Recent acts of violence linked to subcultures of nihilistic violence have captured the discourse on youth radicalization. However, the broader trend of youth radicalization is not confined to these subcultures. Activity inspired by the Islamic State (IS) group persists, primarily driven by teenage actors. Despite sustained pressure in the Levant and a growing operational focus on Africa, the group also maintains the ability to radicalize and mobilize Americans (particularly younger ones).  

In 2025, IS supporters perpetrated two successful attacks in the US—the first in eight years—there were an additional five disrupted plots and six arrests for providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO). All bar one of the incidents involved perpetrators under the age of 20. These figures represent a similar volume of activity in the US compared to 2024 (eight plots disrupted and four individuals arrested for providing material support to a designated FTO). However, IS activity in 2024 marked a clear increase from 2023 and was similarly driven by teenaged actors.  

The consistent disruption of IS-linked plots in the US demonstrates an effective law enforcement framework. Yet, it also demonstrates how easily accessible propaganda and training material continues to inspire and enable attacks. 

Key findings 

• Teenagers (individuals 19-years-old and younger) remain the primary perpetrators of IS-inspired attacks and plots in the US. Six out of seven IS-inspired attack or plot in the US in 2025 involved at least one teenaged suspect. This continues a pattern seen in 2024, when six out of eight plots involved at least one teenaged suspect.  
• In the US, IS-linked attacks and plots employed established IS tactics alongside emerging technologies during the pre-attack surveillance phase. Explosive devices and firearms remained the most commonly used weapons. However, the majority of deaths and injuries in the 2025 New Year’s Day attack resulted from the use of a vehicle ramming attack (VRA), a commonly utilized tactic by Salafi-jihadists. The perpetrator conducted surveillance of the French Quarter in New Orleans with Meta glasses and wore them during the attack, but did not activate them. In the Detroit Arsenal attack plot (May 2025), the plotter allegedly used a drone to conduct surveillance as part of the plot. 
• IS supporters who provided material support expressed a desire to engage in future violence. In two of the six incidents where supporters provided material support, they attempted or are alleged to have attempted to join IS abroad to conduct militant activity. In the remaining four incidents, supporters are alleged to have provided funds, weapons and other supplies, and to have expressed a desire to carry out their own attacks either domestically or overseas. This suggests that providing logistical support may serve as a precursor to violence on the group’s behalf. 

Attacks and disrupted plots 

Age 

In 2025, IS-inspired attacks and disrupted plots in the US were primarily carried out by perpetrators and suspects who were teenagers, aged 13-19. Of the 11 actors allegedly involved across seven incidents, eight were teenagers (of which four were 17-years-old and younger) at the time of the attack or when they were arrested. In five of the incidents, teenagers were the lone actor. By contrast, in the Michigan Halloween plot, three of the five suspects were teenagers at the time of arrest.  

This follows a similar pattern to 2024 where six of eight incidents in the US (75%) involving at least one teenager. This is also in line with trends identified in Europe. Despite the volume of youth actors in the US attacks and plots, the only successful attack that resulted in deaths was conducted by a perpetrator over the age of 19 in New Orleans, Louisiana.  

Weapons and tactics 

A variety of weapons and tactics were used across the seven incidents of attacks and disrupted plots in 2025. The perpetrator behind the New Orleans New Year’s Day attack—the only fatal incident—used his vehicle as a weapon, deployed a firearm and attempted to deploy explosive devices. All 14 deaths, and 52 of the 57 injuries, resulted from the VRA, making it the deadliest attack in US history. The other attack in 2025, the Florence Township Attack, was carried out and featured a VRA, resulting in injuries to three law enforcement officers.  

Vehicle attacks can be just as deadly as shootings or bombings. However, they are typically more difficult for law enforcement to pre-empt due to limited preparatory materials or assembly required. IS and its supporter network have highlighted the difficulty of pre-empting VRAs, as noted in “Just Terror Tactics” (published on 11 November 2016, in the official IS magazine, Rumiyah). Endorsement of VRAs has also appeared in recent releases, such as “The Season of Terror!” (published 25 December 2025 in the group’s official weekly newsletter, al-Naba). “Just Terror Tactics” provided operational guidance on how to conduct VRAs, while “The Season of Terror!” encouraged their use if attackers could not obtain a firearm, praising the VRA on 19 December 2016 at a Berlin Christmas Market. “The Season of Terror!” also promoted hammers as a tactic for those who were unable to acquire a firearm, which appeared in the 2026 New Year’s Eve plot disrupted in North Carolina. Unofficial pro-IS media outlets have taken the messaging from “The Season of Terror!” and produced posters promoting the usage of VRAs and hammers. 

