Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

By: Guy Fiennes and Rashad Ali

On 27 November 2024, Islamist rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies launched an offensive from their enclave in north-west Syria, rapidly capturing major regime-held cities. Rebels from an aligned uprising in the south reached the capital Damascus and toppled dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December. This Explainer provides an overview of the group’s origins, its history of governance in north-west Syria, and its subsequent actions and messaging.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is an Islamist group which is currently proscribed as a terror group by the United Nations, United States and United Kingdom, as well as other states. Although it was founded as an offshoot of Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and was at one time an al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliate, it has since severed ties with both those groups. Ideologically, it differs in that it pursues an approach of pragmatic, locally oriented, nationalist jihad, in contrast to AQ and IS’ ambitions of a global caliphate. The group is led by Abu Mohamad al-Jolani, now referred to by his birth name Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has shaped the contours and trajectory of the group, in part through its alliances.

The Syrian Revolution and the Assad Regime

Protests in southern Syria erupted in February 2011, after children in Daraa were arrested and tortured, one fatally, for spray-painting anti-regime graffiti. These demonstrations expanded to a nationwide rebellion when then President Bashar al-Assad ordered the army to repress protesters with force. The state-backed repression, supported by a range of state and non-state actors, was met with active resistance for almost 14 years, causing the displacement of more than 14 million people.

Supported by Russia, Iran, Iran-backed Iraqi militias and Hezbollah (both its Lebanese branch and subsequent Syrian offshoot), the Assad-regime staved off defeat for more than a decade as the state hollowed out from corruption and conflict. During this period, Syrians were subjected to a range of human rights abuses. The protest movement persisted despite the state’s crackdown, and the local armed resistance which emerged to fight the regime was targeted for co-optation by extremist terror groups, some of whom carved out an enclave in the north-west of Syria.

Roots in Designated Terror Groups: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)

In 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi — leader of then al-Qaeda affiliate Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) — sent al-Jolani and six operatives from Iraq to Syria to establish Jabhat al-Nusra (the Victory Front) in the context of armed Syrian opposition to the al-Assad regime. However, when al-Baghdadi unilaterally declared al-Nusra’s merger with ISI in 2013 to form the Islamic State (IS), al-Nusra leader al-Jolani rejected it and instead pledged allegiance directly to AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Nusra fought IS fighters in Syria, and the rift contributed to AQ’s disavowal of IS in 2014.

A Shift Begins: Evolution of Jabhat al-Nusra to HTS

In 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra officially severed ties with AQ and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). At this time the AQ brand was considered more trouble than it was worth.

After less than a year under that name, the group merged with other jihadist rebel groups to form HTS in 2017. Distancing itself from AQ served to widen the group’s appeal to local Syrians and deter targeting by international forces.

From 2016 HTS/JFS sought to establish dominance in the region through military and administrative prowess. Dubbed a technocratic^[1] jihadist organisation, it established governance mechanisms that responded to local needs and imposed authoritarian rule, and persecuted IS and AQ offshoots. It was during this time that HTS took an aggressive approach to rival factions, creating deeper schisms in the overall jihadist landscape. Much of this culminated in 2023 when IS accused HTS of killing its fourth caliph, Abu Hussein al-Husseini al-Quraishi.

HTS in the Syrian Opposition

HTS became one of the key factions controlling the rebel stronghold of Idlib in north-west Syria and eliminated and imprisoned jihadist rivals in the region. It developed good relations with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), as well as the “Kurdish”-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control adjacent territory in the north-west of Syria. Following a 2022 conflict within the SNA, where HTS intervened on the side of one SNA faction against another, Turkey arbitrated HTS’ withdrawal from the SNA-controlled city of Afrin.

Figure 1. Map showing HTS-governed Idlib region (left, grey), 11 July 2023. Green areas indicate rebel forces (Ahrar al-Sham, FSA), yellow: Kurdish/SDF. Red: Assad regime. Dark blue: Turkey/Qatar. Source: Liveuamap.

During that time, the SNA developed a reputation for corruption and anti-Kurdish sentiment, which made it unpopular with local Syrians and Kurds. Meanwhile, similar accusations of corruption, abuses and an inability to fully defend locals against IS extortion sapped the SDF’s popularity.

HTS Governance in Idlib

When HTS set up the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) as a civilian technocratic administration in 2017, it also attempted to impose strict Islamic governance. HTS enforced gender segregation in schools, discriminated against women in courts and excluded women from representation in its political bodies. However, it did not restrict them from all professions or public life. Sustained protests against HTS broke out in February 2024 in response to autocratic rule, human rights abuses and economic issues. There have been numerous documented cases of HTS detaining and torturing critics, including journalists, women and children. In 2021, four people were sentenced to death by stoning after HTS police raided a brothel in Idlib.

