Introduction

As many on the far left^[1] self-identify as anti-racist, far-left antisemitism^[2] may sound like a contradiction in terms. Indeed, the antisemitism we most commonly see on the far left is different to what we find on the far right or in Islamist extremist contexts; it is rarely explicitly hateful, dehumanising or violent. At the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, much of our analysis of antisemitism online has therefore focussed on its more extreme manifestations.

However, while the most vicious antisemitic rhetoric and mobilisation tends to come from far right and Islamist extremists, far-left antisemitism nonetheless has a significant and pernicious impact on Jewish communities, stoking an increase in harassment, abuse and threats against Jews. 21% of the perpetrators of antisemitic harassment were described as “left-wing” by recipients of such abuse, according to a 2018 survey by the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency among Jews in 12 European countries. Far-left antisemitism also contributes to making  Jewish people feel unsafe in their own countries: at the peak of the antisemitism crisis in the UK Labour party in 2019, 42% of British Jews said they would “seriously consider” leaving the country if the Labour leader at that time, Jeremy Corbyn, became Prime Minister. It is clearly vital to understand, expose and challenge antisemitism wherever it resides across the political spectrum.

Antisemitism on the left has a long history, starting from the ambivalent stances among Enlightenment thinkers toward Jewish emancipation and antisemitic sentiments expressed by some left-wing philosophers during the nineteenth century.^[3] In the 20th century, antisemitic incidents in the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence included the Slánský Trial^[4] or the Doctor’s Plot^[5] in the early 1950’s, but the persecution and institutional discrimination against Jews and simultaneously anti-Zionist as well as antisemitic propaganda remained a feature of the Soviet Union until its demise (the following section will discuss the differences and overlaps between anti-Zionism and antisemitism in greater detail).^[6] In Germany, far left terrorist groups in the 1960’s and 1970’s carried out antisemitic violence,^[7] plotted to bomb a synagogue^[8] and celebrated terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians.^[9]

While today such antisemitic violence from the far left is relatively rare, antisemitic incidents and rhetoric are still present in the broader political far left. Most recently, in the United Kingdom, the leadership of the Labour Party by Jeremy Corbyn between 2015 and 2019 was plagued by controversies around antisemitic incidents. These dynamics were also present online: an analysis by this author found that between 2015 and 2019, 56% of all comment sections about Jews and Israel on public Facebook pages supportive of the Labour Party contained at least one, and in the majority of cases more than one, antisemitic comment, and that in 59% of cases these comments went unchallenged.^[10] In 2019, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investigated Labour and found the party responsible for unlawful acts of harassment and discrimination over antisemitism within the party, and evidence of (unlawful) political interference in the handling of antisemitism complaints.

Given this long history of far-left antisemitism, it is important to understand where it comes from and how it manifests. This article therefore outlines four key areas in which far left politics may be vulnerable to antisemitism:

• Israel, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism
• Conspiracy Mentality
• Intersectionality and Antisemitism
• Selective Solidarity and Conditional Antiracism

It is important to highlight that none of the issues that will be discussed below inherently shape or involve all those involved in far-left activism; rather these are trends that are common on the contemporary far left, and that provide an opening to antisemitism without inevitably leading to it.

Israel, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism

Surveys conducted by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research in the UK show that there is a correlation between respondents who are critical of Israel and those who agree with antisemitic statements.^[11] Crucially, these surveys also show that it is possible to be highly critical of Israeli behaviour without agreeing to any antisemitic statement. Similarly, the Community Security Trust (CST) and organisations set up in other countries to record antisemitic incidents have reported spikes in antisemitic hate crime whenever there is an escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Clearly, there is a complex interplay between events in the Middle East and antisemitism abroad.

Israel has become perceived by many on the far left as an outpost of Western colonialism and imperialism. While not all critics of Israel and Zionism are far-left, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist positions have become a marker of political identity for the “anti-imperialist”^[12] far left.^[13] Of course, criticising the Israeli government’s behaviour and policies or highlighting the historical and ongoing impact Zionism has had on Palestinians is not inherently antisemitic, especially when based on a framework of human rights and international law. However, many observers have argued that hostility towards Israel and Zionism can be expressed in ways that are antisemitic. This presents the primary opening for contemporary far-left antisemitism.^[14]

For example, the Working Definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) acknowledges that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic” but provides a series of examples of when targeting may become antisemitic.^[15] According to the IHRA definition it could be antisemitic to accuse Israel “of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust”, reference classic antisemitic tropes such as the blood libel conspiracy myth to describe Israel or blame Jews collectively for the actions of Israel. For instance, an independent investigation into antisemitism within the UK National Union of Students found that the NUS had failed to prevent antisemitic harassment and bullying that employed blood libel tropes as well as Rothschild conspiracy theories and held Jewish students responsible for actions of the Israeli state.

