A spectrum of threats: Islamist extremism online in Germany post-October 7

28 November 2024

Special thanks to Leonie Oehmig for her research support for this article.

This Dispatch examines the risks presented to Germany by the contemporary online landscape of Islamist extremism. It highlights the increased prevalence of illegal terrorist content online, the ease of accessibility of such content to minors and the role of extremist online subcultures. It also provides a qualitative analysis of key propaganda narratives among Islamist extremists that do not promote violence, whose messaging has found a more receptive audience over the past year. The Dispatch concludes with a series of recommendations on how to counter illegal as well as legal but harmful content in a manner which respects Germany’s commitment to liberal democracy and human rights.

Increasing prevalence of illegal terrorist content on social media platforms

Over the past 12 months, Germany has suffered two deadly Islamist extremist attacks (Mannheim and Solingen)[i] and a steady stream of foiled Islamist extremist plots. In many of these cases, social media appears to have played a significant role in the radicalisation process or the attack planning. This correlates with ISD research showing that terrorist content is again more easily available to social media users, including young people, mirroring the mid-2010s when so-called Islamic State (IS) was able to operate relatively freely on mainstream social media platforms.

While comprehensive research reports on the prevalence of German-language illegal terrorist content are lacking, independent analysts have corroborated ISD’s research, arguing that German IS content is widely available on platforms such as TikTok. One probable cause is increasingly inconsistent moderation, as platforms roll back their investment in trust and safety, particularly in languages outside English.

Accessibility of content to minors

In several cases over the past year, minors were arrested in connection to terrorist offences, highlighting an increasing concern for authorities[ii]. As a generation whose political views and identity have been defined online, it is unsurprising that social media, platforms and messaging apps played a crucial role in the lead up to and during all of their attack plots.

Their radicalisation appears to have been further facilitated by the ease with which minors can access graphic and even terrorist content on major online platforms. Despite TikTok’s claim to have more “robust policies” on kids safety and terrorist content, research by ISD found more than 300 posts or videos portraying extremely graphic, distressing or violent imagery around the Israel-Hamas conflict which could be accessed by users as young as 13 on Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat. Our research also found that minors can easily access Islamist terrorist content using basic English search terms referencing well-known IS-associated individuals.

Islamist extremist online subcultures

Beyond content with explicit affiliation to proscribed terrorist organisations, extremist online subcultures have contributed to radicalisation processes. For years, this trend was primarily associated with extreme-right terrorism through imageboards such as 4chan and 8kun, as well as accelerationist currents such as the Terrorgram network. However, younger Islamist extremists are likewise increasingly shaped by online subcultures that combine extremist ideologies with references to internet, gaming and youth culture, memes, and transgressive humour.

These trends are also increasingly reflected in the intersection between online extremist activity and offline violence. Following the stabbing of a Jewish man perpetrated by a 15-year-old in Zürich in March 2024, it was revealed the attacker had published a pledge of loyalty to IS. His online footprint also showed clear signs of influence from the Islamist extremist online subcultures first highlighted in ISD’s 2021 research on the Islamogram network (which merges Salafi-jihadist ideas with alt-right memes and gaming subcultures).

Non-violent Islamist extremists finding a receptive audience

In August 2024, US pop star Taylor Swift cancelled a series of concerts in Vienna after authorities arrested three teenagers in connection to an alleged plot to “kill as many people as possible” at the events. The three suspects were between 15 and 19 years old and reportedly “radicalised themselves on the internet”. German-language outlets have cited unnamed intelligence sources indicating that at least one suspect was radicalised in part by content from German Salafi preacher Abdul Baraa. Channels belonging to Baraa and other German Islamist extremist preachers across TikTok, YouTube, Spotify and Instagram have tens of thousands of followers. The Vienna case highlights how linguistic overlaps across the German-speaking region (primarily consisting of Austria, Germany and Switzerland) allow Islamist extremists to engage across borders, especially through online influencers.

Previous ISD research has highlighted that much contemporary Salafi online content and Islamist extremist propaganda comes from groups and individuals such as Baraa who do not directly incite their followers to commit acts of violence. Nevertheless, their ideology may still serve as a gateway to radicalisation. The rigid, black-and-white, dogmatic and sectarian views promoted by non-violent Islamist extremists also present a broader set of potential harms including:

Social polarisation;
The undermining of integration and belief in democracy;
The proliferation of conspiracy theories;
The promotion of discriminatory and reactionary views around gender, sexuality, religion and belief.

For example, the Hizb ut-Tahrir-inspired group Muslim Interaktiv held a protest in Hamburg in April 2024 to challenge allegedly biased media reporting against Muslims and around the Israel-Hamas conflict. Protestors called for a “Caliphate” which they believe could militarily intervene to protect Muslims from oppression. Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in Germany in 2003 as an “extremist group”; the UK banned it as a “terrorist group” in 2024 although the group is expected to legally challenge this. However, its ideology is widely disseminated by German offshoots such as Muslim Interaktiv that are highly active on social media.

Muslim Interaktiv’s social media output attempts to appeal to audiences beyond its core constituency, exploiting common foreign policy grievances among German Muslims (especially by highlighting perceived German hypocrisy on these issues). Examples include the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Xinjiang and Myanmar, but also Germany’s close relations to authoritarian rulers in Muslim-majority countries. Muslim Interaktiv seeks to undermine the credibility of liberal values and to present Germany’s democratic institutions as hollow and biased against Muslims.

