Risk, Needs and Threat Assessment

Read Ahead Materials for the US Prevention Practitioners Network

Background - the US Prevention Practitioners Network
Over the course of the next two years, the McCain Institute, with support from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and a steering committee of violence prevention and social safety experts, will develop and engage a US practitioners network for individuals working in targeted violence and terrorism prevention (TVTP). The aim of this is not only to connect practitioners across the US with one another, but also to build their capacity and the efficacy of their programs through a series of workshops that cover both theoretical and practical elements of delivering prevention and intervention initiatives. The first of these workshops covers risk, needs and threat assessment.

Why risk, needs and threat assessment?
Risk, needs and threat assessments are key tools to support practitioners and intervention providers with making structured and evidence-based decisions around risk mitigation, supervision and treatment decisions for at risk individuals, facilitating their safety and that of those around them. In the past few years, researchers and practitioners have endeavored to create a variety of frameworks specifically for TVTP. While generic violence and crime prevention frameworks are numerous, the applicability of these for assessing an individual’s risk in regards to violent extremist radicalization has been questioned. Among other concerns, such generic assessments are seen as insufficient because they do not consider political or ideological motivations and convictions. The past decade has therefore witnessed an emergence of assessment tools designed specifically for TVTP. This remains, however, a developing field with many unanswered questions and limited guidance on best practice.

What is the purpose of this document?
This document serves as an entry-level summary of the landscape of this nascent field, to provide existing and aspiring US-based intervention practitioners and program designers with useful language, learnings and key considerations to inform their own initiatives. It is not intended as a best practice guide for risks and needs assessment. Rather, it brings together important theoretical and practical considerations for practitioners to bear in mind and further research as they deliver this type of work. This information pack provides:

- a definitional introduction to the topic
- an overview of current practice, highlighting a selection of existing frameworks
- important considerations for program design, including emerging trends and recommendations
- a look into what we can learn from other criminal justice disciplines
- a glossary of useful terms
- and finally, further reading recommendations.

Documents like this one will be provided ahead of each workshop and will be used, alongside key takeaways from the workshops, to produce practitioner-focused toolkits for TVTP programming.
Introducing Risk, Needs and Threat Assessments

Risk, needs and threat assessments differ in their objectives. In TVTP, risk assessments seek to measure and understand the extent to which an individual is susceptible to radicalization, targeted violence or terrorism. Threat assessments often form part of this larger risk assessment and are used specifically to assess the imminence of danger, for example whether an individual poses an immediate threat to themselves or others. Needs assessments, on the other hand, are used to identify treatment and services that will improve their circumstances and build their resilience against radicalization, targeted violence and terrorism. Intended users depend on the setting in which the assessment takes place (e.g. in or outside of prison settings) and can range from social workers to mental health professionals to prison and probation staff.

Risk

In the context of countering targeted violence, risk assessment frameworks help practitioners assess, monitor and understand factors, and vulnerabilities or characteristics of an individual that may make them susceptible to extremist narratives and/or violent behavior.

Factors considered include:

Static or unchanging:
- Age and gender
- Criminal history
- Trauma history
- Other personal and family history

Dynamic or potentially changeable:
- Ideological convictions
- Attitudinal considerations
- Employment status
- Accommodation / living situation
- Substance abuse/misuse
- Capability (e.g. access to firearms)
- Coping mechanisms

Environmental / Relational:
- What do the individual’s networks look like? Including their friend groups, links with other extremists, family dynamics? Are they socially isolated or excluded?
- Is their home environment conducive to or protective from radicalization?

Needs

Needs assessments allow for practitioners to mitigate risk by identifying appropriate services and necessary types of support provision for the individuals concerned. Risk and needs assessments therefore generally work together to a) create an understanding of the risk level of an individual and b) identify “gaps” and criminogenic needs in the individual’s life that intensify risk and that can be managed or filled in order to lower their risk level.