Emerging technologies 

The weapons and tactics used or planned in the 2025 incidents were typical of IS-inspired attackers. However, two incidents demonstrated the use of emerging technologies during pre-attack surveillance. The New Orleans attacker used Meta glasses to conduct surveillance of the French Quarter, while the Detroit Arsenal plotter is alleged to have used a drone to conduct surveillance.  

Meta glasses provide an effective tool for surveillance and recording attack footage for propaganda purposes. Meta glasses provide hands free recording capability (including live streaming and posting to social media functionalities) in a subdued form factor that would make it harder to detect surveillance activities. These attributes combined with the growing normalization of their use increase the likelihood that they will feature in future attacks and plots. 

The use of a drone in May’s Arsenal plot in Detroit is also a significant development. While IS and other Salafi-jihadist groups have extensively used drones in conflict zones, and despite the large volume of IS propaganda promoting drone usage, the accessibility operational manuals, and their growing popularity among European IS plotters, there have been no successful Salafi-jihadist inspired drone attacks in the West. Drone usage by Salafi-jihadist inspired actors in the US is rare; the isolated occurrences involved using drones as weapons rather than for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tool.  

Targets 

As there were no consistent target trends across incidents, no clear protective priority stands out based on IS-inspired US attacks and plots in 2025. The suspects in the November Michigan Halloween plot were allegedly inspired by the 2015 attacks in Paris and the 2016 Pulse attack in Orlando in their targeting of nightlife venues and the LGBTQ+ community. Meanwhile, the perpetrator of the New Orleans attack targeted a public celebration and the suspect in the TACOM attack plot in May allegedly desired to cause as much damage to the US military as he could. Other targets included a religious institution and concert, targets of personal significance, law enforcement and a school.  

IS-inspired attacks and plots in the US in 2025 appear to diverge from the group’s prevailing pattern elsewhere, which often targets Jewish or Israeli communities and institutions. An ISD analysis of IS-linked attacks and plots conducted in 29 countries from 1 January 2024 to 23 December 2025 identified a pattern of mass casualty attacks and plots targeting the Jewish community. The analysis identified that 42.3 percent of attacks conducted against and 32.1 percent of plots targeted Jewish and Israeli communities or institutions. 

Material support 

Some IS supporters attempted to advance the group’s cause through material support rather than direct violence. In 2025, there were four cases where individuals provided material support involving financial transfers, the provision of explosives or instructional material on explosives. Two incidents involved supporters attempting to join IS abroad. Neither chose West Africa, the current primary driver of IS operations. Instead, one man attempted to travel to Somalia apparently driven by ethnic affiliation, while two other men allegedly sought to join IS in Syria (seemingly motivated by the aesthetic appeal). 

Notably, in the four incidents in which the perpetrator did not physically attempt to join IS abroad, they at least expressed interest in becoming an IS fighter abroad or undertaking their own attacks domestically. Material support charges can carry sentences of up to 20 years in prison but are often treated as less severe due to the absence of violence. This sometimes results in reduced sentences or early release. ISD’s 2024 report highlighted the long-term implications of this: since 2012, 72 IS-linked offenders were released by May 2024. Six of them had received lighter sentences or were released early but were rearrested within a few years for violating their parole. Analysts identified 15 more releases of IS-linked offenders between May 2024 and January 2026. 

Conclusion 

As of March 2026, the IS group’s capacity to conduct physical operations in the US remains limited. The group instead relies on its digital ecosystem to enable self-radicalization, galvanize support around ongoing conflicts, and encourage lone wolf style attacks. Within the US, the digital ecosystem has fueled a youth-driven mobilization to violence.  

In Western countries, the principal threat continues to stem from individuals inspired by IS rather than operatives under direct organizational control. This underscores the importance of systematic monitoring of digital platforms and the early detection of threat signals. The link between material support and interest in acts of violence also requires further study to limit the risk of recidivism.