Limiting the impact of Islamist extremist online content

Public debate around how to tackle Islamist extremism over the past year has often primarily focused on adopting tougher stances on migration. Many of the proposals also risk undermining freedom of expression, assembly and association: for example, following the Muslim Interaktiv protest, several politicians and commentators called for measures including the banning of the group even though no laws seem to have been broken during the protest.

There were also calls for the revocation of German citizenship for dual citizens involved with the group and the deportation of foreign citizens (it is unclear how many people without German citizenship are involved with Muslim Interaktiv). This comes in the context of increasingly illiberal measures to curtail pro-Palestine activism, including local authorities banningprotests, the conflation of pro-Palestinian political symbols with those of Hamas, travel bans on those involved with protests, and the cancellation and defunding of events.

This underlines the urgent need for accurate and precise language when addressing the challenges from Islamist extremism. ^[iii] Islamist extremists advocate for an exclusionary and totalitarian Islamic state, using both violent and non-violent means to subjugate religious outgroups. This must not be conflated with Islam as a religion, different forms of (Islam-inspired) social conservatism or advocacy for Palestinian self-determination. Aligning definitions with academic standards will enhance understanding and facilitate effective communication across sectors.

Beyond semantics, it is also important that German efforts to combat the appeal of Islamist extremism reinforce the country’s commitment to liberal democracy and human rights. The following section provides a series of proportionate and targeted recommendations for measures to reduce the availability of illegal content and the impact of legal but harmful material.

Firstly, it is crucial to enforce the legal obligations on platforms under the Digital Services Act (DSA) to consistently remove illegal terrorist content. Federal and state governments should increase funding for independent research to close the current knowledge gap regarding the prevalence of German-language illegal Islamist terrorist content. The obligations to algorithmic transparency under the DSA also need to be enforced. These include the role of algorithms in suggesting search terms for Islamist extremist groups and ideologies, as well as the amplification of clearly illegal content. Greater data access for researchers, as mandated under the DSA, will help legislators, independent auditors and the public to understand the prevalence of illegal extremist content available online.

Secondly, it is vital to support more preventative measures to combat legal but harmful Islamist extremist content. Policies to curb the reach and influence of borderline content are essential to address the ideological milieu in which violent extremism sits. At the same time, it is essential to balance public safety with the right to freedom of expression. Platforms should evaluate whether borderline content could be de-amplified rather than removed, as part of their obligations under the DSA to assess the risks from the spread of legal but harmful content on their platforms.

Lastly, authorities should explore a substantial program to foster Muslim life in Germany (equivalent to similar programs around combatting antisemitism and fostering Jewish life). This could undermine the appeal of Islamist extremist groups, who instrumentalise and exploit experiences of anti-Muslim incidents, discourse and structural discrimination in Germany in their propaganda. Such a program would include long-term research on anti-Muslim attitudes and incidents, potentially by reviving the anti-Muslim racism commission (disbanded in 2023). It could also involve the promotion of initiatives to counter exclusion and discrimination against Muslims. As part of such a programme, the Federal Government should enhance and consolidate Germany’s strategic communication capabilities to emphasise the diversity of Muslim life in Germany, in line with existing structures for countering information manipulation and disinformation. Research suggests that strategic communications campaigns rooted in promoting an open, tolerant, pluralistic and democratic society, rather than takedowns of extremist influencers who are adept at navigating thresholds for illegal speech or attempts to directly address their arguments, could effectively undermine the appeal of Islamist extremist propagandists.

Conclusion

In most Islamist extremist attacks and plots in Germany since October 7, digital communication and social media content played a key role in the lead-up. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the platforms, content, networks and narratives of Islamist extremists online. This Dispatch analysed a range of risks posed by contemporary Islamist extremist content and networks online and made a series of recommendations on how to counter illegal as well as legal but harmful Islamist extremist content affecting Germany.

As Islamist extremists attempt to hijack broader domestic and foreign policy grievances, efforts to undermine Islamist extremists’ influence should avoid alienating Muslim communities. They should also emphasise human rights-based approaches to countering Islamist extremism both domestically and internationally, centred around freedom of religion, thought, conscience and speech.

In an increasingly interconnected world, violent conflict in one part affects domestic politics in another. In turn, when democratic governments fail to protect individual rights at home or to call out crimes against humanity abroad, they weaken the entire rights-based order. This, ultimately, undermines their own counter-extremism efforts.

[i] In August 2024, a Syrian man fatally stabbed three people at a “festival of diversity”^[i] in Solingen, celebrating the 650th anniversary of the city’s founding. IS later took credit for the attack and published a video allegedly showing the attacker pledging allegiance to the group. In May 2024, an Afghan man attacked and injured the prominent anti-Islam activist Michal Stürzenberger with a knife and killed the police officer Rouven Laur who had intervened to protect Stürzenberger.

[ii] Between 2001 and 2022, around one in five people involved in Islamist attacks and plots in Germany was under 18. The involvement of minors has become more common since 2016. https://ifsh.de/file/publication/Research_Report/011/Research_Report_011_DE_V4_web.pdf

[iii] Several Ministers and high-profile politicians have used the term “Islamist” as shorthand for pro-Palestinian, which glosses over the diversity of ideological backgrounds within the Palestine solidarity movement.