While the IHRA definition has been adopted or endorsed by many Jewish civil society organisations, 41 national governments and European institutions such as the European Parliament, Commission and Council, it has also been widely criticised. Human rights organisations and free speech activists have argued that IHRA stifles freedom of expression by conflating (some) criticism of Zionism and Israel with antisemitism.

These disagreements are often fierce, even though there is much common ground between supporters and opponents of the IHRA definition. Both believe that criticism of Israeli policies and behaviour is not in principle antisemitic, and both agree that criticism of Israel can be expressed in antisemitic ways or be motivated by antisemitic views. The disagreements revolve around where to draw the line between legitimate criticism of Israel and attacks on Israel that single it out because it is a Jewish state. The most contentious debates regard the questions of whether double standards against Israel (the idea that Israel is singled out and judged more harshly than other countries that have similar or worse human rights records),^[16] opposition to Israel’s existence as a Jewish state, or analogies to Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa are antisemitic.^[17]

The IHRA definition takes a more expansive view of antisemitism on these questions, arguing that double standards, Nazi analogies and opposition to Jewish self-determination may constitute antisemitism. By drawing these lines, the IHRA definition’s authors seek to challenge those who minimise the Holocaust, who treat Israel differently than other countries because it is Jewish or who seek to delegitimise it while not questioning the existence and legitimacy of other nation states. Lastly, the IHRA definition aims to prevent discrimination against Jews due to their views on Israel and Zionism. As opposition to Israel and Zionism has become a central focus for the far left, the debates around definitions of antisemitism and the boundaries between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism are of particular relevance for the far left.

Some of the more influential competing definitions include the Jerusalem Declaration of Antisemitism (JDA) and the Nexus Document. These definitions diverge from or seek to clarify perceived ambiguities within the examples provided by the IHRA. Its authors seem particularly concerned about protecting the freedom of expression of those who advocate for the human rights of Palestinians as well as their national and political right to self-determination and preserve their ability highlight and commemorate historical injustice without being identified as antisemitic.

Regarding alleged double standards against Israel, the JDA argues that “political speech does not have to be measured, proportional, tempered, or reasonable to be protected” under human rights law and that not every “unreasonable” criticism of Israel is automatically antisemitic, while the Nexus Document similarly makes the case that disproportionate focus on Israel could be motivated by factors other than antisemitism. While neither the JDA nor the Nexus Document explicitly mention Nazi analogies, one could interpret them to imply that even though Nazi analogies may be inaccurate, they are not automatically antisemitic. Proponents of the IHRA’s definition however claim that such analogies objectively diminish the scale and nature of the Nazi genocide, independent of whether this is intended or if it is a feature of a wider political discourse that over-relies on flawed analogies to Nazi crimes.

Similarly, JDA and Nexus take more lenient stances on anti-Zionism, arguing that it may be motivated by opposition to all forms of nationalism or by the dispossession experienced by Palestinians due to the creation of Israel. Relatedly, the JDA argues that support for a binational state with full equality of all citizens is not antisemitic, even though this would imply the end of Israel as a Jewish state. One prominent author who has recently proposed such an arrangement is Peter Beinart, who has argued that the essence of Zionism is not a Jewish state but a Jewish home, and that instead of further pursuing a two-state solution it has become necessary to “embrace the goal of equal rights for Jews and Palestinians” in one state.

The IHRA definition on the other hand lists “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g. by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour” as a form of antisemitism. This has sometimes been interpreted to mean that according to the IHRA it could be antisemitic to call Israeli policies racist, or to argue that the formation of Israel led to the displacement of Palestinians. However, the specific wording emphasises that it would be antisemitic to deny the Jewish people their right to self-determination, and hence refers to “a state of Israel” rather than “the state of Israel.” Rather than stigmatising factual criticism regarding Israeli policies or its history, the aim is to prevent Jewish people from being treated differently than every other people whose right to self-determination should (in principle) be respected. Nevertheless, the JDA and Nexus sought to clarify this ambiguity by stating that to “point out systematic racial discrimination” or “to compare Israel with other historical cases, including settler-colonialism or apartheid” is not intrinsically antisemitic. From this point of view, the assessment of human rights organisations like B’Tselem, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that Israel is committing Apartheid^[18] would not be considered antisemitic, as all these organisations explicitly state that they believe this to be an evidence-based description of Israeli policies rather than of the inherent nature of Zionism. As the IHRA definition does not directly refer to the Apartheid charge, supporters of the definitions may diverge in their assessment of whether it is synonymous with calling “a state of Israel a racist endeavour.”

