Neo-Nazi accelerationists seek new digital refuge amid looming Telegram crackdown

4 October 2024

By: Steven Rai and Moustafa Ayad 

Background

Since the arrest of Telegram CEO and founder Pavel Durov and the subsequent indictment of leaders within the Terrorgram Collective, neo-Nazi accelerationists on Telegram have begun the process of migrating to a new decentralized, encrypted platform, which ISD is choosing not to name to avoid undue amplification. The platform was chosen for the fact that it provides enhanced privacy and assigns no unique identifiers, such as User IDs, to its users. The platform boasts that using it is like “having a different burner email or phone for each contact, and no hassle to manage them.”  

Beginning on September 16, an accelerationist neo-Nazi operational security group with more than 13,000 subscribers on Telegram began making the transition to the new platform and announced that “while it’s not as smooth as Telegram, it appears to be miles ahead with regard to privacy and security.” The group further stressed the new platform’s “ability to join chats anonymously, which further compartmentalizes identities.” The group is now approaching 1,000 subscribers on the new platform and is part of a wider network built by neo-Nazi accelerationists that consists of nearly 30 channels and group chats.  

The move to this new platform echoes similar online migrations by extremists across the ideological spectrum, including a failed migration by the Islamic State and its supporters and neo-Nazi accelerationists to TamTam. Whether the groups will be able to survive on the new platform and replace their Telegram assets remains an unanswered question. The groups that have migrated are already populating the platform with legacy material such as Terrorgram manuals and are actively recruiting propagandists, hackers, and graphic designers, among other desired personnel. While there is newfound enthusiasm over the migration, it remains unclear if the platform will become a central organizing hub.  

Neo-Nazi accelerationists panic and regroup

The migration to this platform appears to be part of a desperate campaign to salvage what remains of the Terrorgram Collective following the arrest of its leaders in early September and is in line with efforts among the broader neo-Nazi accelerationist community to ensure their survival in the wake of significant changes to Telegram’s privacy policies. While neo-Nazis initially seemed uncertain over the implications Durov’s arrest would have on their ability to operate online, the one-two punch of the Terrorgram arrests followed by the announcement that Telegram would provide certain identifying information to law enforcement crystallized their suspicion that the platform may no longer be a viable host for their online activities.   

Figure 1: A bot account identified in previous ISD research as being connected to the Terrorgram Collective urges viewers to join the new platform.

One Telegram channel which claims an affiliation with an outlet operated by former leaders of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a defunct neo-Nazi terrorist group, appears to be at the forefront of the migration to this new platform. The channel, which boasts more than 13,000 subscribers and specializes in the provision of operational security advice to individuals seeking to evade detection by investigators, is attempting to lure users to the platform with flashy artwork, promises of airtight anonymity and security, and grand plans for projects reminiscent of those undertaken by the Terrorgram Collective in its prime, such as their book-length publications. 

Of particular interest is a post made on September 23 that issued a call for “artists, propagandists, and people who enjoy presenting their art and knowledge in a high quality and informative way” to participate in a “community driven art project.” While the same post attempts to assure readers that the project will not advocate for violence, it also states that it wants to push the limits of the “militant Aryan spirit” and solicits artists who specialize in “militant fascist” and “Terrorwave” aesthetics. Such calls for contributors were a hallmark of the Terrorgram community and were often issued in advance of their major publications, such as the digital magazines they released in 2021 and 2022.  

Despite this apparent surge in activity, these efforts are among the dying gasps of an extremist community that has experienced a period of decline since late 2022 and which was delivered a catastrophic blow in early September with the arrests of two prominent figureheads. The extent to which the migration to this new platform will be successful is questionable and given that the Terrorgram Collective has not produced a major work since October 2022, their ability to effectively organize a significant project during this period of online instability is unclear. 

Migration animates a flurry of activity

Much of the activity on the platform has revolved around resurrecting legacy documents and artwork from neo-Nazi accelerationists such as the Terrorgram Collective and other groups. However, there have also been repeated calls for political violence within the channels assessed by ISD. For example, during a 24-hour period on September 25, analysts observed three instances of users calling for the assassination of Vice President Kamala Harris, and one instance calling for the assassination of former President Donald Trump. Similarly, numerous users called for a race war that would hasten the fall of society, allow them to take the US by force, and institute their desired system of white supremacy.  

