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Digital Dispatches

July 24, 2025

ISD UK

Targeted Threats, Hate and Abuse

‘No Innocents’: The collective blame of Palestinians online

Guy Fiennes, Moustafa Ayad and Jacob Guhl

23 July 2025

This Dispatch analyses the digital spread of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric which holds Palestinians collectively responsible for the actions of Hamas and claims there is no distinction between civilians and combatants. Although it predates the 7 October attacks, it gained much greater traction in their wake. 

Based on analysis of Hebrew and English content with a focus on X (formerly Twitter) between October 2023 and 2024, we found content supporting the ‘no innocents’ narrative likely contravenes platform guidelines but is inconsistently moderated. The Dispatch also identifies key actors behind the discourse, examines sub-categories of the rhetoric, and discusses significant differences in the volume of supportive and critical posts about ‘no innocents’ rhetoric between English and Hebrew. 

Note on terminology: it is important to distinguish between 1) posts supportive of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric and 2) posts discussing ‘no innocents’ rhetoric which ISD researchers gathered using keywords. The latter includes posts supportive of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric but also critical posts or those describing it in a neutral manner. This metric therefore indicates the level of attention ‘no innocents’ rhetoric receives, not the level of support for it. For clarity we have split posts into four categories: 

  • Content critical of ‘no innocents’ narratives,  
  • Content that is supportive,
  • Content that is descriptive (i.e. does not clearly support or criticise the ‘no innocents’ narrative)  
  • Content that is irrelevant (i.e. false positives not related to the Israel-Hamas conflict)

Key findings and recommendations  

  • ISD found that between 7 October 2023 and 7 October 2024, there were more than 513,000 English-language posts by 261,000 unique authors with ‘no innocents’ rhetoric. Based on a sample of 1,200 posts, more than three quarters of posts (including high-traction examples) were critical of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric. Content was often made in response to statements from Israeli or pro-Israel politicians, commentators or TV interviews. English-language posts declined in the last months of our analysis. 
  • 57,800 Hebrew-language posts by 17,630 unique authors were found to have discussed ‘no innocents’ rhetoric (including critical and descriptive posts). Out of 1,200 Hebrew-language posts (including high-traction examples), almost 70 percent were supportive of the rhetoric while only a fifth directly criticised it. There was a spike in Hebrew posts in October at the beginning of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. 
  • ISD analysis found that public figures contributed disproportionately to dehumanising ‘no innocents’ discourse, particularly in Hebrew. Of the top ten most reshared posts in the Hebrew-language dataset, three came from high-profile politicians supportive of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric, including a sitting member of the Knesset (MK).  
  • Posts critical of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric came from a broad variety of political and ideological backgrounds. While many framed their concerns around human rights and a desire to protect civilians, others in the English dataset promoted antisemitic or dehumanising narratives themselves. 
  • Although ‘no innocents’ rhetoric appears to clearly violate X’s policies including around hateful conduct and violent speech, the platform does not appear to consistently take action against this content. X should consistently enforce its policies against content that could lead to direct incitement of violence against civilians, especially children.  

Background 

Since Hamas’ attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023, many statements by Israeli and pro-Israel voices have laid responsibility for terrorist activity onto every resident of Gaza1. Such statements reflect broader public opinion in Israel: according to a March 2024 survey, almost one-fifth of Israelis believe the country does too much to protect Palestinian civilians “since there are no ‘non-combatants’ in the Gaza strip.” In June 2024, the official X account of the Israeli government used ads to promote a post that featured ‘no innocents’ rhetoric.  

There is credible evidence from international investigations and human rights organisations, including footage of the attack and multiple survivor accounts, that some2 civilians from Gaza did cross the perimeter fence to engage in violence and looting during the October 7 attacks while others were subsequently involved in hostage-holding3 .

However, arguing that there are no innocent civilians in any population justifies indiscriminate violence and collective punishment, and makes it easier to dismiss suffering, war crimes and extremist policies, including the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.  

Such generalisations also ignore the diversity of thought among Palestinians, including those who protested against Hamas as recently as May 2025 despite the significant risks in doing so. Finally, demonising all Palestinians fosters cycles of mutual hatred, reinforces an “us-versus-them” worldview and is likely to prolong conflict. 

This dangerous and dehumanising rhetoric has proliferated against the backdrop of a conflict with one of the highest death rates in the 21st century. More than 57,000 Palestinians 4 have been killed since 7 October 2023, according to Gaza’s (Hamas-run) authorities. Others suggest this may be a conservative estimate. After a two-month ceasefire starting in mid-January, Israel renewed the blockade of essential supplies entering Gaza and resumed its military offensive in March, exacerbating concerns about the humanitarian situation and civilian lives.   

