



Online Domestic Extremism in Canada Data Briefing – March to May 2025

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Online Domestic Extremism in Canada

This briefing paper details analysis of Canadian domestic extremists' online activity between 1 March and 31 May 2025. It explores the platforms they are active on, the topics which galvanize them, and the ways in which they target communities in Canada. It is part of a multi-year study which provides ongoing insight into Canadian domestic extremist activity through the ongoing delivery of analytical briefs.

ISD used its definition of domestic extremism (see Annex) to decide if accounts and channels should be included. This definition states that extremism can be pursued through violent or non-violent means. It thereby complements efforts addressing political violence and terrorism by considering the broader risks to democracy, rights, and social cohesion posed by non-violent extremism. This broader focus also aims to highlight the continuum of ideologies and activities that inspire violence and illuminate different pathways to radicalization. A full breakdown of the methodology employed can be found in the technical Annex.

ISD analyses anti-Muslim speech as a form of hate but also tracks anti-Muslim extremists as a sub-group of domestic extremism. Anti-Muslim extremists are an established category of extremists that historically have primarily targeted Muslims.

ISD also analyses hate against other communities such as Jewish people, LGBTQ communities or migrants. So far, there are no corresponding categories for e.g. antisemitic extremists or anti-LGBTQ extremists, as these types of hate are usually one element of more established domestic extremist worldviews such as white supremacy or ethnonationalism, rather than their defining characteristic.

Key Findings

Account Analysis

- ISD has so far identified 598 domestic extremist social media accounts and channels in Canada across 8 platforms. Where permitted by API's, we gathered data from 302 accounts and channels in Canada which published 444,010 posts between November 2024 and February 2025. This included 149 accounts and channels on X, 98 on Telegram, 28 on Facebook, 18 on YouTube, and 9 on Instagram.

- ISD identified 89 as white supremacists (98,763 posts), 83 as ethnonationalists (116,809 posts), 48 as anti-Muslim extremists (72,526 posts), 30 as Neo-Nazis (18,420 posts), 27 as anti-government extremists (56,601 posts), 24 as Christian Nationalists (12,904 posts), 21 as extreme right accelerationists (12,225 posts) and 9 as male supremacists (5,475 posts).
- While white supremacists and ethnonationalists had the highest number of accounts per sub-ideology, it was ethnonationalist and anti-Muslim accounts that accumulated the highest engagement on their posts.
- This quarter, extremist activity rose following President Trump's announcement of 25% tariffs on imports from Canada on 4 March. The other large spike, seen between 28 and 30 April coincided with the Canadian federal elections.

Key Topics

- This analysis illustrates the continued interest among Canadian domestic extremists in both domestic and international issues. Prominent themes included discontent with Canadian democracy and politics, conspiratorial or racially charged discussion of major social or geopolitical topics (especially the Russia-Ukraine war), and opposition to the political left.
- This included posts which expressed widespread frustration with the Canadian federal election and democracy in general, including disillusionment with major parties and politicians and pessimism in the ability of elections to bring about positive change. Some high-engagement content alleged the election had been "stolen".

Hate Speech

- Of the 440,010 posts made by the domestic extremist accounts and channels between 1 March 2025 and 31

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May 2025, 8,463 (1.9% of the total) were classified as containing hate speech (defined in the methodological annex of this report). This is a 17.4% decrease in the volume of hateful posts from the last reporting period

- Of these hateful posts, 2,317 (21.2%, -4.9% compared to the previous quarter) were targeted at migrants, 2,295 (21.0%, -1.3%) at the LGBTQ community, 2,218 (20.3%, -2%) at Jewish people, 1,405 (12.9%, -2.3%) at Asian Canadians, 1,205 (11.0%, +3.9%) at Black Canadians, 1,189 (10.9%, -1.1%) at Muslims, 290 (2.7%, +0.3%) at Indigenous communities and 68 (0.6%, -0.2%) at Arab Canadians.

Violent Speech

- Of the 444,010 posts made by the domestic extremist accounts and channels between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025, 1,299 (0.29%) were classified as containing violent speech, such as threatening language, incitement to violence or glorification of violence.
- Violent speech peaked on 20 May and 3 April, with both days seeing 26 violent posts. Many of these posts glorified the prospect of US violence against Canada and expressed desire for US military rule over Canada and violence against perceived elites in Canada. A smaller proportion of posts called for violence against the US administration.

Note on Account Categorisation

ISD analysts categorised all accounts and channels included into the following sub-categories: White supremacist, Ethnonationalist, Christian Nationalist, Anti-Muslim Extremists, Male Supremacism, Anti-Government Extremism. For white supremacists, ISD additionally coded for two sub-categories, Neo-Nazi and extreme right accelerationists (i.e. all Neo-Nazis are coded as white supremacists though not vice versa). Accounts and channels could also be ethnonationalist and Christian Nationalist, as these categories sometimes but not always overlap. Otherwise, accounts and channels have been assigned to one sub-category.