Lastly, the JDA addresses the debate around the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. BDS is an international campaign that calls for the boycott of Israeli goods, divestment from companies involved in the occupation of Arab territories, and sanctions to force the Israeli government to comply with international law and respect the rights of Palestinians, including the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Inspired by the boycott campaign against Apartheid South Africa, BDS has attracted many supporters, especially on the far left, but has also caused controversy. Critics have claimed that BDS is antisemitic as it singles out and delegitimises Israel’s existence rather than merely opposing its policies and behaviour. The JDA however argues that boycotts are “commonplace, non-violent forms of political protest against states” and not inherently antisemitic. While the IHRA definition does not specifically mention BDS, the definition was cited in the 2019 German Bundestag’s resolution that condemned the movement as antisemitic. The debate around BDS is complex: many of its core demands are clearly not antisemitic, and since the movement lacks a central leadership that would issue official stances, it is difficult to make blanket statements about the movement as a whole. Nevertheless, accusations that BDS supporters employ antisemitic rhetoric about malign Jewish influence and reported incidents of harassment or intimidation of Jewish students on campus should be taken seriously.

Conspiracy Mentality

Antisemitism is a form of racism that is often centred around conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain a phenomenon by invoking a sinister plot orchestrated by powerful actors. Where conspiracy theories identify Jewish individuals or collectives as the powerful conspirators, they are likely antisemitic as they play on tropes that have been used to marginalise and justify persecution of Jews. As the IHRA definition states, “the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions” is a key form of antisemitism.

The frequent identification of Jews as the puppet-masters pulling the strings behind the conspiracy does not happen by accident. Instead, antisemitic conspiracy theories draw on age-old tropes about Jewish moneylenders, blood libel accusations and the Rothschilds, among others. These tropes were perhaps most famously summarised in the 19th century forgery, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, which claims to document a meeting by an international Jewish conspiracy that is controlling world politics.

As supporters of conspiracy theories usually see themselves in direct opposition to the status quo and the powerful, these theories are attractive for some on the far left who similarly seek to challenge systemic social and economic inequality. According to large-scale surveys, conspiracy mentality (the tendency to explain significant events as the result of a plot by clandestine and powerful actors)^[19] is common on the far left (though less common than on the far right). As antisemitism is often centred around the idea that there is a global Jewish conspiracy, it should not be surprising that studies have found that antisemitic attitudes are correlated to conspiracy mentality, especially when respondents believe Jewish people to be powerful and/ or privileged.

As mentioned above, antisemitic tropes around powerful and wealthy Jewish people are culturally deeply engrained, meaning that individuals may not always be consciously aware of them. This means that it is possible for people on the far left, who may identify themselves as anti-racist, to nevertheless reproduce ways of talking about e.g. the banking system, the media or the elites that are shaped by the cultural legacy of antisemitic conspiracy theories while believing themselves to be speaking truth to power rather than attacking a minority community.

According to the Nexus Document, conspiracy theories that refer to Israel may be antisemitic when they baselessly attribute “injustices around the world on a hidden Jewish conspiracy or of being the maligning hand of Israel or Zionism.” Examples for this include a 2012 interview for the Iranian state broadcaster Press TV in which former UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn (without evidence) asserted that he “suspected the hand of Israel” behind a Salafi-jihadist terrorist attack in Egypt, or actress Maxine Peake claiming in 2020 that the death of George Floyd could be attributed to “seminars taught by Israeli secret services.”^[20] According to a research report, Press TV’s “Palestine Declassified” program, which primarily addresses a left-wing audience, also regularly spreads conspiracy theories about Zionists controlling world events, the media and entertainment industry, and grooming children into Zionism.^[21] According to the report, this includes claims that Zionists and the US intelligence services colluded to instigate anti-regime protests in Iran following the murder of Mahsa Amini.

Other antisemitic conspiracy theories on the far left may be entirely unrelated to Israel and Zionism. For example, in 2016, the vice chair of the pro-Labour activist group Momentum, Jackie Walker, alleged that Jews were the “chief financiers of the sugar and slave trade.”^[22]