



Baseline Evaluation Report for PROACT: Community-Based Interventions in Kenya Program

Acknowledgments

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) in partnership with Act Change Transform (Act!) is leading an innovative community-based intervention program in Kenya entitled PROACT.

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

Act!	Act Change Transform
AS	Al-Shabaab
AVRI	Assisted Voluntary Return and Integration
CAP	County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CEF	County Engagement Forum
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CT	Counterterrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
FBO	Faith-Based Organization
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GOK	Government of Kenya
HH	Household (survey)
HURIA	Human Rights Agenda
IPL	Isiolo Peace Link
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
ISD	Institute for Strategic Dialogue
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
MRC	Mombasa Republic Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PROACT	Community-Based Interventions in Kenya Program
SCN	Strong Cities Network
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VE	Violent Extremism

Executive Summary

Violent extremism has been a growing issue in Kenya since al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based terrorist jihadist group active in East Africa, has expanded its activity and attacks to countries neighboring Somalia. Major attacks by al-Shabaab in Kenya include the Nairobi Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013, Mpeketoni attack in 2014, the Garissa University attack in 2015 and more recently, the Nairobi hotel siege in 2019.¹ More than 400 people have been killed as a result of attacks executed by the violent extremist group. More concerning to prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) practitioners, has been the number of Kenyan citizens travelling over the Somali border to join al-Shabaab, or those being forcefully recruited.² In the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) *Journey to Violent Extremism in Africa*, most former violent extremists admitted to joining extremist groups across the continent due to human rights abuses at the hands of militaries and police.³ Unfortunately, Kenya's security forces are often criticized for its hard-handed security measures which have led to multiple civilian deaths. In 2019, Human Rights Watch submitted a report in which it expressed concerns over enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of violent extremist and criminal suspects. Communities are continuously faced with threats, intimidation and harassment by police and the military—incidents which are rarely reported or investigated.⁴

Against the backdrop of distrust in security forces nationally, P/CVE practitioners, traditional and community leaders are often tasked with addressing the causes of radicalization, which not only pertains to human rights abuses but also socioeconomic drivers like poverty and unemployment. To help address these challenges, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) through funding from the US Department of State is implementing PROACT: Community-Based Interventions in Kenya program for the period 2019-2022. The program aims to enhance community resilience to address and prevent polarization, radicalization and extremism, which are security and conflict concerns in the prioritized counties of Isiolo, Kwale, and Nakuru.

This program includes the distribution of sub-grants to several community-based organizations (CBOs) to implement the program in the counties of Isiolo, Kwale, and Nakuru respectively.⁵ PROACT supports and strengthens existing structures and strategies such as County Action Plans for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (CAPs), as well as its organs such as Community Engagement Forums (CEFs) to build local capacities for community-designed and delivered P/CVE interventions. It also contributes to ISD's Strong Cities Network (SCN) whose purpose is strengthening municipal and local capacities to counter radicalization and recruitment by violent extremist groups.⁶

Considering the lack of a clear evidence base of radicalization and drivers of violent extremism (VE) in Kenya, PROACT collaborated with Act! to develop this baseline report to study community-based P/CVE interventions in the counties of Isiolo, Kwale, and Nakuru. This baseline study established an initial dataset that will serve as a baseline for tracking and evaluating how the program contributes to increasing communities' resilience to address polarization, radicalization, and extremism. The results have been used to revise the theory of change and the logical framework designed for each county and provide baseline figures and targets for indicators. It relied on a household quantitative survey approach to gather primary data in the program counties. Data was collected in the three programmatic counties from 5 to 25 August 2020.

Key Findings

- The overwhelming majority of respondents identified poverty as the main socioeconomic driver or cause of radicalization and VE in Isiolo, Kwale and Nakuru. The link between divisive religious ideologies and radicalization and VE is similar in Isiolo and Kwale. However, the link is less pronounced in Nakuru which has a predominantly Christian population.
 - Regarding perceptions about hard-handed security measures across the three counties, the majority believed that police use unnecessary force when dealing with citizens. Additionally, a low proportion of respondents said they engage well with the police.
 - Online recruitment by VE groups, such as al-Shabaab, is posing a significant challenge in Kenya. This threat is difficult to address because of the challenges and concerns involved in monitoring the communications of individuals. There are no clear guidelines for schools, parents, or other caregivers, nor has there been sufficient public education on the issue.
 - Non-state actors are perceived to be the most effective in delivering P/CVE programming. Religious leaders and local civil society organizations (CSOs) in Isiolo and Kwale are considered crucial in addressing and preventing radicalization and VE.
 - Regarding state agencies' successes in P/CVE programming: the majority of respondents believed that national government administration officers, especially chiefs, are perceived as the most effective state P/CVE actors. Slightly more than half of the respondents in Nakuru and Isiolo believed that the police are also effective in P/CVE, but only a small percentage believed so in Kwale.
 - The study established that the infrastructure and systems for formal mental health and psychosocial support services (MHPSS) for counseling youth who have been affected by or are vulnerable to radicalization and VE are weak or even non-existent in places such as Isiolo. Nearly all MHPSS respondents expressed that they could benefit from technical assistance in capacity building on VE and methods of assisting and handling alleged Al-Shabaab returnees from Somalia and at-risk youth. Additionally, the institutions also reported other significant challenges like clients presenting with complex, multifaceted psychological and psychosocial conditions, family problems, and a lack of resources. MHPSS services also tend to be expensive and remain out of the reach of most people.
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Recommendations