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1 Account Analysis

Overall, ISD has so far identified 598 domestic extremist social media accounts and channels in Canada. This includes 194 on X, 144 on Facebook, 131 on Telegram, 34 on YouTube, 31 on TikTok, 23 on Gab, 28 on Instagram and 13 on Rumble.

Of these, 302 were active during the period of data collection. This includes 149 on X, 98 on Telegram, 28 on Facebook, 18 on YouTube, and 9 on Instagram. Using the API's provided by these platforms, ISD collected 444,010 posts from 12,748 Canadian domestic extremist accounts and channels between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025. This included 305,845 posts on X, 119,854 on Telegram, 13,890 on Facebook, 2,844 on Instagram, and 1,577 on YouTube.

Of these channels ISD analysts identified 89 as white supremacists (96,171 posts), 82 as ethnonationalists (85,722 posts), 48 as anti-Muslim extremists (59,217 posts), 30 as Neo-Nazis (18,420 posts), 26 as anti-government extremists (50,816 posts), 24 as Christian Nationalists (12,904 posts), 21 as extreme right accelerationists (12,225 posts) and 9 as male

Figure 1: Active accounts per sub-ideology



Figure 2: Number of posts per sub-ideology



Table 1: Number of active accounts, posts and engagements per sub-ideology

Sub-Ideology	Posts	Active accounts	Total engagement
Accelerationists	12,225	21	193,923
Anti-Government	56,061	27	1,325,354
Anti-Muslim	72,526	48	22,329,860
Christian Nationalists	12,904	24	852,447
Ethnonationalists	116,801	83	27,735,752
Male Supremacists	5,475	10	4,508,245
Neo-Nazis	18,420	30	1,155,285
White Supremacists	98,763	89	3,714,754

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supremacists (5,458 posts). Definitions for these categories are provided in the Annex of the report.

Whilst white supremacists and ethnonationalists had the highest and second highest numbers of accounts and posts per sub-ideology, it was ethnonationalist and anti-Muslim accounts that accumulated the highest engagement on their posts. This suggests that the followership of anti-Muslim accounts is much more engaged than others. While white supremacist accounts are more numerous and more active, their posts do not reach anywhere the level of engagement (the sum of all likes, comments and shares) of both anti-Muslim and ethnonationalist accounts. Accelerationist accounts remain among the least active and least engaged, while anti-government accounts, although relatively prolific, fail to gain high engagement on their posts.

X remains a key platform for almost all the sub-ideological groups and is the most popular platform for anti-Muslim and ethnonationalist accounts. In comparison white supremacists, neo-Nazis, accelerationist and anti-government accounts favour Telegram. While Instagram remains underutilised by the accounts in the dataset, Facebook is the second most popular platform among anti-Muslim accounts. Across sub-ideologies, YouTube was used the most among male supremacist accounts.

Figure 5 shows the total volume of posts produced by all accounts in the dataset over the time period analysed.

There were a number of spikes in posts in this period. The increase seen on 4 March can be attributed to President Trump’s announcement of 25% tariffs on imports from Canada, and the subsequent retaliation of Canada placing tariffs on US goods. Canadian domestic extremists reacted to the news in a number of different ways – by declaring their support for Trump’s tariffs, by claiming the solution to the tariff war was to end the Temporary Foreign Workers program and instead employ only Canadians and to criticise then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s reaction to Trump’s announcement.

The other large spike, seen between 28 and 30 April coincides with the Canadian federal elections. The highest engaged post during this time frame was YouTube video posted on 30 April which questioned whether the election had been “stolen”.

Figure 4: Distribution of accounts per sub-ideology across platforms




Figure 5: Volume over time of posts during the time period



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Both the election fraud narratives and the tariff-related spikes discussed above show the direct influence of US politics has in shaping the discourse among Canadian extremists. It suggests an importance of closely monitoring developments on the US far right but also recognise that reactions among the Canadian extremists to the US will be divided.

2 Hate speech

To better understand the ways domestic extremists target different communities we used Natural Language Processing to classify hate speech in the messages gathered targeting Jewish people, migrants, Muslims, Asian Canadians, Black people, Indigenous communities, Arab Canadians and LGBTQ communities.¹ A full breakdown of the methodology employed can be found in the technical Annex.

Of the 440,010 posts made by the domestic extremist accounts and channels between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025, 8,463 (1.9% of the total) were classified as containing hate speech. This is a 17.4% decrease in the volume of hateful posts from the last reporting period.

Compared to all previous reporting periods, this quarter was below average in terms of the share of hateful posts. The previous peak in the final quarter of 2024 was caused by a combination of events which led to increased volume of hate speech. This included the anniversary of the October 7 attacks, the Government of Canada announcing a new immigration plan, and the US presidential debate during which Donald Trump spread unfounded claims about the Haitian migrant community in Springfield, Ohio.

Of the hateful posts made between March and May 2025, 2,155 (25.5%) were targeted at migrants, 1,907 (22.5%) at the LGBTQ community, 1,693 (20.0%) at Jewish people, 1,124 (13.3%) at Muslims, 1,093 (12.9%) at Asian Canadians, 811 (9.6%) at Black Canadians, 276 (3.3%) at Indigenous communities and 48 (0.6%) at Arab Canadians.