Methodology 

ISD analysts collected all Hebrew- and English-language posts on X between 7 October 2023 and 7 October 2024 with social media monitoring tool Brandwatch which included keywords related to the ‘no innocents’ rhetoric (regardless of sentiment). These keywords were selected based on examples of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric manually selected by ISD analysts who coded the 100 most reshared posts in both Hebrew and English each month (1,200 posts for each language) as: 

  • Supportive (used this language affirmatively)  
  • Descriptive (described this rhetoric in a neutral manner)  
  • Irrelevant
  • Critical (criticised this discourse)

 Due to the greater complexity of Hebrew-language posts, we established two additional sub-themes:  

  • Straightforward ‘no innocents’ rhetoric which held all or most Gazans collectively responsible for the actions of Hamas 
  • Posts which sought to extend guilt to a broader range of Gazans and Palestinians – for example, civilians alleged to support Hamas or minors who might grow into terrorists

7 October spikes ‘no innocents’ rhetoric  

‘No innocents’ rhetoric predated 7 October: on 13 September 2023, local Israeli politician Eliyahu Libman called for the West Bank town of Huwara to be razed and its residents displaced, claiming that most were “not innocent”5. During the 2018 Gaza protests then-Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman had already stated that “There are no innocents in Gaza” and “everyone is affiliated with Hamas”. However, this rhetoric gained far stronger traction after Hamas’ attacks (see figure 1). 

 

Figure 1: Weekly breakdown of English (bottom) and Hebrew (top) language posts featuring ‘no innocents’ rhetoric on X between 7 October 2023 and 7 October 2024.

There were three peaks in Hebrew-language posts discussing ‘no innocents’ discourse on X: 

  • The first was on the week of 23 October 2023, when Israel launched its ground invasion of Gaza following intense airstrikes followed by a second on the week of 27 November 2023 at the end of a four-day truce which was briefly extended.  
    • During both peaks, the share of high-traction posts supportive of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric likewise rose, reaching 90 percent during the week of 23 October and 75 percent during the week of 27 November compared to 68 percent overall.6 This indicates that Hebrew-language dehumanising discourse spiked directly before/ following Israeli military escalations, encouraging and pre-emptively justifying civilian casualties.  
  • The third peak followed the Israeli operation around Nuseirat Camp on 8 June which rescued four hostages and killed at least 274 Palestinians. Israeli journalist Almog Boker argued that all of those killed in the operation were “fully involved” because they did not inform the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) of the hostages’ location.  

When examining English-language posts, we found that posts discussing ‘no innocents’ rhetoric peaked during the first month of the Israel-Hamas war, mostly criticising it. Generally, these posts increased in response to supportive statements about ‘no innocents’ rhetoric by Israeli or pro-Israel politicians, commentators or TV interviews. This included statements by Israeli President Isaac Herzog,7 former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, former Deputy Prime Minister Avigdor Lieberman, MK Merav Ben-Ari and Mia Schem, a hostage freed during the temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in late November 2023. There was another peak in English posts on 10 June, following the Israeli rescue operation around Nuseirat Camp.  

Types of ‘no innocents’ narratives 

Among posts supportive of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric in the dataset collected, analysts found three main narratives:  

  • “There is no such thing as uninvolved”: Palestinians in Gaza are not innocent because they all celebrated, supported or were involved in the 7 October attacks.  
  • “Democratic liability”: The idea that Palestinians in Gaza are not innocent because they democratically elected Hamas.   
  • “Intrinsic guilt”: The idea that Palestinians in Gaza are not innocent because they are intrinsically inclined towards terrorism and present a threat to Israel.  

“There is no such thing as uninvolved”  

One of the most prominent types of ‘no innocents’ rhetoric in the dataset centered on the idea of the mass involvement of Palestinians in the terrorist attacks on 7 October as alleged by Israeli public figures. On 11 November 2023, journalist Ishay Friedman claimed on X that “an absolute majority” of Gazans had information about Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members. On 16 October 2023, MK Boaz Bismuth (Likud) argued on X that even “innocent citizens” of Gaza took part in “the systematic murder of Jews”, calling on Israelis not to be apologetic about the need to strike civilians.  

Democratic liability    

Another key narrative is that Palestinians are responsible for Hamas as they elected them in 2006.8  In a CNN interview on 18 November 2023, former Mossad official Rami Igra claimed that “all of the Gazans voted for Hamas” and “most of the population in the Gaza strip are Hamas.” In a post on X from 24 October 2023, US Senator Tom Cotton stated “anyone who claims to support the people of Gaza but not Hamas should remember that Gazans elected Hamas.” 

While Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, there have been no subsequent elections, meaning an overwhelming majority of Gazans have never been enfranchised: just under half of the population in Gaza are under 18 years old with three quarters under 359. One independent analyst estimated only eight percent of Gazans alive today voted for Hamas in 2006.  

Intrinsic guilt  

The third narrative argues that all Palestinians are responsible for terrorist activity, implying that they are intrinsically inclined towards terrorism and violence, mirroring common anti-Muslim tropes.  During a TV interview on 30 October 2023, independent Israeli researcher Eliyahu Yossian

In the media

ISD Contributors

Guy Fiennes
Research Associate

Moustafa Ayad
Research Chair in Global Islamism & Counter-Terrorism