PROACT stakeholders should consider integrating research and advocacy activities on police abuses and police-citizen engagement into their projects in the three program counties. Civil society stakeholders could also design strategies that safeguard their autonomy while they enter into strategic partnerships with the police and other security agencies. They must be able to keep an objective distance from the police so that they can freely point out gaps in policing and human rights compliance when required.

There is a need for more police engagement/training, especially with the junior ranks on the need for professionalism in handling reports on suspected cases of violent extremists received from community members. Communities fear being victimized by violent extremists and have concerns about police protecting the confidentiality of report makers or informants, and the information given. Police and other security forces can benefit from **awareness-raising campaigns** that pertain to how their actions could perpetuate radicalization into VE.

PROACT could consider having programmatic linkages to ongoing community-based crime prevention initiatives in **all the program counties** that are not necessarily P/CVE-focused. Security and conflict issues cannot be addressed effectively in silos and should address, as far as possible, the complex manifestations of crime and violence that affected people in the program counties.

P/CVE stakeholders in the country and the program counties should develop a clear understanding and effective response to the **problem of online recruitment** by violent extremist groups. This is especially urgent in Isiolo where the problem is significant. The response needs to be addressed through a variety of actors such as parents, schools, businesses, and the private sector.

The role of chiefs and religious leaders in receiving reports from communities needs to be enhanced, with proper follow-ups and protection of the informant and confidentiality of the information provided for their safety. This includes strengthening their roles as leaders in delivering P/CVE activities in the counties, as they are often considered well-trusted authority figures.

PROACT stakeholders need to carry out strategic advocacy to encourage both the national and county governments to **invest more resources in MHPSS systems**. Urgent action should be taken to form innovative non-state institutional partnerships to introduce MHPSS services in Isiolo. To inform further programming, PROACT should conduct a more in-depth review and documentation of the important lessons civil society actors learn in **Kwale** and **Nakuru** as they work to address the mental health and psychosocial consequences of violence.

Introduction

This baseline evaluation is the first of a series of community-driven research activities in the “Community-Lead Research and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the PROACT program”. Its purpose is to establish an initial dataset that will serve as a baseline for tracking and evaluating how the program is contributing to increasing communities’ resilience to address polarization, radicalization, and extremism.

The objectives of the study were to provide:

1. Baseline values for measuring the outcome indicators in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks of the program and sub-grants’ projects, and tracking and reporting progress and achievements.
2. Datasets and information to revise the program’s theory of change and M&E framework.
3. Baselines for making conclusions about the program’s effects and the sustainability of outcomes at the mid-term and end-term evaluation stages.
4. Baseline assessments of community and stakeholders’ knowledge and understandings of the issues of VE, radicalization, and polarization in the program counties.
5. Baseline assessments of community and stakeholders’ understanding of and participation in interventions aimed at addressing and preventing VE.
6. Information on MHPSS is available to individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist groups in the program counties.
7. New knowledge and analytical information on emerging issues on radicalization and VE in the program counties.
8. Case studies, lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations to inform the review and redesign and implementation of the existing sub-grants, as well as the planned innovation grantees.

The baseline study used a quantitative approach to gather primary data in the three program counties of Kwale, Nakuru and Isiolo counties.⁷ The study sites in the program counties were established and sampled through the initial desk review and consultations with PROACT partners. Data was collected in the three counties from 5-25 August 2020 using digital administration of a household (HH) survey and administration of a mini-survey to community leaders, CSOs and government leaders. Mapping of MHPSS facilities and services in the three counties was also carried out. Table 1 shows the household samples reached.