Sample needs:
- Socioeconomic
- Educational or vocational, e.g. supporting the individual with getting into and understanding the job market
- Social services, including childcare
- Medical services
- Psychosocial support

Threat

A threat assessment is a type of risk assessment used specifically to determine the level and scale of immediate or potential danger that an individual poses to themselves, their surroundings and the wider community.

Importantly, threat does not just refer to physical danger, for example whether an individual has intent or capability to do physical harm. It can also refer to the influence of an individual - are they able to encourage others to commit harm on their behalf?

Considerations:
- Does the individual have access to firearms, knives or explosives?
- What is their attitude towards violence? Do they have a violent past?
- What is their attitude towards death (suicidality and homicidality)?

Good to know - risk factors vs. protective factors:

Some risk assessment frameworks also consider protective factors. The Research Triangle Institute (RTI) defines protective factors as those that “insulate and buffer an individual’s resilience to radicalization into violent extremist ideologies and organizations”, while risk factors increase the likelihood or make an individual more susceptible to radicalization and/or violent behavior. Examples of protective factors include stable employment, strong ties to community, and positive influence e.g. through family or other personal relations.
In Practice - Existing Frameworks for Risk, Needs and Threat Assessment

Although relatively nascent compared to other criminal justice disciplines, several risk and needs assessment tools and guidelines have been developed to aid frontline practitioners and other stakeholders with TVTP programming. The following three pages take a topline look at four of these, selected based on accessibility of information and to reflect different types of existing assessments. Summaries, strengths and limitations provided are informed by existing literature, listed in the "Further Reading" section of this document, as well as insights from ISD practitioners.

For a more comprehensive list of frameworks and related sources, see the final page of this document.

The Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG) were developed to assess risks of group-based violence (e.g. through gangs or extremist criminal networks) and examines both individual and group-level risk factors.

The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Revised (VERA 2R) is the second iteration of a framework used primarily in post-crime settings, with individuals already convicted of extremist-related or other violent offenses.

The Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+) originated in the UK as a framework for assessing and monitoring risk amongst individuals convicted of extremism-related offenses.

Radar was developed in Australia to assess individual-level risk of radicalization. It can be used in and out of prison settings, but is not intended for individuals already convicted of extremism-related offenses. It is designed for earlier use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Intended Demographic</th>
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<tr>
<td>ERG 22+</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement*, looks at risk and need, considers protective factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, looks primarily at risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radar</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, looks at risk and need, considers protective factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERA 2R</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, looks primarily at risk, considers protective factors</td>
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*See page 10 for definitions of useful terms.
In Practice -
Existing Frameworks for Risk, Needs and Threat Assessment

How does it work?

ERG 22+

Restricted access (not available to the public).
Requires training.

Categorizes factors into
a) Engagement
b) Intent
c) Capability
d) “Any other factor” (incl. protective factors)

Less structured than other frameworks in that factors provided serve more as guidelines - they don’t all need to be coded.

Strengths:

• Restricted access and training requirements help facilitate consistent and proper use
• Development was informed by an independent evaluation of its predecessor, the Structured Risk Guidelines (SRG)
• Considers protective factors and allows for inclusion of risk factors that are not specified by the framework
• The assessment is delivered collaboratively (offenders are encouraged to input) and is intended to be informed by multiple sources of information
• Encourages practitioners to consider external factors that may influence current or future risk level

Limitations:

• Training requirements may be a barrier for smaller organizations
• No red flag indicators may make thresholding more difficult
• The development of the ERG 22+ was informed partially by existing casework, but casework at the time of its development predominantly concerned Islamist extremism, potentially affecting the applicability to other forms of extremism.
• Equally, given it was developed in the early 2010s, it likely requires updating and refinement.

MLG

Open access (available for purchase by the public). Does not require training.

