissioner” for the self-proclaimed Russian-proxy Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), who was sanctioned by the EU in February 2025. While not named on the US sanctions list, Soroka also falls under the broader restrictions imposed by the Biden administration on the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic in February 2022. The LPR, alongside the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), is controlled by Russia and serves as a key tool in Russia’s occupation strategy in eastern Ukraine. Soroka’s participation underscores the Kremlin’s direct involvement in these influence operations.  

Screenings of Voci del Donbass in Arezzo and Tortona were respectively cancelled in January 2025 by MEP Pina Picierno and the Tortona Council. However, many more are currently scheduled to go ahead throughout the spring. Pro-Kremlin organisers are adept at evading these bans: they often arrange screenings in secret, requiring attendees sign up via WhatsApp and congregate in a public place before being informed as to where the documentary will be shown. 

Image 4: A Telegram post displaying a ‘plan B’ stating there is always a way around censorship and that ‘due to the sudden unavailability’ of the location that was booked for the screening, the new location will only be revealed on the evening of the screening itself.

Image 5: Telegram post advertising a screening with the initiative promoted by a regional councillor, Michele Menchetti.

As some screenings are taking place in public libraries and municipal halls, local institutions and politicians are potentially complicit in the dissemination of Russian propaganda. The involvement of sanctioned Russian figures and the use of RT-branded content suggests a deliberate effort to evade European sanctions and maintain a foothold in Western information spaces. 

ISD also found evidence of deceptive branding: an advertised screening of I Bambini del Donbass due to take place during the first week of April in Taranto features the official UNICEF logo. Lorusso claimed he was initially contacted by a local UNICEF provincial committee that expressed interest in supporting the screening but UNICEF ITALIA has refuted any involvement, stating in a post on X that it “has not authorised, sponsored, nor will be participating in the event in any way.” Lorusso concurrently accused UNICEF of dishonesty and misrepresenting the situation. This misleading use of a humanitarian organisation’s branding raises further concerns about the deceptive tactics employed by the pro-Kremlin movement to give legitimacy to their propaganda efforts.  

Image 6: A poster advertising the screening with the official UNICEF logo in the top-right-hand corner.

Backdrop of Russian influence operations in Italy 

These screenings are part of a larger Russian influence effort targeting Italy. RT and other Russian state-backed media entities have increasingly relied on proxy networks, “independent” activists and alternative media channels to circumvent bans and spread their messaging across Europe. Italy has proven to be fertile ground for these operations due in part to a history of strong pro-Russian sentiment among certain political and activist groups. 

The networks behind these documentary screenings appear to be the same ones responsible for another offline campaign with the title Russia non è il mio nemico (“Russia is not my enemy”). This poster campaign featured calls for peace and opposing arms support for Ukraine and was widely displayed across Italian cities such as Perugia and Rome.         

Images 7 and 8: (Left) La Russia non e il mio nemico (“Russia is not my enemy”) poster displayed in Perugia.  
(Right) Poster displayed on behalf of “a group of free citizens from La Spezia.”

Both initiatives have been promoted by Donbass Italia and Contronarrazione. This suggests a coordinated effort between the channels to push pro-Kremlin narratives in Italy.  

This connection is further supported by Lorusso’s recent profile picture change on X: the picture now displays an image of the Russia non è il mio nemico poster. A previous profile picture of his from June 2024 does not feature this image, indicating a deliberate alignment with the campaign.  

Like the film screenings, the Russia non è il mio nemico posters seek to influence public perception by framing Russia as a victim of Western hostility rather than an aggressor. These disparate campaigns underscore the scale and intent of Russian influence operations in Italy, using multiple channels to shape discourse in favour of Moscow’s strategic interests. 

Image 9 and 10: (Left) An archived profile picture from 6 June 2024, (Right)Current profile picture featuring the ‘Russia non e il mio nemico’ poster.

ISD also found links to other groups such as Verona per la Libertà, a Telegram group which initially formed to protest lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic before pivoting to pro-Kremlin, anti-NATO content. This group was instrumental in instigating and amplifying the Russia non è il mio nemico poster campaign and other pro-Russian propaganda efforts in Italy by sharing content prolifically across social media platforms and organising offline protests. The group also enjoys the support of Italian politician Stefano Valdegamberi, the former mayor of Badia Calavena in Veneto, who has been vocally pro-Russian in recent years. Valdegamberi has reportedly served as an election observer in Russia’s recent elections, a further connection between Italian political actors and Moscow’s influence operations. 

Images 11 and 12: (Left) Stefano Valdegamberi attends a meeting between Veneto and Russian officials. (Right) Valdegamberi supporting a photography show by pro-Kremlin journalist Vittorio Rangeloni on ‘10 years of War in the Donbas’ together with Regional Counsellor, Stefano Valdegamberi and founder of ‘Popolo Veneto’, Vito Comencini.

Further evidence of these close connections comes from a petition launched by Lorusso urging Italians to apologise for Italian President Sergio Mattarella’s remarks comparing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the atrocities of the Third Reich. The petition, which reportedly gathered 23,000 signatures, was presented to Maria Zakharova – the spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – on 22 February 2025. Zakharova appeared visibly emotional during a video shared on social media, describing the document a “historic” expression of solidarity from Italians who “do not share President Mattarella’s views.” This video received 763,560 impressions on X, while a similar post made on the same platform on 25 February 2025 generated 609,625 impressions (in this instance, impressions refer to the total number of times a piece of content appears in users’ feeds). 