Household survey: A HH survey was administered to 1,230 respondents using the Open Data Kit-ODK platform. This is an online platform where respondents could complete the survey and send it to a central database once they were connected to the internet. A sampling frame was developed for each county to help identify households and respondents in households per focus area. HH selection in the village was done using a systematic sampling method and simple random sampling was used to select the respondents from those 18 years and above in a household. This was to ensure randomness and provide representative data.

Table 1 Summary sampling frame for the household survey.

County	Population (2019 census)	Estimated sample population (18+)	Sample size (planned)	Sample size (actual)	Approx. confidence interval
Kwale	866,820	400,000	400	415	4.9
Isiolo	268,002	100,000	400	416	4.9
Nakuru	2,162,202	1,500,000	400	399	4.9
Total		2,000,000	1,200	1,230	

Data analysis: The quantitative data from the HH survey, the mini-survey, and the mapping of MHPSS facilities were processed and analyzed on MS Excel and SPSS. Data coding, cleaning and organizing preceded data analysis to provide benchmarks for indicators targets in the PROACT results framework. Based on the analysis, the study generated conclusions, lessons, and programmatic recommendations for stakeholders' consideration.

1.1 Overall Findings Across Counties

1.1.1 Household survey characteristics

Some 1,230 respondents were reached by the HH survey in Isiolo, Kwale and Nakuru. These samples were as follows.

Table 2 Sample selection by sub-county and households.

County	Sub-county	Household sample
Isiolo (416 HHs)	Isiolo Sub-County	342
	Merti Sub-County	74
Kwale (415)	Matuga Sub-County	229
	Msabweni Sub-County	186
Nakuru (399)	Nakuru Town East	57
	Nakuru West Sub-County	342


There was near gender parity in the respondents reached. Approximately 48.6% of respondents in Isiolo were men and 51.4% were women. Men accounted for 51.3% of respondents in Kwale, while women were 48.7%. In Nakuru, men made up 47.9% of respondents, and women were 52.1%. The mean age of respondents was almost the same in Isiolo (37 years), Kwale (38.9 years) but lower in Nakuru (33.7 years).

In terms of religious identity, Muslims were predominant in Isiolo (80.8%), while Christians account for 18.5%. Similarly, Kwale County is predominantly Muslim (89.6%) but there is a small Christian minority (10.4%). Christians are predominant in Nakuru, accounting for 95.2% of the population.

1.1.2 Perceptions and understandings of radicalization and violent extremism

Survey findings on perceptions and understandings of radicalization show significant variance across the three program counties. Figure 1 shows the trends as regards perceptions of safety and direction of radicalization.

Figure 1 Perceptions and understanding of radicalization.



Public perceptions of the risk or threat of terrorism:

Most people in Isiolo (62.5%) reported feeling safe from threats of terrorism, followed by Kwale (42%), and Nakuru (27.3%). Further analysis indicated that there was no significant gender-based variance in response to the question about safety from threats of terrorism across the three counties. However, the data shows that religion is a significant factor affecting perceptions about safety from threats of terrorism in the three counties. Nearly twice as many Christians (30.2%) compared to Muslims (17.5%) reported not feeling safe from threats of terrorism. This is reasonable given that violent extremists in Kenya have deliberately targeted Christians as happened in the 2013 terrorist attack at the Westgate Mall, the 2014 terrorist attack in Mandera targeting Christians/non-Muslims in a bus, and the 2015 rampage through Lamu County.

Public perception on trends of radicalization:

Survey findings show significant variance across the three counties in public perceptions of the trend of radicalization. A good number of respondents in Isiolo (58.9%) and Kwale (41.2%) believe that the radicalization of young people by violent extremist groups is decreasing. In stark contrast, the minority

(21.6%) feel radicalization is in decline in Nakuru. It is good to note that Nakuru respondents were equating gang activity to radicalization and VE, which it is not. There was no significant gender-based variance in responses to the question about prevailing trends (decreasing/increasing). However, religion emerges as a significant factor affecting perceptions about the trend of radicalization in the three counties: Nearly three times as many Christians (38.6%) as Muslims (12.1%) believe that radicalization is increasing. Christians are clearly afraid of terrorism and tend to blame Muslims—many do not think radicalization is happening among Christians.

It can be deduced from these findings that PCVE stakeholders; including the CAP model, have not successfully demystified the perception that Islam as a religion tolerates VE. A lot; including using empirical data, needs to be done to reverse this flawed thinking, especially among the majority of Christians in Kenya.