Categorizes factors into
a) Individual (factors irrespective of group affiliation)
b) Individual-group (e.g. identity and attitudes towards other groups)
c) Group (affiliated group norms)
d) Group-societal (societal context in which the group operates)

Strengths:

• Informed by multi-disciplinary empirical data and expertise from experts in terrorism, gangs, organized crime, cults
• Considers the influence, norms and dynamics of the group the assessed individual is affiliated with, while still accounting for factors that are unique to the individual / not influenced by the affiliated group
• The group-societal domains captures important contextual considerations that may influence the individual’s risk level

Limitations:

• Does not require training and is open to the general public. While this makes it more accessible, it also risks inconsistent or improper administration
• Does not account for or provide guidance on protective factors
• Recommended for use alongside other violence or TVTP risk assessments, so may be more resource-intensive
In Practice -
Existing Frameworks for Risk, Needs and Threat Assessment

**Radar**

Restricted access. Requires training. Recommended for police and social workers. Is designed to identify individuals in and out of prison settings who may benefit from programming as they are deemed at risk of radicalization.

Categorizes risk factors into
a) Ideology (e.g. beliefs and attitudes)
b) Social Relations (e.g. family / friend networks)
c) Criminal Action Orientation (e.g. criminal history, attitudes towards violence, towards others)

These are assessed in a two-step process that starts with an initial screening and is followed by an in-depth risk assessment.

**Strengths:**
- Considers protective factors
- The intervention that follows the risk assessment considers additional domains, including coping mechanisms and understandings towards identity, helping to identify appropriate support
- Assessments are reviewed by a panel

**Limitations:**
- Protective factors are limited
- Purpose of the tool is early prevention (preventing further radicalization), so may not be as applicable in all settings as other tools

**VERA-2R**

Restricted access, requires training.

Designed to be informed by multiple sources of information.

Categorizes risk factors into
a) Beliefs and Attitudes (e.g. hostility to national collective identity)
b) Context and Intent (e.g. personal contact with violent extremists)
c) History and Capability (e.g. prior criminal history)
d) Commitment and Motivation (e.g. driven by criminal opportunism)
e) **Protective factors** (e.g. community and family dynamics)

**Strengths:**
- Accounts for protective factors
- The 34 factors considered in the framework have extensive descriptions and include sample questions
- Framework also provides thorough criteria per risk rating
- Allows for factors not listed in the framework to be considered / added to the assessment
- Requires training and upon completion of training, practitioners receive a VERA-2R manual to refer to as they use the framework. This facilitates consistency in use and quality assurance

**Limitations:**
- Although this is somewhat mitigated by the capability risk domain, there is no explicit guidance on red flag factors or indicators listed. This may make thresholding or decision-making around escalation more difficult
- The protective factors included are limited and do not sufficiently account for individual characteristics that facilitate resilience to extremism and extremist violence

For more strengths and limitations of the ERG 22+, MLG and VERA-2R, see the CREST directory in the “Further Reading” section.
For more about Radar, see "The Practitioner’s Guide to the Galaxy" and RTI’s "Use of Assessment Tools..."
In Practice -
Existing Frameworks for Risk, Needs and Threat Assessment

Takeaways - what does this tell us?

Method:
Structured professional judgement has become the go-to method for risk and needs assessment. This is generally lauded by professionals and academics, and is considered the leading existing practice.

Factors:
Literature about existing frameworks for TVTP risk assessments demonstrate there is notable overlap in the risk factors they consider. The four risk frameworks provided reflect this - although framing of the domains differs, they each consider ideological / attitudinal factors, as well as capability considerations.

While some don't include explicit red flag indicators to determine threat and imminence thereof, the "capability" domain they include helps mitigate this by still accounting for ability to commit violence.

Finally, the inclusion of protective factors in assessment, although improving and recommended as good practice, is still limited.