Allegations that some signatures on the petition were forged has raised questions about the legitimacy of public support claimed by these networks (although Lorusso has denied this). Nevertheless, the petition demonstrates how pro-Kremlin actors in Italy have direct access to and can coordinate with Russian officials. The significant engagement around this petition also highlights the traction of pro-Kremlin narratives within Italian digital spaces and their potential to influence public opinion. 

Image 13: Maria Zakharova and Vincenzo Lorusso in Moscow on 22 February 2025 during the presentation of the petition.

Conclusion 

ISD analysis shows that Italian ‘independent journalists’ active in the Donbass and Russia are screening RT-branded Russian state propaganda in Italy. This is not just a media issue – it poses a threat to national security. These influence efforts appear designed to: 

• Undermine European support for Ukraine by portraying Russia as a liberator rather than an aggressor, 
• Legitimise Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories by presenting Russian representatives in Luhansk and Donetsk as ‘authorities’, 
• Erode trust in Western media by positioning RT and affiliates as the only ‘truthful’ sources of information. 

The potential impact of these operations is significant. Over the 60-day period analysed (1 January to 1 March 2025) on X, content related to the Voci dal Donbass event and associated networks – including Donbass Italia, Contronarrazione, and the Russia non è il mio nemico campaign – reached an estimated 1.84 million users, generating 4.03 million impressions. Posts mentioning these events and narratives received 6,477 likes, reflecting notable user engagement. This online activity underscores the ability of these campaigns to permeate Italian digital spaces, influence political discourse and reach sizeable audiences beyond the immediate event attendees. 

Given the EU’s sanctions on RT, its continued presence in Italy through events such as Voci dal Donbass and other documentary screenings highlights clear gaps in enforcement. These activities demonstrate how sanctioned entities and individuals are still able to conduct influence campaigns within European borders. The central question now is how enforcement mechanisms can be strengthened to prevent this activity – and what measures can be taken to disrupt the narratives they promote.  

Recommendations 

RT’s ongoing activities in Italy highlight a significant loophole in the enforcement of EU sanctions. The use of the RT logo, the involvement of Italian journalists embedded in Russian-occupied Ukraine and the participation of sanctioned Russian officials point to a deliberate strategy to sidestep restrictions and re-establish RT’s presence within the European information space. The connection to the Russia non è il mio nemico poster campaign reveals a broader, coordinated effort to shape public sentiment through a combination of online mobilisation and offline messaging. 

This effort is not occurring in a vacuum. The role of Telegram groups such as Verona per la Libertà (supported by elected political figures) demonstrates how digital disinformation ecosystems intersect with formal political structures. These actors serve as key amplifiers of Kremlin narratives, bridging grassroots mobilisation with institutional legitimacy. 

 On the basis of these findings, ISD would recommend:  

• Expand fact-checking efforts across the Italian media ecosystem to systematically debunk misleading or false claims propagated by pro-Kremlin sources. Public-facing “evergreen” explainers should also be published in Italian to dismantle persistent disinformation narratives about Ukraine, NATO and EU institutions.
• Invest in media literacy programming to reduce public susceptibility to mis- and disinformation. National awareness campaigns should be launched to help individuals spot, verify and challenge mis- and disinformation. Partnerships with schools and universities can embed media literacy into curricula, equipping younger generations with the critical tools to assess online content. While a “whole-of-society” approach is crucial, it must be backed by sustained investment to build long-term democratic resilience. 
• Strengthen enforcement and regulation of social media platforms. Platforms must be held accountable for failing to enforce their own terms of service, particularly when state-affiliated accounts are allowed to masquerade as independent outlets. These accounts should be clearly labelled as state-linked to prevent manipulation through false credibility. Additionally, alternative platforms such as Telegram, which often serve as havens for unmoderated pro-Kremlin content, must be brought under the remit of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) to close current regulatory gaps exploited by malign actors. 
• Ensure effective, swift, and transparent enforcement of existing EU sanctions and the Digital Services Act. This includes ensuring that banned Russian state media outlets and sanctioned individuals cannot continue to operate through proxy networks, cultural events or alternative platforms.
• Increase the ambition of the Democracy Shield, potentially through the creation of a dedicated Democracy Shield Fund, to enhance coordinated responses to information manipulation and bolster democratic infrastructure. 
• Strengthen coordination between the Democracy Shield, Resilience Councils and the EU Preparedness Plan to ensure a coherent and integrated response to disinformation threats across the Union. 
• Update the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) to address the realities of the digital media landscape, including the influence of digital-native outlets, social media influencers, and the platform-driven amplification of malign content. 
• Engage and incentivise internet service providers (ISPs) to more comprehensively enforce EU restrictions on Russian state media, ensuring that banned content cannot be easily accessed via loopholes or mirror sites. 
• Implement stricter vetting for foreign investment in critical sectors such as telecommunications and energy to safeguard Europe’s critical infrastructure from potential cyber and influence threats. 

A consistent and coordinated approach to enforcement is essential to maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s sanctions regime. Strengthening implementation efforts across member states will be critical to closing loopholes and limiting opportunities for sanctioned entities and individuals to continue their activities. Without such collaboration, Italy risks continuing to serve as a permissive environment for sanctioned actors and their disinformation operations. This threatens potentially destabilising effects on democratic discourse and public trust.

The sole responsibility for any content supported by the European Media and Information Fund lies with the author(s) and it may not necessarily reflect the positions of the EMIF and the Fund Partners, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the European University Institute.