1.1.3 Vulnerability factors

The respondent’s perceptions data indicate that VE in the program counties is driven by the prevailing poor socioeconomic conditions, including factors such as poverty, inequality, unemployment and low educational outcomes. The overwhelming majority of respondents—86.1% in Isiolo, 79.8% in Kwale, and 82.7% in Nakuru—identified poverty as the main socioeconomic driver or cause of radicalization and VE in the program counties. Roughly the same proportion of people—34.9% in Isiolo, 39.3% in Kwale, and 33.4% in Nakuru—believe that substance abuse is a key driver although further research into this linkage is required.

Given the focus of the program as regards community interventions in reducing radicalization and VE, the prevalence of perceived historical and contemporary injustices against certain ethnic, racial or religious groups, divisive religious ideologies and peer influence was investigated. The results are shown in Figure 2.

The HH survey data shows the link of divisive religious ideologies on radicalization, VE is higher in Isiolo, and Kwale (31.3% and 19% respectively) compared to Nakuru (4.8%). The low percentage for Nakuru can be explained by the fact that ideological radicalization and VE has not been felt in Nakuru to the same extent as in

Figure 2 Chart showing selected vulnerability factors by county (%).



Isiolo and Kwale. It may also be linked to the fact that most people (96.3%) in Nakuru identify as Christians (perceived to have less divisive religious ideologies).


The proportion of respondents who mentioned perceived injustices as a driver of terrorism were few with 4.8% in Nakuru, 12% in Kwale and 16.3% in Isiolo. These findings contradict a widely held narrative about marginalization and historical injustices as a key factor in radicalization, especially in Kwale and Isiolo. However, these findings could still explain radicalization in other parts of the country as found by a number of researchers.⁸ Inadequate understanding of “injustices” among the respondents may have also contributed to the finding that is at odds with other findings.

On the other hand, slightly over one-third of the respondents across the three counties perceive radicalization as being linked to peer influence from bad friends. This is highest in Nakuru (40.6%), followed by Kwale at 38.6% and Isiolo at 38.5%.

1.1.4 Community interventions and prevention of violent extremism

Prevention of radicalization involves a multiplicity of actors and interventions from psychosocial to tangible provisions to address the drivers. The respondents were asked whether there were opportunities for counseling and vocational training in the community

Figure 3 Perceptions of violent extremism prevention interventions.



to take care of at-risk youths. They were also asked From the responses, opportunities for counseling were least in Isiolo County with 31.5% of the respondents saying there were no opportunities for counseling. Nakuru and Isiolo followed this with 17.8% and 12.3% of the respondents saying there were no opportunities for counseling respectively. This information was collaborated by the mapping of psychosocial facilities, which indicated the near non-existence of such facilities in Isiolo.

In Isiolo County, 51% of the respondents said there were no opportunities for youth to access vocational training. Fewer respondents said so for Kwale (27.5%). And even fewer Nakuru County respondents (23.1%) said there were opportunities for vocational training for youth. Taking up vocational opportunities can help to keep disaffected youth busy and reduce unemployment, identified as a key vulnerability factor in this research. More advocacy is required for stakeholders to set up more opportunities for vocational training in the three counties or create more public awareness and link the youth with existing openings.


Respondents were also asked how effective community leaders (elders, women and youth leaders) were in P/CVE. Community leaders in Isiolo seem to be most effective in P/CVE with 64.4% of the respondents

rating them as effective. This is in comparison to Kwale and Isiolo respondents who rated them 41.9% and 52.4% respectively. Community leaders are therefore least effective in P/CVE in Kwale County.

Police response and prevention of violent extremism

Respondents in Nakuru (53.9%) and Isiolo (41.6%) believe the police are effective in P/CVE, but less in Kwale think so (31.6%) (Figure 4). This relates well with another finding where the respondents said police use unnecessary violence on suspects, which was 58.8% for Kwale, a figure higher than the other two counties (56.2% for Isiolo and 55.1% for Nakuru). The use of unnecessary force, therefore, does not translate to effectiveness in P/CVE.

Figure 4 Reporting of violent extremism cases and police effectiveness.




Less than half of the respondents said people report suspected cases (49.6% in Nakuru, 46.5% in Kwale and 44.2% in Isiolo). 19.8% of respondents in Kwale said people fear to report due to non-confidentiality by the police, with 19% in Isiolo and 15% in Nakuru. Most Kenyans continue to fear reporting cases related to VE and crime to the police (and security actors generally) because of their well-documented history of human rights abuses, corruption, and lack of professionalism for instance exposure of whistleblowers/report makers.