Key Considerations for Program Design

Risks and needs assessments are undoubtedly complex processes. While there are now several options and approaches for TVTP practitioners to consider, there is no agreed-upon, universal tool with which to measure risk and need as it relates to targeted violence and terrorism. This in part reflects the fact that there is no single pathway into or out of violent extremism, that there are multiple, distinct “varieties” of violent extremism, and that TVTP is still a relatively nascent field in which accessibility to relevant data remains a problem. Risks, needs and threat assessment in TVTP therefore remains an emerging field with few certainties. However, regardless of which framework practitioners opt for, there are a series of considerations highlighted in the literature and drawn from the sample of frameworks provided that should be accounted for as practitioners deliver risk and needs assessment.

1) Target Demography and Setting(s)

a) In what settings do you work / will you be expected to deliver risk and needs assessments? For example, will you be working in:
   - Pre-crime or post-crime?
   - With individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalization or those already affiliated with violent groups?
   - In prison settings or outside of prisons?
   - With children and youth? This may require additional considerations that existing frameworks don’t account for.

b) Given this, what is the purpose of your risk and needs assessment? Is it to assess risk of first violent extremist offense or of re-offense and recidivism? Or are you looking at earlier stages and assessing risk of radicalization in the first place?
Key Considerations for Program Design

2) Frequency, Recording and Reporting Structures

a) How often should risk and needs assessments take place? Given the importance of dynamic risk and protective factors in determining overall risk, how frequently and at what intervals should these factors be re-assessed?

b) How should assessments and judgements be recorded and stored? Practical questions around language used to assign risk levels, documentation and storage are important to help facilitate consistency, to account for staff turnover and to abide by proper data security practices.

c) Does your risk and needs assessment rely on self-reporting by the individual concerned and/or also on (external) data collection? E.g. from family members, law enforcement, medical health services? If the latter, how do you intend to gather this data? Consider data-sharing agreements and memorandums of understanding.

3) Thresholding and Escalation

a) What distinguishes adjacent risk levels from each other? What makes a case high risk versus medium risk?

b) At what point should cases be escalated? Consider “red flag indicators”. If the individual is assessed as posing an immediate threat to themselves or their environment, do you have the appropriate pathways in place to escalate their case to other authorities?

Consider also when cases should be referred externally, e.g. if they require specialized support. Considerations like these highlight the importance of conducting needs assessments, whether as part of or adjacent to risk assessments. They allow for practitioners to identify appropriate internal and external services that can address the individual’s needs and either maintain or lower their risk level.

4) Staffing, Training and Administration*

Consider staffing requirements and budgetary implications of delivering risk and needs assessments. For example, while structured professional judgement is considered the best existing practice for risk assessment, it does require staff that are already well-versed and experienced in relevant subject matters and whom have the ability to recognize and mitigate personal biases that may influence their overall assessment.

Equally, many of the existing frameworks require training to be used properly, which in turn bears financial and accessibility considerations. A lack of proper training risks improper or inadequate use of the chosen framework, in turn risking the delivery of inaccurate assessments.

Consider also the diversity of your staff - do you have trained male and female staff? Personal bias and diversity trainings are also advised.

*Staffing will be covered in the second workshop delivered for the US Prevention Practitioners Network.
Emerging Trends and Recommendations

It is important for practitioners to also be aware of emerging trends and the potential trajectory of TVTP risk and needs assessments. Among others, emerging trends include:

- **An increased focus on digital footprints and social media**, whereby either a) individuals’ digital lives and social media behavior are captured in the risk assessment or b) individuals are identified for further risk assessment and, where necessary, online or offline intervention programming because of the nature and content of their digital lives. In interviews with intervention providers, ISD learned there is increased appetite and need for interventions to have some form of online component - whether that’s as simple as providers making themselves known online so individuals can refer themselves for support, or whether this manifests as direct, targeted outreach. Equally, the need for more sophisticated incorporation of digital considerations in risk and needs assessments lies in the centrality of the online world to extremist radicalization and recruitment processes. An individual’s digital footprint can therefore provide important insight into their vulnerabilities and treatment needs, but of course should always be contextualized within their offline behavior.