HTS has been noted for its increasingly tolerant attitude toward ethnic and religious minorities. Despite this, there have been accusations of discrimination and religious freedom is limited. HTS has also been criticised for interfering in civil society.

Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani:  A ‘Charismatic Authoritarian’

Understanding the rise and transformation of Ahmad al-Sharaa to Abu Mohammad al-Jolani – and back to Ahmed al-Sharaa – is necessary both in understanding HTS’s historical formation and its current iteration as it attempts to govern a country in the midst of transition.

Al-Jolani was born in Saudi Arabia in 1982 to a Syrian family and moved to Damascus, Syria, where he majored in Media Studies at university. In 2003 he travelled to Iraq to join AQ, and was imprisoned by the United States in 2005, where he met al-Baghdadi. In 2011, al-Jolani was sent to Syria to set up Jabhat al-Nusra. In 2013, the US designated al-Jolani a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and in 2017 put a bounty of $10 million on his head, which remains in place.

In November 2024 al-Jolani launched an offensive that would bring down the Assad regime in under two weeks. During this time, he reverted to his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa. He had previously adopted the kunya al-Jolani, referencing the Golan Heights, from which his family was displaced during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Dropping the name is a signal of his intention to rebrand and transition from a military to a civilian leader.

Al-Jolani is described as a soft spoken, educated and media-savvy leader, who championed pragmatism and moderation against the more radical stream of his organisation. However, some analysts caution that he remains the leader of an authoritarian regime which suppressed political opposition and civil society during its rule in Idlib.

Fig 2. Post on official HTS Telegram channel ‘General Command’ on December 7, centring al-Jolani as ‘General Ahmed Al-Shara’ and guaranteeing safety to compliant regime soldiers.

HTS Defines HTS

HTS is an Islamist organisation, with roots in the global jihadist movement. However, before the fall of Damascus, al-Jolani attended a CNN interview dressed in military fatigues and made little reference to Islam. He instead pointed to the importance of institutionalisation and a legal framework to protect minorities. He described HTS as one rebel group amongst many in Syria, suggesting it could dissolve once its task of confronting Assad’s regime was complete. He denied that HTS wanted to fight the West, said that they “have only criticised Western policies”, and emphasised the need for pragmatism in a Syrian leader. In subsequent interviews with BBC and France 24, al-Jolani appeared in civilian clothing, he argued that HTS should be de-listed as a terrorist group and claimed that it had never targeted civilians.

Unlike other Salafi-Jihadist rebel groups in Syria, HTS adopted the slogans of the revolution and the Syrian rebel flag. They announced a transitional government led by the head of HTS’s Syrian Salvation Government, which they said would step down in March 2025.

Fig 3. HTS statements pledging to protect minorities and media freedom. Source: Telegram.

HTS has pledged to protect minorities and journalists and stated that it would not impose a strict dress code on women. It further invited international media to visit liberated cities. Al-Jolani’s messaging suggests a vision of tolerant and pluralist Islamic governance. However, concerns persist about the future of minorities, women and political opposition in post-Assad Syria.

International sanctions against Syria due to the Assad regime’s brutality, as well as against HTS and al-Jolani due to their terrorist designations, are an incentive for HTS to convey a moderated image to the international community. Unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan, HTS is not the sole actor capturing the state. Instead, a spread of armed groups representing diverse interests and constituencies control the territory, constraining HTS’s ability to apply strict Islamic law.

On 16 December, al-Jolani affirmed commitment to the 1974 agreement with Israel over the Golan Heights and promised that Syria would not be used as a launchpad for attacks. He called for Israel to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in Syria following the regime’s fall.

Conclusion

HTS is neither a maximalist global jihadist entity like IS/AQ, nor is it the secular-liberal pro-democratic movement which some hoped would prevail at the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. The group’s history indicates a desire to maintain good relations with international and local actors and to prevent rival jihadist groups from using their territory to launch attacks. Nonetheless, autocratic rule and human rights abuses checkered HTS’ rule in Idlib. While their recent messaging has been lacking in extremist Islamism, the absence of such rhetoric is a pragmatic response to the political reality on the ground. Similarly, although HTS’s record on minorities and women improved while it was in a vulnerable position in Idlib, some analysts note this could change once power has been secured.

International pressure and local demands, including armed groups and minorities, carry significant weight and affect the incentive structure facing HTS in post-Assad Syria. The group has demonstrated a historical willingness to compromise and a desire for public legitimacy, but al-Jolani will have to repress hardliners who remain in or are aligned with HTS. Nonetheless, while bearing in mind the concerning features of HTS’s rule in Idlib, its ideological history and conservative religious ideals, some analysts and officials have concluded that there is reason for cautious optimism.

End Notes

[1] Technocracy refers to a social system or system of government in which people with scientific or technical knowledge have a lot of power and influence.

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This Explainer was published on 20 December 2024.