1.1.5 Police citizen engagement

The study established that police abuse and poor police-citizen engagement are serious concerns in the three program counties. Past studies have shown that abusive security practices can themselves frustrate and trigger young people to decide to join extremist groups.⁹ Despite this, the study established that police abuses are not a major trigger for young people in the three counties to join violent extremist groups with only 16.1% of respondents in Kwale, 12.5% in Isiolo and 7.5% in Nakuru indicating it as a factor.

The study established that nearly half of respondents believe that authorities take action on CVE reports made with the highest number being Isiolo (54.8%) followed by Kwale and Nakuru at 47.7% and 41.6% respectively (Figure 5).

Figure 5 Perceptions of state and non-state actor collaboration in %.



Roughly the same proportion of respondents—56.5% in Isiolo, 58.8% in Kwale, and 55.1% in Nakuru—believe that police use unnecessary force when dealing with citizens. The use of violence probably contributed to the low proportion of respondents who said they engage well with the police at 18.9% for Isiolo, 28.7% for Kwale and 34.6% for Nakuru.

Nevertheless, the majority of respondents said they are willing to report suspicious behavior with 76.9% in Isiolo, 58.8% in Kwale and 72.2% in Nakuru, meaning they still have trust in the police. However, this figure is lower in Kwale (which reports a bigger problem of police non-confidentiality) compared to Nakuru and Isiolo. Unlike the other two counties, Kwale has had a legacy of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and a high number of returnees hence poor relations with law enforcement agencies as a whole.¹⁰

Across the three counties, a high proportion of the respondents indicated that police are slow in response to threats or incidences of terrorism (70.4% in Nakuru, 69.6% in Kwale and 66.8% in Isiolo).

Findings by County

2.1 key findings in Isiolo

Perceptions and understanding of radicalization and VE

Survey results indicate al-Shabaab (58.6%) is the most prevalent terror group in Isiolo, others mentioned included ISIS (5.3%) and al-Qaeda (7%) although this is an affiliate of al-Shabaab. Under others (8.2%) a common term mentioned was “shifita”, these “bandits” were active in the 1960s but still remembered by the older generation.¹¹ Local gangs made up the remainder of other prevalent violent groups in the county.


Asked if they feel safe from threats of terrorism, the majority of the respondents in Isiolo, (62.5%) felt safe, as illustrated in figure 1. The majority of respondents also believe radicalization is decreasing (58.9%) with only 10.3% thinking it is increasing. Some 12.7% believe there is no change while 18% are not sure. So, the perception in Isiolo is that radicalization and VE is decreasing, and with that trend, residents are feeling safer.

Vulnerability factors

From the study, most respondents in Isiolo believe poor socioeconomic conditions are the main drivers of radicalization and VE. A large majority (86.1%) of HH survey respondents in Isiolo identified unemployment as a key driver of radicalization and VE; while 68% identified poverty and inequality as key drivers (Figure 6). Roughly equal proportions of respondents cited substance abuse (34.9%) and religious ideologies (31.3%) as key drivers.


Specific problems cited included widespread poverty and unemployment, drug abuse, low levels of education, unequal access to economic opportunities, and the historical marginalization of northern Kenya by the state. Asked about the “factors that cause young men and women from Isiolo to join violent extremist groups”, most respondents identified low household income (65.1%), poor parenting (48.1%), negative peer influence (38.5%), and inadequate access to education (31.3%). Figure 6 indicates public perceptions about the key drivers of radicalization and recruitment in Isiolo.

Figure 6 Public perceptions about the key drivers of radicalization and recruitment in Isiolo.



Public perception on the effectiveness and relevance of state P/CVE mechanisms in Isiolo¹²

The survey findings indicate more than half of the respondents in Isiolo (56%) believe that the government agencies take action on reports and issues of VE (Figure 7). About a quarter (26.2%) feels that they do not and 18% are unsure whether they do or not.



Separate from the issue of “government taking action”, respondents were asked about the “effectiveness” of government P/CVE actors. A large majority of respondents (74.9%) think that chiefs are the most effective government actor in P/CVE. The high rating can be partly explained by the fact that chiefs are more accessible than the police because

they are appointed locally from where they serve and live. Less than half (41.6%) of the respondents believe that the police are effective in P/CVE. Asked if the police respond fast enough to threats or incidents of terrorism, only a quarter (25.5%) think they do.

Public perceptions of the effectiveness and relevance of non-state actors P/CVE mechanisms in Isiolo¹³

Non-state actors were perceived as the most effective P/CVE practitioners, ahead of all state actors, except for chiefs. Survey findings indicate that the majority (79.3%) of respondents in Isiolo think that religious leaders are the most effective actors in addressing and preventing VE. A majority of respondents (64.4%) thinks that community leaders (elders, women and youth leaders) are effective, while slightly more than half (50.5%) believe non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are effective. It can be deduced that religious leaders have a high rating in terms of P/CVE on the account that they are better suited to counter al-Shabaab's ideological polarizing narratives. Religious leaders, because of their understanding of religion, can also provide positive ideological narratives unlike most of the other stakeholders.