- **Greater demand or call for validation of existing frameworks and greater systemization of their use** - while there has been some progress in this regard, none of the existing frameworks for TVTP risk assessment have been validated to the extent that assessments in other, related disciplines have. Equally, inconsistent application of the frameworks can skew or lower their overall use and impede on efforts for validation or for evaluation.

- **Better or more systematic inclusion of protective factors and needs assessment** to allow for decision-making (regarding support provision and rehabilitative requirements) that is led by the individual’s needs and informed by a holistic understanding of risk. Related to this are recommendations for research into how risk factors engage with each other and with protective factors.

What can we learn from other disciplines?

While risk assessment frameworks for other, related disciplines are considered by many to be insufficient for TVTP, they are generally more established and better evaluated than those that exist specifically for this emerging field. Applicable learnings can be drawn from such "tried and tested" approaches, to inform how practitioners assess and manage risks and needs pertaining to TVTP. Further, research by the National Institute of Justice shows us there is significant overlap in the risk factors covered by generic violence prevention frameworks and those designed especially for TVTP, suggesting there is benefit in being aware of other frameworks to understand how they compare and differ from TVTP frameworks, and how each can draw from the other. The following page therefore summarizes three risk assessments from other criminal justice disciplines, including generic violence and serious harm prevention, as well as gang prevention and reduction. See also the "Further Reading" page for more.
## In Practice - Learning from Other Disciplines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Summary:</strong></th>
<th><strong>How does it work?</strong></th>
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</table>
| **HCR- 20 v3** | The Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management (HCR-20 v3) tool is a risk assessment tool for violence prevention. First developed in 1995, the tool is now in its third version and is thus well-established and has been tried and tested. | The tool uses three overarching risk categories to assess individual risk level, including:  
- a) historical factors (including criminal, social, trauma and personal history, as well as history of addictions and other potentially harmful behaviors)  
- b) clinical factors (e.g. concerning mental health, emotional stability, psychosocial considerations)  
- c) potential / future risk factors |
| **ROSH** | The Reduction of Serious Harm (ROSH) provides guidance for risk and needs assessment as well as mitigation and management for individuals in the UK’s criminal justice system. The guidance is therefore catered to assess risk of re-offense and of future offense being of a more serious or dangerous nature. | The ROSH prescribes a four-step risk and needs assessment process, which involves:  
1) an actuarial assessment that determines risk level in accordance with empirical data of similar offenders  
2) an assessment of dynamic risk and protective factors  
3) “immediacy” or an assessment of the individual’s current situation and circumstances (e.g. do they have access to potential victims, do they still exhibit intent to do harm?)  
4) using steps 1-3 to assign an overarching risk level. |
| **YSET** | The Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) is a risk and needs assessment tool that gang prevention and other community practitioners can use to determine whether an individual (aged 10-15) would benefit from additional care to prevent them joining a gang. | The YSET’s initial assessment uses seven domains to assess risk, including: antisocial tendencies, weak parental supervision, critical life events, impulse risk taking, guilt neutralization, negative peer influence and peer delinquency. Those that are deemed high-risk and eligible for programming are then re-assessed six months later, in which self-reported delinquency and family gang influence are also looked at. Re-assessment is also used to evaluate the programming, e.g. to determine if any of the risk levels per domain decreased or not. |

### So what learnings can we apply to TVTP risk and needs assessment?

- **HCR- 20 v3**
  - The HCR-20 v3 also looks at needs and potential or future risk areas that need to be managed to maintain or lower risk levels, including employment, accommodation, personal relations, and coping mechanisms. Similar practice, specifically the inclusion of needs in risk assessment frameworks, is strongly advised by TVTP practitioners and academics. The HCR-20 v3 therefore provides a useful example to model this on.