Neo-Nazi groups such as The Base, which has similarly called for a race war in the US, have a dedicated channel set up for recruitment and have been pushing propaganda to audiences on the platform. It is one of several more militant neo-Nazi accelerationist groups that are now enlisting the new platform to resurrect their recruitment and propaganda efforts. Groups that specialize in white supremacist memes have also taken to the platform, suggesting that it may gain traction beyond communities that are explicitly accelerationist. One such group with more than 6,000 subscribers on Telegram has been a key node connecting users that made the migration to the new platform.  

One tactical group with a previous presence on Telegram has been sharing instructional material prepared by a large swath of the extremist spectrum, including al-Qaeda training manuals, Hamas rocket development guides, neo-Nazi accelerationist handbooks from the Terrorgram Collective, and militant anarchist literature. The goal behind this channel is to inspire members to target infrastructure as well as prepare for an “inevitable race war.” In discussion groups, users have not only called for high-level political assassinations, but also the targeting of infrastructure as well as the need for training. In one chat, users created an automated system to deliver manuals within the group on how to build weapons, improvised landmines, and bombs from a list of 227 pdfs.  

In chats, users also discussed infiltrating political parties to get access to “information” and ultimately mainstream their extremist ideologies, focusing on both the Democrats and the Republicans as well as “alphabet agencies” such as the FBI and CIA. Such calls have long been a tactic of accelerationist communities, who seek to infiltrate political parties as a means to hastening the downfall of the government. While this type of discourse was once commonplace on Telegram, much of the chatter has toned down following the arrest of Durov. 

Assessing the appeal and efficacy of the new platform among extremists

The rapid migration of extremists from one platform to another is not a new phenomenon, and the latest shift harkens back to the Terrorgram Collective’s failed transition to TamTam Messenger in late 2022. However, to better understand and strategically disrupt these online communities, it is necessary to examine the attributes that are attracting these actors to certain platforms in the first place. Additionally, it is imperative that practitioners and policymakers understand the factors that ultimately contribute to whether such relocations will be successful and lead to an enduring presence.    

While neo-Nazis have discussed numerous alternatives to Telegram, they have homed in on one platform in particular due to its unique security features that they believe will allow them to operate unfettered. In addition to enabling end-to-end encryption on messages by default, the platform also allows users to create a profile without providing any identifying information. Most notably, the platform uses a unique system that circumvents the need to create User IDs for each profile, which is a critical element of most social media platforms that allows investigators, hostile actors, and others to track users. Finally, the platform allows users to activate an “incognito profile” when joining groups, which assigns them a random system-generated username that can thwart surveillance.  

While these features might be appealing to terrorists and extremists seeking to establish an online presence, security is not the only factor that bears on their ability to conduct and maintain a successful operation. In fact, such rigorous security measures often present crucial trade-offs—while neo-Nazi accelerationists may feel safer on the new platform, it is unclear whether it offers the ease-of-use, reach, and functionality necessary for their long-term survival and online influence.   

Figure 2: A neo-Nazi Telegram channel attempts to manage expectations about successfully transitioning to a new online platform.

There are several aspects of the new platform that will challenge the ability of neo-Nazi accelerationists to effectively reach the masses. Unlike Telegram, there is no global search function that scans public material. Instead, users must receive an invite link to join group chats and channels. This means that in order build an audience, extremists will still have to advertise invite links on Telegram or another platform. Additionally, administrators need to approve new users before they are added to the channel or group chat, and new joiners can only view material that was published within a certain number of posts. These features further limit the spread of propaganda and require significantly more upkeep and organizational acumen than is the case on Telegram.  

Conclusion

Managing the transition to a new platform that poses limitations to the spread of propaganda will be a delicate needle to thread for the neo-Nazi accelerationists who are seeking to revitalize their online operations and secure their long-term survival. However, the rapid growth of groups, channels, and members within the new platform shows the need for stakeholders to take the threat seriously and work in concert to address it.  

Fortunately, the new platform’s policies expressly prohibit illegal communications, and its operators reserve the right to mitigate the spread of this material. Given the distribution of content associated with entities that have been deemed illegal in the UK, Canada, and Europe, the platform has the legal and policy justification in place to disrupt it before extremists fully solidify their presence.