State and non-state actor collaboration on P/CVE in Isiolo

In Isiolo, 35.1% of the mini-survey respondents which included representatives from government agencies, CSOs, P/CVE practitioners and religious leaders, feel collaboration between state and non-state actors in PCVE is high or very high. In terms of the effectiveness of this collaboration, 64.9% of respondents feel

collaboration between state and non-state actors is effective or very effective in addressing and preventing radicalization and VE in Isiolo.

Crime reporting behavior in Isiolo

The survey findings indicate that slightly more than three-quarters (76.9%) of respondents are willing to report suspicious behavior to the police, while 13.9% are not and 4.8% are not sure if they would. Of those who reported in the negative, the most common reasons given were "fear of being victimized by violent extremists" (24%) and "concerns about police protecting the confidentiality of information given" (19%). People were less likely not to report because of "lack of concern or interest" (9.8%) or "lack of knowledge about where to report" (4.1%).

Less than half (44.2%) of respondents believe that people report suspected cases of terrorism or radicalization or recruitment of youth by violent extremist groups. About a third (30%) do not think so and a significant proportion, (26.2%), do not know. When asked who they believed people report to, nearly half (47.6%) said chiefs, followed by police (23.8%), counties (16.6%), and less than 5% each for other actors, including Nyumba Kumi committees (a community policing model based on ten neighboring households), village elders, religious leaders, and local NGOs. The low rating on the other "community-based" actors could be because they don't have the mandate to arrest and prosecute suspects, especially where an immediate response is needed. They are mainly the "soft" responders known for prevention and reconciliation.

Table 3 Public perceptions about key security and conflict issues in Isiolo County.

Rating (Likert scale) ¹⁴	Violent crimes	Natural resource conflicts	Gender-based violence	Electoral political violence	Clan-based violence
7	48.3%	48.1%	39.4%	39.4%	28.8%
6	16.8%	20.4%	19.2%	19.2%	17.8%
5	8.2%	5%	9.1%	9.1%	12.7%
4	9.9%	3.8%	7.9%	7.9%	11.1%
3	12.3%	10.8%	14.7%	14.7%	17.8%
2	3.8%	6.3%	8.7%	8.7%	11.3%
1	0.7%	5.5%	1%	1%	0.5%

Public perceptions of policing, human rights, and VE in Isiolo

The survey findings indicate that more than half (56%) of respondents believe that the police use unnecessary force. Around 30% believe they do not, while 14% stated that they did not know. Most (78%) of survey respondents feel that the police-citizen engagement in Isiolo is very poor or poor.

VE, organized crime, and conflict and social cohesion in Isiolo

Survey respondents were asked to rate how important the following security issues were by rating once with 1 being the least and 7 being the highest. Survey findings indicate that violent crimes (which includes VE) are the most pressing security and conflict concern in Isiolo, rated 7 by 48.3% of the respondents. This was followed by natural resource conflicts, gender-based/domestic violence (GBV), electoral political violence and clan-based violence (Table 3).

2.2 Key findings in Kwale

Trends in radicalization and recruitment in Kwale


Survey results in Kwale indicate that al-Shabaab is the main, active terror group in Kwale County involved in radicalization, terrorist recruitment, and perpetrating terrorist attacks. Affected areas include Bongwe-Gombato and Kibundani (Msambweni Sub-County) and Waa and Ng’ombeni (Matuga Sub-County). Al-Shabaab is considered the most active violent extremist group by 23.4% of survey respondents, followed closely by the secessionist Mombasa Republican Council (22.7%).¹⁵

Some 41.5% of HH survey respondents believed that radicalization and recruitment are decreasing. In contrast, a third (33.5%) believed that radicalization is either continuing or increasing. Nearly a quarter (24.6%) of respondents indicated they were unsure about the trend.

Public perceptions of the drivers and causes of radicalization and VE in Kwale

Respondents believe that poor socioeconomic conditions are the main drivers of radicalization and VE in Kwale. The majority (79.8%) of survey respondents in Kwale identified unemployment, followed by poverty and inequality (62.9%), alcohol and substance abuse (33.5%), and religious ideologies and divisions (25.5%)

Figure 8 Public perceptions about the key drivers of radicalization and recruitment in Kwale.



as the main drivers of radicalization and VE (Figure 8).¹⁶ Several survey respondents recommended that VE could be addressed by reducing poverty levels through youth job creation.