Anti-migrant hate remained the most common type of hate speech. Between reporting periods, ISD observed a small rise in the proportion of anti-Black content, which increased from 8.8% of posts during the previous

Table 1: Number and percentage of hateful posts in the first four data briefings on Canadian extremists

Reporting Period	Total Posts	Hateful Posts	% Hateful
1 January – 30 August 2024	1,022,427	13,055	1.4%
1 September – 30 Nov. 2024	282,288	9,894	3.5%
1 December – 28 February 2025	413,288	9,512	2.3%
1 March – 31 May 2025	440,010	8,463	1.9%

Table 2: Hate Speech by domestic extremists, broken down by target group

Sub-Ideology	Count
Anti-Migrant	2,155
Anti-LGBTQ	1,907
Antisemitic	1,693
Anti-Muslim	1,124
Anti-Asian	1,093
Anti-Black	811
Anti-Indigenous	276
Anti-Arab	48

reporting period to 9.6% during this quarter. Conversely, there was a minor decline in anti-migrant content between the two reporting periods from 26.1% of posts to 25.5%, and a more significant decline in anti-Indigenous content (3.3% this quarter compared to 9.6% in the preceding quarter). The proportion of anti-LGBTQ content remained relatively stable compared to the last period but overtook antisemitism as the second most prominent form of hate among Canadian domestic extremists.

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025, there were several notable spikes in posts containing targeted hate. The day with the highest volume of hate was 7 March, with 136 posts identified. Many of the posts on 7 March featured antisemitic rhetoric, which remarked upon a speech given by former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in which he described himself as a Zionist.

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Treemaps showing the number of posts per ideology per target hate group

Please note that ideology annotations are non-mutually exclusive - i.e. an account (and hence, any posts created by that account) can belong to multiple ideologies. Hence, figures within each per-hate target group treemap do not necessarily sum to the overall, un-broken-down, count for that target group.


Anti-Migrant




Anti-LGBT




Antisemitic




Anti-Asian




Anti-Muslim



Anti-Black



Anti-Indigenous



Anti-Arab



- Accelerationist
- Anti-government extremist
- Anti-Muslim extremist
- Christian-Nationalist
- Ethno-Nationalist
- Male Supremacist
- Neo-Nazi
- White Supremacist

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Numerous Canadian extremists condemned the speech and suggested that it provided evidence of widespread Jewish control of politicians, including Trudeau. On 28 April, there were 135 posts containing hate speech, with 50 of these targeting LGBTQ communities, including by denying the existence of trans people, e.g. “there is no such thing as transgender, only mentally disabled.”

14 March and 19 March (125 posts each) were tied for the third-most hateful posts. On 14 March, a plurality of hateful posts (35) was antisemitic, including posts which attacked the Jewish journalist Glen Greenwald over his leaked sex-tape, cast doubt on the Holocaust and accused Jews of being responsible for crime and internet censorship. By contrast, a plurality of hateful posts (35) on 19 March were anti-migrant, including posts calling for deportations of non-white migrants, generalising about all Indian migrants being corrupt and accusing foreigners of invading and controlling Canada

As in previous reports, across ideologies, white supremacists produced the highest volume of posts containing hate speech (3,543 posts), followed by ethnonationalists (2,337). In fact, white supremacists published the most hateful posts against each target group except for Muslims, for whom anti-Muslim extremists were the most prolific, and Indigenous communities, for which ethnonationalists produced the largest number of posts.

These findings suggest that white supremacists and ethnonationalist groups should warrant particular attention by law enforcement and prevention practitioners seeking to safeguard marginalized communities from hate crime. Likewise, support systems and safety planning for targeted communities could be informed by the primary source of online hate and harassment.

3 Violent Speech

To better understand the ways domestic extremists target different communities we used Natural Language Processing to classify violent speech such as threats of, incitement to, and glorification of violence. A full breakdown of the methodology employed can be found in the technical Annex.

Of the 444,010 posts made by the domestic extremist accounts and channels between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025, 1,299 (0.29%) were classified as containing violent speech.

Violent speech peaked on 20 May and 3 April, with both days seeing 26 violent posts. On 3 April these posts largely related to discussion of US tariffs on Canada. Many of these posts glorified the prospect of US violence against Canada and expressed desire for US military rule over Canada, for example “WE AS CANADIANS NEED THE AMERICANS TO ANNEX US, THIS THEN MAKES EVERY SINGLE MEMBER OF OUR PARLIAMENT ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL THE CRIMES ALL HAVE COMMITTED UNDER UNITED STATES MILITARY LAW!!! I CANT WAIT FOR IT TOO HAPPEN, AND TO WATCH THEM HANG, BE SHOT, OR BE LETHALLY INJECTED...”.

This highlights trends observed in [previous analysis](#) which point towards a strong US influence on Canadian extremists and in particular an admiration for the Trump administration. However, this wasn't universal, and a smaller proportion of posts called for violence against the US administration, for example “I am going to shove vodka down Trump's throat until he dies”, suggesting that Canadian nationalism may form a fault-line amongst Canadian domestic extremists in light of tensions with the US.