- **ROSH**
  - The ROSH provides an interesting example of how to think about protective factors in relation to risk factors. The guidance provides prompts for practitioners to ask themselves as they decide upon a risk level, as well as tips for thresholding, which has applicability in TVTP risk assessment, e.g. when deciding if/when to escalate a case to external authorities.

- **YSET**
  - Finally, from the YSET, we see practical and tested examples of combining risk and needs assessment to identify eligibility for programming, and how these assessments are delivered multiple times per individual to monitor progress and to evaluate programming.
Useful Terms

- **Targeted violence**
  In its [Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/counterterrorismstrategicframeworktargetedviolence_0.pdf), the Department of Homeland Security defines targeted violence as “any incident of violence that implicates homeland security and/or U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) activities, and in which a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to the violent attack”. The definition is based on [research from the NIJ](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pbcsearch/servlet/PBCSearchServlet?PAGE=SearchResults&SearchId=13538), wherein the term was first coined.

- **Criminogenic needs**
  Criminogenic needs are needs which, if not filled, may lead to criminal behavior. They typically encompass four to eight needs domains. [See here](#) for more.

- **Risk factors**
  Factors that “increase the likelihood of a given outcome”. In the case of TVTP, factors that increase the likelihood of radicalization and violence.

- **Protective factors**
  Factors that make an individual more resilient to a given outcome, or that decrease the likelihood of a negative outcome. In the case of TVTP, factors that “insulate and buffer an individual’s resilience to radicalization into violent extremist ideologies and organizations”.

- **Factors vs. indicators**
  Although often used interchangeably, factors and indicators are distinct. RTI distinguishes between the two as follows: “...factors increase the likelihood of a given outcome, while indicators help signal the presence of that outcome”. In practice, therefore, a risk factor could be having an extensive criminal history, while an indicator would be an individual expressing threats or violence offline or online.

- **Disengagement vs. deradicalization**
  Disengagement in TVTP refers to “the abandonment of extremist activity, [while] deradicalization is viewed as involving the abandonment or rejection of extremist beliefs and ideology”.

- **Radicalization vs. mobilization**
  In TVTP, radicalization is the complex process by which an individual adopts extremist beliefs and ideology. Mobilization refers to when an individual [prepares to engage](https://www.dhs.gov/home_Advisories/BestPractices/PreventMobilization) in violent extremist or terrorist activity, for example facilitating or committing an attack, or travelling for violent extremist or terrorist purposes.

### Types of Assessment

- **Clinical risk assessments** are based on interviews and qualitative data collection between a clinician or practitioner and the individual concerned. Clinical risk assessments are often criticized as too subjective, as the assessment relies predominantly on the practitioner’s judgement or “weighting” of identified risk factors and is therefore subject to significant personal bias.

- In the criminal justice space, **actuarial risk assessments** “use measurable and statistically significant predictors or risk factors” to provide a quantitative assessment of risk informed by databases of offenders with similar criminal and/or personal histories. Actuarial assessments are typically disregarded in TVTP as too inflexible as they are based on static factors that the individual has or doesn’t have in common with other offenders.

- **Structured Professional Judgement** combines the strengths of clinical and actuarial risk assessments by leveraging both relevant statistics and practitioner experience. They are presently considered the preferred method for risk assessment as they account for the individuality of extremist offenders or individuals at risk of this, the invaluable experience of practitioners, all while still providing guidelines and criteria per assessment.
Further Reading

Below are a few useful resources for further reading. These resources were also used to inform the contents of this document.