The impact of VE

Survey findings indicate that nearly the same number of respondents feel *safe* (42%) and *unsafe* (44.8%) from threats of terrorism; 10.6% were neutral on this particular question. Two-thirds (66%) of mini-survey respondents which targeted representatives from government agencies, CSOs, P/CVE practitioners and religious leaders, believe that individuals and groups have *low* confidence to publicly discuss issues of VE. The locals fear that they may be identified by extremist groups, their recruiters or sympathizers and government agencies for reprisal if they openly discuss these issues. As pointed out by Kwale CAP, the county has suffered from extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, especially of the youth. Chiefs, peace committee and Nyumba Kumi elders have also been killed for speaking against groups such as al-Shabaab.

Public perceptions of the effectiveness and relevance of state P/CVE mechanisms in Kwale¹⁷


Nearly half (47%) of survey respondents think that the government takes action on reports and issues of VE (Figure 9). Approximately one-third (30%) think that

they do not, while 21% expressed that they do not know whether the government takes action on such reports.



Less than half of respondents (43.1%) believe that chiefs are the most effective government actors in addressing P/CVE in Kwale compared to the county government (39.3%) and the police at 31.6% (Figure 10). Of all the government actors, police are perceived to be the least effective. P/CVE outreach activities led by chiefs and other officers of the National Government Administration Office in Kwale were judged effective in reaching and educating the public on radicalization and VE.

Figure 10 Public ranking of the effectiveness of state and non-state actors on preventing and countering violent extremism in Kwale.



In as much as the survey found that police are perceived to be less effective in PCVE, 39% of respondents believe that the police respond *fast* to threats or incidents of terrorism, while about a third (30.6%) believe that they respond *slowly*. This infers that the police are not doing enough to

meet the community’s expectation of enforcing law and order.

Public perceptions of the effectiveness and relevance of non-state actor prevention measures¹⁸

Survey findings indicated that 52.5% of respondents believed and ranked religious leaders (Islam, Christian and traditional) as the most effective non-state P/CVE practitioners, followed by community leaders (political, youth, women leaders) and NGOs (43.6%) and local community leaders (elders) at 42.2% (Figure 10).

Crime reporting behavior in Kwale

Survey findings indicated that 58.8% of respondents are willing to report suspicious behavior to the police but 29.6% are not. The most common reasons for not reporting were “fear of being victimized by violent extremists” (24%), “concerns about police protecting the confidentiality of information given” (19.8%), and “lack of follow up” (15.4%). People were also less likely to fail to report because of “lack of knowledge about where to report” (11.3%) or “lack of concern or interest” (9.9%).

Public perceptions of policing, human rights, and VE in Kwale

Survey findings show that 58.8% of respondents in Kwale believe that the police use unnecessary force when dealing with citizens in the county. However, about a third (26.3%) believe police do not use unnecessary force and 11.8% did not know. A total of 65.2% of respondents in Kwale also believe that the police-citizen engagement in the county is *non-existent, very poor, or poor*. Just about a third of the respondents (28.9%) believe that they engage very well or well with the citizens. Several survey respondents recommended the need to improve police accountability by tackling abuses.

Although there is the risk that the use of unnecessary force by police can frustrate and trigger young people to decide to join extremist groups, only 16.1% of survey respondents reported that police abuse is a driving factor to joining VE groups.¹⁹

Some 25% of the mini-survey respondents (which includes representatives from government agencies, CSOs, P/CVE practitioners and religious leaders) in Kwale *strongly agreed or agreed* that the police and other security actors have a sufficient understanding of human rights and the skills needed to ensure they

respect human rights. A similar percentage disagreed and 20% were neutral or had no opinion on the matter.

Public perceptions of VE, organized crime, and conflict and social cohesion in Kwale

Survey findings indicate that natural resource-based conflicts and violent crimes (this includes VE), are the most pressing security/conflict concerns followed by GBV (intimate partner violence (IPV) and domestic violence), electoral/political violence, and ethnic-based violence (Table 4). A rating of 7 was the highest while 1 was the lowest in terms of perception. Each respondent ranked a conflict concern once. Natural resource conflicts rated the highest at 7 (45.1%) followed by violent crimes at 43.4%.

Table 4 Public perceptions about key security and conflict issues in Kwale.