The other spike in violent speech observed on 20 May was largely driven by discussion on Telegram relating to conspiracy theories about the murder of the tech CEO Matthew Staikos with suggestions that police were involved in his killing and that there was a cover-up relating to his death (e.g. “WE NEED THE LIST OF JUDGES AND CROWN ATTORNEYS WHO COVERED UP MATTHEW STAIKOS MURDER, WHILE THEY CONTINUED THEIR MURDERING SPREE PRESIDENT TRUMP AND HIS MILITARY CAN CHAIN THEM BY THEIR NECKS”).

Similarly, discussion about Staikos generated a disproportionately large number of violent posts on 19 April (0.48%, compared to a monthly average of 0.29%). This was triggered by Canadian QAnon adherents who believe Staikos possessed damaging information about political elites and authority figures, leading them to believe his death was orchestrated and covered up by government officials. It is unclear why there were spikes in such discussion on 19 April and 20 May, but they

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coincided with media reporting about Staikos in early April. This highlights how relatively obscure conspiracy theories can nevertheless act as lightning rods which for violent rhetoric targeting public servants and other officials.

4 Key Topics

The following section outlines the findings of ISD's qualitative analysis of key topics among Canadian domestic extremists between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025 identified through LLM assisted automated topic modelling (outlined in detail in the Annex).

This analysis illustrates the continued interest among Canadian domestic extremists in both domestic and international issues. Prominent themes included discontent with Canadian democracy and politics, conspiratorial or racially charged discussion of major social or geopolitical topics, and opposition to the political left.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Discussions featured criticism of Western military and financial support for Ukraine, which was portrayed as an economic burden for Canada. Posts also claimed that the conflict is being used to justify European Union or NATO expansion. Criticism of President Zelenskyy was another common theme, including accusations that he is persecuting Christians in Ukraine.

Antisemitism

This cluster of posts centred on antisemitic rhetoric and anti-Israel narratives inflected with conspiracy theories or coded hostility about Jews. Such posts often perpetuated antisemitic stereotypes, including allegations of Jewish control of major institutions or nefarious connections to global events.

Mark Carney

Discussions expressed criticism and hostility towards Mark Carney, focusing on his perceived elitism or suspicious political and financial motivations. Posts also questioned Carney's authenticity and allegiance to Canada, including accusations that he is a "globalist" who is seeking to undermine Canada's national sovereignty.

Figure 11: Violent speech by Canadian domestic extremists, volume over time



Romana Didulo

Posts focused on the conspiracy theorist Romana Didulo, the self-described "Queen of Canada," and her followers. Discussions often centred around Didulo's "Royal Decrees," proclamations which claim authority over Canadian law and governance. Followers often expressed reverence for Didulo and spread conspiratorial and spiritual content attacking the political and media establishment. These discussions preceded Didulo's arrest in September 2025.

Pierre Poilievre

Discussions focused on Pierre Poilievre's role as Conservative Party leader, with some posts expressing praise of certain policies, such as proposed tax relief measures, while others portrayed him as insufficiently right-wing. Many posts questioned his identification as a 'Canada First' politician, attacking his perceived weakness in combatting "woke" ideology.

Election Disillusionment

Posts expressed widespread frustration with the Canadian federal election and democracy in general, including disillusionment with major parties and politicians and pessimism in the ability of elections to bring about positive change. Other posts signalled apathy in conventional political processes or concerns about election integrity, including vulnerability to fraud and foreign interference.

Misogyny

Discussions expressed disdain for women, feminism, and trans people. Common themes included the promotion

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Table 3: Total number of posts per top specific topics

Russia-Ukraine Conflict		7,235
Antisemitism		5,325
Mark Carney		4,386
Romana Didulo		4,364
Pierre Poilievre		4,347
Election Disillusionment		3,541
Misogyny		3,407
Anti-Immigration		2,931
Anti-Progressivism		2,783
Donald Trump		2,764

Table 4: Total engagements per top specific topics

Russia-Ukraine Conflict		1,112,784
Antisemitism		405,396
Mark Carney		3,348,605
Romana Didulo		80,523
Pierre Poilievre		3,139,955
Election Disillusionment		498,621
Misogyny		2,060,373
Anti-Immigration		532,420
Anti-Progressivism		746,204
Donald Trump		402,749

of patriarchy and rigid gender roles, accusations of societal decline due to the empowerment of women, and attacks on so-called “gender ideology” and sexual autonomy.

Anti-Immigration

Posts expressed intense opposition to immigration and often included calls for immigration moratoriums or mass deportations. Discussions frequently demonised immigrants from non-Western countries, framing them as a threat to Canada’s identity and economic health. Many posts painted immigrants as invaders who do not belong in Canada.

Anti-Progressivism

This cluster of posts contained strong hostility towards progressives, the political left, liberals, and the Liberal Party of Canada, including accusations that these communities are radical, immoral, or corrupt. Discussions frequently invoked culture war rhetoric and depicted progressives and the political left as an existential threat.