**TVTP Specific:**

- [Extremism Risk Assessment: a directory](#)  
  By the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) - *provides a useful overview of six TVTP risk assessment frameworks (ERG 22+, IR 46, IVP, MLG, TRAP-18, VERA-2R)*

  By the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) - *compares the VERA-2R, ERG 22+, SQAT, IR 46, RRAP, Radar and VAF*

- [Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us](#)  
  By Allison G. Smith Ph. D. - *this is a very useful source, which compares two TVTP risk assessments with one for generic violence*

- [Countering Violent Extremism: The Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Criminal Justice and Rehabilitation Process](#)  
  By the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) - *a useful overview of the history of risk assessment and challenges this in TVTP*

- [Countering Violent Extremism: The Use of Assessment Tools for Measuring Violence Risk](#)  
  By RTI - *runs through existing frameworks for risk assessment and associated challenges*

- [An Imprecise Science: assessing interventions for the prevention, disengagement, and de-radicalization of left and right-wing extremists](#)  
  By the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) - *research based on interviews with online and offline intervention providers*

- [Developing, implementing and using risk assessment for violent extremist and terrorist offenders](#)  
  By the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) - *provides guidance for risk assessment in TVTP*

- [Violent Extremism: a comparison of approaches to assessing and managing risk](#)  
  By Caroline Logan and Monica Lloyd - *maps the landscape of risk assessment, with a close look at a selection of existing frameworks. Also includes guidance for making risk assessments."

**Other:**

- Gang Prevention Resources: [Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Research and Evaluations, Overview of GRYD Services](#)

- Risk Assessments from Other Disciplines: [Suicidality, Child Sexual Exploitation Risk and Vulnerability, Gender-Based Violence](#) (this has a set of questions specifically for children and adolescents), [Generic Violence Threat Assessment](#)
### Appendix - Additional TVTP Risk Assessment Frameworks

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (A-Z)</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+)</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, post-crime, all ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful sources:</strong> <a href="#">Inter-rater reliability of the ERG 22+</a></td>
<td><a href="#">The Structural Properties of the ERG 22+</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP)*</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, pre-crime, any individual in a community setting about which there is concern, all ideologies but domains assessed steer heavily towards Islamist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">Guidance for IVP to Recruitment into Violent Extremism</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Radicalization (IR 46)</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, pre-crime, for individuals who may be susceptible to Islamist extremist ideology, for Islamist extremism only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">CREST Extremism Risk Assessment directory</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG)</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, pre and post-crime, for any individual affiliated with or formally a member of an extremist group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful sources:</strong> <a href="#">MLG</a>, <a href="#">Risk Assessment and Management of Group-Based Violence</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADAR</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, pre-crime, for individuals identified as (potentially) at risk by counter-terrorism officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">Evaluating Case-Managed Approaches</a>, see “Data Sources”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Radicalization Prevention in Prisons (R2PRIS) / Radicalization Risk Assessment in Prison (RRAP)</td>
<td>R2PRIS provides two frameworks - the Frontline Behavioral Observational Guidelines and the Individual Radicalization Screening (IRS). Both are Structured Professional Judgement, both are intended for use in prisons.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">www.r2pris.org</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee 45</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, designed specifically to assess the commitment, motivations and risk of returning foreign fighters and family members thereof from Syria and Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">RAN Manual Responses to Returnees</a>, p. 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance Quest Assessment Test (SQAT)</td>
<td>Uses a self-questionnaire, for individuals in or after detention. It uses the 3N radicalization model of “needs, narrative and network” and Likert scales to assess risk or degree of radicalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">The Practitioner’s Guide to the Galaxy</a>, pp. 15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18)*</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, pre-crime, for individuals identified as (potentially) at risk by counter-terrorism officials and law enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful sources:</strong> <a href="#">Manual, Risk Management Authority</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Revised (VERA-2R)</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, pre and post-crime, all ideologies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Useful sources:</strong> <a href="#">European Commission, Risk Management Authority</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF)</td>
<td>Structured Professional Judgement, any individual deemed at risk of radicalization, all ideologies. Has since been replaced by the ERG 22+.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful source:</strong> <a href="#">Channel Vulnerability Assessment</a></td>
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</tbody>
</table>