Donald Trump

Discussions centred around Donald Trump were both supportive and critical. Some posts expressed praise for Trump and his perceived embrace of social and economic freedom, with some endorsing his calls to make Canada the 51st state. Others criticised Trump, accusing him of being corrupt and threatening Canada’s sovereignty.

5 Geographic Overview

Identifying the places extremists mention online helps identify potential targets, recruitment areas and local grievances. This can therefore support efforts to prevent extremist mobilisation and aid more effective and targeted security and policy responses.

To assess which places within and outside of Canada domestic extremists reference most, ISD collected all mentions of countries (excluding Canada) as well as provinces and cities within Canada between 1 March and 31 May 2025.

The top three provinces mentioned were Ontario (6,634), Alberta (5,003), and British Columbia (3,142). Popular posts mentioning Alberta often highlighted its distinct identity, arguing that the US should accept Alberta only (perhaps alongside Saskatchewan) rather than Canada overall as the 51st state. Popular posts about B.C. often focussed on a local dispute about an Ostrich flock which the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has ordered to be culled to prevent the spread of avian influenza (the case had gained more attention after Robert F. Kennedy Jr. objected to the CFIA measures. Opponents of decision view it as a case of government over-reach; CFIA workers tasked with carrying out the measures have faced threats and intimidation online.)

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Top

Choropleth showing the number of mentions of Canadian provinces and cities, with the top 10 mentioned cities labelled. Tabular data for the cities and provinces is below.



Below

Choropleth showing the number of mentions of Canadian provinces and countries, with tabular data below.

City	Mentions
Toronto	1,876
Ottawa	1,857
Vancouver	704
Calgary	615
Montreal	591
Edmonton	548
Richmond	408
Brampton	214
Winnipeg	129
Oshawa	126

Province	Mentions
Ontario	6,634
Alberta	5,003
British Columbia	3,142
Quebec	2,177
Saskatchewan	1,086
Manitoba	403
Nova Scotia	209
New Brunswick and Labrador	166
Nunavut	63

Country	Mentions
United States	18,701
United Kingdom	5,136
China	3,381
Ukraine	3,278
Russia	2,665
Israel	2,243
Spain	2,005
Australia	1,380
India	1,269
Palestine	846




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

The top two most mentioned cities by Canadian domestic extremists were Toronto with 1,876 and Ottawa with 1,857 mentions. While posts mentioning Ottawa did not have a clear common topic, popular posts mentioning Toronto often criticized alleged biases by local authorities in favour of minority groups, including Muslims and black people.

Canadian domestic extremists mentioned the US 18,701 times, making it the most mentioned foreign country, although there was no clear common theme among the most-liked posts about the US. Four of the top ten mentioned countries (Ukraine, Russia, Israel and Palestine) are involved in current conflicts; while opinions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine were mixed, several posts with high engagement were critical of Ukraine, asking for the US and Canada to cease support and accusing supporters of Zelenskyy of attacking Orthodox churches. The ten most liked posts by Canadian domestic extremists were all supportive of Israel, accusing Prime Minister Mark Carney of being “pro-Hamas”, and suggesting that authorities and the police were not taken decisive action against pro-Palestine protestors and creating a hostile environment for Jewish people and Israelis.



6 Language-Based Communities

This section summarises the findings of a cross-platform natural language processing approach to map the location of accounts and channels within a network (outlined in detail in the Annex). In simple terms, if accounts and channels use similar language, they are grouped together. This allows the identification of communities based on



common interests, even if they would not have been assigned the same ideological sub-category or use the same platform. Rather than being shaped by analysts’ expertise and expectations, this approach is driven purely by the output of domestic extremists online and may therefore produce counter-intuitive findings or patterns that may have otherwise been overlooked. It thereby serves as complementary approach to ISD’s account and platform focussed analysis.

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
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ISD subject matter reviewed the clusters identified through this approach. Based on our interpretation, these are the characteristics of the 10 clusters identified.

- 1. Disillusioned Canadian Far Right (Pink Cluster):** Medium-sized Cluster of 24 accounts, mixed of ethnonationalists, anti-Muslim extremists, white supremacists and Christian nationalists that are focussed on their disillusionment with Canadian politics and opposition to liberalism.
- 2. Pro-Deportation White Supremacists (Brown Cluster):** Large Cluster of 35 mostly white supremacist accounts and channels focussed on deporting migrants, white supremacist ideology, misogynist narratives and race in Canada.
- 3. Anti-Liberal Separatists (Purple Cluster):** Very large cluster of 70 mostly ethnonationalist and anti-Muslim extremist accounts and channels focussed primarily on separatism, anti-liberal narratives and disillusionment with Canadian politics. Thematically, very similar to the Disillusioned Canadian Far Right Cluster.
- 4. Anti-Government Conspiracists (Red Cluster):** Small cluster of 16 mostly anti-government extremist

accounts and channels focussed on conspiracy theories, support for Romanda Didulo, anti-vaccine narratives and the Russia-Ukraine war.

- 5. Christian Nationalist Race Realists (Orange Cluster):** Small cluster of 9 mainly Christian nationalist accounts and channels, which mainly discussed Christianity, Pope Francis, the white supremacist podcaster Stefan Molyneux and anti-abortion stances.
- 6. Misogynists (Green Cluster):** Medium-sized cluster of 23 accounts and channels, made up of a mix of male supremacists, ethnonationalists and anti-Muslim extremists focused on misogynist narratives.
- 7. Racist Antidemocratic Antisemites (Grey Cluster):** Large cluster of 30 predominantly white supremacist accounts and channels focussed on antisemitism, calls for deportations, extreme right ideology and disillusionment with elections.
- 8. Middle East Curious Anti-Muslim Extremists (Blue Cluster):** Small cluster of 7 anti-Muslim extremist accounts and channels with significant reach, discussing the Israel-Palestine conflict, support for



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anti-Muslim figures such as Tommy Robinson and domestic Canadian politics.

9. White Supremacist Antisemites (Turquoise Cluster): Small cluster of 18 accounts and channels, mainly white supremacist and ethnonationalists. Thematically very similar to Cluster 7, only with an even more exclusive emphasis on antisemitism and white supremacist ideology.

10. Far-Right Conflict Observers (Brown-Green Cluster): Small mixed cluster of 7 accounts and channels, most commonly white supremacists and anti-Muslim extremists predominantly focussed on the Russia-Ukraine war, regularly in connection with antisemitic, anti-Muslim and white supremacist themes.

These clusters reveal that Canada's domestic extremist ecosystem is not monolithic but composed of overlapping extremist subcultures which often find common ground around shared enemies such as migrants, Muslims, Jews, liberals and women. Shared grievances such as disillusionment with elections likewise appeared across clusters, including among over white supremacists who reject democracy in principle, but also among anti-liberal and separatist clusters.

While most clusters were centred around thematic overlaps, we also identified one cluster made up of supporters of the anti-government conspiracy theorist Romanda Didulo who discussed her ideas. Two relatively isolated clusters exhibited a focus on geopolitics, specifically the Middle East/Israel and Russia-Ukraine, setting them apart from the other clusters which were more focused on domestic Canadian issues.

While white supremacists appear across multiple clusters, themes like deportations, antisemitism, and misogyny serve as connective tissue between clusters. More ideologically hybrid clusters suggest that preventative measures must address the interconnected nature of far-right narratives rather than treating them as isolated blocs.

Methodological Annex

Definitional Framework and Thresholds for Inclusion

Often, extremism has been narrowly framed around security threats related to terrorism and violent extremism. By contrast, ISD has sought to conceptualise extremism as an ideology centred around social identity that promotes supremacy of an in-group, justifies discrimination of out-groups and therefore runs counter to the very idea of universal human rights. This definition complements efforts focused on political violence and terrorism, and considers the broader risks to democracy, rights and social cohesion presented by the non-violent promotion of extremist ideologies. At the same time, the definition draws a key distinction between radical critiques of the status quo that do not promote supremacist or authoritarian societies and extremist ideologies which do.

- **ISD's Definition of Extremism** is the advocacy of political and social change in line with a system of belief that claims the superiority and dominance of one identity-based 'in-group' over an 'out-group.' Extremism advances a dehumanising 'othering' mindset incompatible with pluralism and universal human rights and can be pursued through violent or non-violent means.

These quarterly data briefings focus specifically on domestic extremism. ISD has developed a definition of **domestic extremism** that is rooted in our definition of extremism and informed by complementary work led by Professor Barbara Perry and right-wing extremism expert Cas Mudde.

Domestic extremism is a belief system that is characterised by its reference to racial, ethnic, cultural supremacy which advocates a system of belief in inequality based on an alleged difference and the perceived threat posed by out-groups. This extremism is often framed in terms of white power and commonly exhibits nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, misogyny, hate against minority communities, and strong state advocacy.

This definition is necessarily broad and captures a range of extremist subcultures and harmful activity, which is reflective of the diversity of groups and trends within domestic extremism. It should be noted that our definition

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is not limited to illegal content and behaviour but overlaps and intersects with several existing legal categories. Our definition of extremism encapsulates a spectrum of activity and related frameworks which are relevant to different stakeholders. This is intentional, as it is hoped that our analysis will demonstrate the continuum of ideologies and activity which inspires different types of harm, and evidence pathways to radicalization and violence.

Legal but harmful	Criminal	National security
Conspiracy theories	Hate crime	IMVE
Mis/disinformation	Illegal hate speech	PMVE
Hate speech below criminal threshold	Online abuse	RMVE
	Harassment	
	Property destruction	
	Incitement to violence	

Account Discovery

These quarterly data briefings draw on analysis across the digital ecosystem occupied by domestic extremists, including quantitative insights from Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, X and Telegram, as well as qualitative insights from platforms that do not offer API access.

ISD originally identified a list of seed accounts and channels belonging to Canadian domestic extremists for the first data briefing covering the period from January to August 2024. These were identified through a three-step process:

- ISD drew on existing lists of domestic extremists from previous projects analysing right-wing extremism in Canada, as well as an extensive review of existing research and reporting on extremist mobilisation in Canada.
- With its technology partner CASM, ISD conducted an automated account discovery analysis to identify accounts and channels that were recommended by or engaged with known Canadian right-wing extremists.
- ISD analysts then reviewed these accounts and channels against our definitional thresholds for domestic extremism.

ISD and CASM are now replicating this exercise on a quarterly basis to identify newly emerging accounts and channels missed or non-existent during the initial set-up phase.

Categorisation of accounts and channels

ISD drew on its definition of domestic extremism to guide its’ decisions about if a group, individual or community should be classified as domestic extremist. Decisions were made based on if an account or channel analysed:

- Is clearly based in Canada
- and
- Explicitly self-identify as right-wing extremists (or as “domestic extremists”) or
 - Can be clearly characterised as such based on existing literature and previous research or
 - Can be clearly characterised as such based on a review of a sample of content they have produced.

In the latter case, ISD ensured that the group, individual or community has posted 5 or more pieces of content that clearly promote features such as nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy or strong state advocacy. ISD analysts recorded a rationale in the coding document with relevant screenshots.

Also included were accounts associated with movements with transnational adherents known to have an impact on Canada (e.g. Terrorgram).

To account for the ideological heterogeneity within domestic extremism, ISD additionally identified ideological sub-categories. ISD analysts have therefore categorised the following sub-categories:

- **White supremacist:** White supremacists believe in the superiority of whites over people of colour and advocate that white people should be politically and socially dominant over people of colour. This can extend to a belief in the need for violence against, or even the genocide of, people of colour.

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• Sub-Categories of white supremacists²:

- **Neo-Nazi:** A movement promoting National Socialism, a fascist ideology pioneered by Adolf Hitler.
- **Extreme Right Accelerationist:** ‘Accelerationism’ is a term used by white supremacists and other extremist groups to refer to “their desire to hasten the collapse of society as we know it”. Generally, acceleration is used in the context of white genocide conspiracy theories, which believes white people are under threat and are being systematically targeted through e.g. immigration and other means. A collapse of modern societal structures and political systems is seen as the only means through which to stop these perceived injustices against white people. Indeed, many accelerationist groups desire this collapse and call for replacing modern society.
- **Ethnonationalist:** Ethnonationalism is a form of nationalism where the nation is defined in terms of ethnicity. Central to ethnonationalism is the belief that nations are tied together by a shared heritage and culture that is based on ethnicity. Ethnonationalists are often marked by implicit rather than explicit racism, and rarely promote overt supremacism.
- **Christian Nationalist:** According to US academic Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Christian Nationalism is based on the proposition that your country ‘is and should remain a Christian nation and that Christianity should be prioritized by the state.’ Christian Nationalists therefore explicitly reject the separation between the Church and the state.
- **Anti-Muslim Extremists:** The anti-Muslim movement is a loose network of groups and individuals who share the fear that Western cultures are threatened by an ‘Islamic takeover’. Anti-Muslim groups are marked by their opposition to Islam as an ideology, and Muslims as a people.
- **Male Supremacism:** The manosphere is a loose collection of movements marked by their overt and extreme misogyny. Movements include ‘incels’, Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) and men’s rights activists (MRAs).

- **Anti-Government Extremism:** Sovereignists are marked by their and militia groups’ rejection of court and state authority. Joining these groups together is the rejection of the authority of the federal state, and commonly adherence to a range of conspiracy theories. In some instances, sovereignists may mobilise as militia.

Hate speech

As with extremism, there are a wide range of definitions of hate or hate crime offered by legislators, advocacy and community groups or social media companies. Usually, hate speech is differentiated from offensive speech, based on the understanding that in democracies offensive speech must be permitted. However, speech that threatens individual’s rights or may cause violence against certain groups can be regulated and prevented—often through the frame of illegal hate speech.

Over the course of this project, ISD will track the weaponization of targeted hate (including illegal hate speech) as a tactic used by domestic extremists in Canada. Hate speech spread by non-extremists is beyond the scope of this project. ISD defines targeted hate is activity which seeks to dehumanise, demonize, harass, threaten, or incite violence against an individual or community based on religion, ethnicity, race, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, national origin or migrant status. Targeted hate may be considered a key tool for extremists to target members of an out-group, they consider inferior or intimidate political opponents. It should be noted that our definition does not exclusively cover illegal hate speech.

This definition is generally aligned with the definition in the Canadian Criminal Code, which argues that hate crime “needs to be expressed in a public way or place, targets a group of people that have a protected characteristic (race, religion, sexual orientation); uses extreme language to express hatred against that person/group because of their protected characteristic.”

ISD used keywords to filter each message in the overall dataset of 413,288 posts gathered across platforms: a message that did not have any keywords and phrases relevant to potential target groups was marked as not hateful, the rationale being that hate speech needs a recognisable target. Target groups from the previous briefing were Jewish people, migrants, Muslims, Asian

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Canadians, Black people, Indigenous communities and Arab Canadians. For this briefing, LGBTQ communities were added as a target group.

These messages were then run through a LLM prompt classifier, based on the group the keyword was from. The LLM prompts were tested on a manually labelled dataset for each target, along with variations to the prompt such as different wording and providing more guidance and examples. The labelled dataset itself was constructed with a label to identify if the message was hateful or not, and another label to state whether it was a 'boundary case', where it could be argued whether it fell into the hateful category. The evaluations took this into account and the results were evaluated both with and without the boundary cases, where the clear-cut messages were given priority to be correct over boundary cases. The two models that were used for this were GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini.

Violent Speech Classifier

Violent speech encompasses any language that explicitly or implicitly endorses, incites, or glorifies physical harm or violence against individuals, groups, or entities, including infrastructure.

ISD and CASM trained a classifier to detect violent speech such as:

- 1. Direct Threats:** Statements that explicitly threaten physical harm to a specific individual or group.
- 2. Incitement to Violence:** Calls to action encouraging others to commit violence, even if not directed at a specific target.
- 3. Threatening Language:** Statements that create a sense of imminent danger through referencing an individual's safety or violent tropes without directly threatening an individual or group
- 4. Glorification of Violence:** Celebrating, endorsing, or praising violent actions or individuals who commit violence.
- 5. Violent Rhetoric:** Language that normalizes, trivializes, or romanticizes violence as a means of resolving disputes or achieving goals.

6. Hate Speech with a Call to Violence: Language targeting a group based on race, religion, gender, etc., combined with a suggestion or call to violence.

7. Attacks Against Infrastructure: Language advocating for harm to infrastructure or property damage likely to result in harm to people or disrupt essential services, such as attacks on utilities, transportation systems, or similar infrastructure.

362 exact words/phrases were used to identify mentions of violence. These messages were then run through a LLM prompt classifier. The LLM prompts were tested on a manually labelled dataset for violent speech. The two models that were used for this were GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini.

Topic Modelling

ISD collected 444,010 posts from 302 domestic extremist accounts and channels in Canada across X, Facebook, Telegram, YouTube and Instagram between 1 March and 31 May 2025.

The process of semantic mapping involves (1) computing numeric representations of messages that capture semantics of the text, (2) clustering message representations to identify groups of semantically similar messages, and (3) manually coding clusters into themes and subthemes. For computing numerical representations, we utilised "bge-m3". For clustering we used a widely adopted approach of applying UMAP to simplify numerical representations to a lower-dimensional space, suitable for applying HDBSCAN to identify clusters. We utilised the BERTopic package to encapsulate this process.

We applied the semantic mapping pipeline to all messages in the dataset. We perform standard preprocessing techniques to (1) remove all hashtags, user mentions, emojis, and URLs from the text of the messages and (2) remove any subsequently empty messages. This resulted in 416,800 messages.

We performed a grid search of 24 configurations of clustering hyperparameters and selected the configuration that (a) resulted in a suitable number of clusters for review (approximately 300), and (b) was considered the best fit to the data, in terms of minimising the number of not clustered points.

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Semantic mapping resulted in 258 distinct clusters, with 54.5% (226,952) of the messages remaining unassigned to any cluster (assigned to an 'outlier' category). The outlier category acts as a bucket for messages that HDBSCAN doesn't consider similar enough to any of the identified dense clusters, and due to the noisy nature of social-media data is quite typical to be around half the dataset. This left us with 189,848 messages categorised into 258 clusters.

These clusters were subsequently manually assessed by analysts based on a random sample of 10-20 related comments and qualitatively grouped into subthemes and themes. The most popular themes are analysed in the key topics section above.

Named Entity Recognition (NER)

We used a language model from SpaCy (en_core_web_lg) to automatically find references to people, locations, and organizations in the text. Since this approach does not attempt to canonicalise extracted entities, we additionally apply the Mordecai3 geoparsing tool to the text to identify and map locations into countries, top-level Canadian administrative divisions (territories and provinces), and Canadian cities, where possible.

Language-Based Account Clustering

The process of account clustering involves: (1) representing accounts by their contributions (messages) to relevant themes (identified by the Semantic Mapping process); and then (2) clustering account representations to identify groups of accounts with similar thematic profiles.

Account representations are computed as their distribution over relevant themes to which they've contributed. We do not include the commenters of YouTube videos as accounts; this results in a dataset of 80,073 messages from 274 accounts. We apply the same clustering process used during Semantic Mapping: identifying clusters of accounts using a combination of UMAP and HDBSCAN. The clustering parameters selected results in 10 clusters, with 12.8% (35) accounts remaining unassigned to any cluster (assigned to an 'outlier' category).

Endnotes

- 1 Please note that hate speech targeting other groups, including misogynistic speech will be added into future quarterly briefings.
- 2 While all accounts and channels coded as Neo-Nazi or accelerationist were also coded as white supremacist, not all white supremacists were also coded as Neo-Nazis or accelerationists.

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