Rating	Natural resource conflicts	Violent crimes	Gender-based violence	Electoral political violence
7	45.1%	43.4%	42.7%	30.6%
6	18.6%	22.2%	16.9%	15.7%
5	11.3%	9.4%	11.3%	9.9%
4	10.1%	9.4%	9.9%	18.8%
3	7%	8%	9.6%	10.4%
2	5.8%	5.5%	6.7%	11.1%
1	2.2%	2.2%	2.9%	3.6%

2.3 Key findings in Nakuru

Trends in radicalization and recruitment in Nakuru


Results from the HH survey suggest that only a very small minority (0.5%) of respondents reported that al-Shabaab exists and is active in the county. A total of 46.6% of HH survey respondents knew about and mentioned the Confirm gang, followed by Mungiki (10%) and Kamjesh (3.3%).²⁰ Most respondents equated the crime and violence perpetrated by gangs with terrorism when responding to the relevant survey question. However, it is important to note that Confirm is a gang of robbers and thieves not terrorists with any ideological or religious intentions. No one mentioned international terror groups such as ISIS.

While most (70.1%) of the mini-survey respondents in Nakuru reported that youth were *much more vulnerable* or *vulnerable* to violent extremist groups or gangs, no terrorist attacks have occurred in Nakuru in the six months (February-July 2020) preceding the start of this study, nor have any been documented in the past. A third (30.6%) of the respondents believe that terrorist recruitment has taken place during that period, while more than half (52.6%) do not think so. A total of 46.4% believe that radicalization is increasing, while less than a quarter (21.6%) believe that it is decreasing.²¹

Public perceptions of the drivers and causes of radicalization and VE in Nakuru

The majority (82.7%) of HH survey respondents in Nakuru identified unemployment as a key driver of radicalization and VE (as alluded to and in their understanding, VE includes crime and violence perpetrated by gangs; which is not the case, especially for purposes of this study), followed by poverty and inequality (43.6%), substance abuse (39.3%), and religious ideologies and divisions, over 11% (Figure 11).

Figure 11 Public perceptions about the key drivers of radicalization and recruitment in Nakuru.



Public perceptions of the impact of VE in Nakuru

HH survey findings indicate that more than half of respondents (59.4%) in Nakuru *do not feel safe* from


threats of terrorism (most respondents equated terrorism with the crime and violence perpetrated by gangs in the county, which to them is terror). Only about a third of respondents (27.3%) reported that they felt *very safe* and *safe*, while 12% were neutral. About 60% of mini-survey respondents (representatives from government agencies, CSOs, P/CVE practitioners and religious leaders) believe that individuals and groups in Nakuru have *no confidence* at all or *very low confidence* to publicly discuss issues of VE and engage at-risk youth. About 20% believe there is *some confidence* or *more confidence*.

Public perceptions of the effectiveness and relevance of state P/CVE mechanisms in Nakuru²²

As indicated in figure 5 earlier in the report, about 70.4% of HH survey respondents felt that the police response to threats and incidents of terrorism (including crime and violence perpetrated by gangs) is *slow*.

HH survey findings indicate that 42% of respondents in Nakuru think that government agencies take action on reports and issues of VE (read as crime and violence) (Figure 12 below). All most a similar number (39%) feel that they do not and 19% are unsure whether they do or not (10% – maybe and 9% – don't know). Government actors perceived as most effective in addressing VE and crime are, in order of importance: chiefs (62.7%), the police (53.9%), and the county government (38.6%).

Figure 12 Public perceptions about whether authorities act on reports of violent extremism and crime in Nakuru.



Public perceptions of the effectiveness and relevance of non-state actor prevention measures in Nakuru²³

Non-state actors are perceived as most effective in addressing and preventing VE and crime. Survey findings indicate that a majority (65.2%) of respondents in Nakuru believe that religious leaders are the most effective in this respect, followed by community leaders such as village elders (59.6%), and NGOs (46.4%).

State and non-state actors collaboration on P/CVE in Nakuru

Almost half (40%) mini-survey respondents (representatives from government agencies, CSOs, P/CVE practitioners and religious leaders) believe that state and non-state actors collaborate *very effectively* and *effectively* to address and prevent VE in the county. About a third (29.8%) think that collaboration is *very ineffective* and *not effective*. Less than half (29.8%) of the mini-survey, respondents rated the level of engagement and collaboration between the two sides as *low* and *very low*; 17 respondents rated it *neutral*. Only 20% of respondents rated it *very high* or *high*. A majority, 60% of mini-survey respondents believe that local groups working to prevent VE are using the knowledge they have acquired from different supporting organizations to help address and prevent radicalization and VE.

Crime reporting behaviour in Nakuru

HH survey findings indicated that 72.2% of respondents are willing to report suspicious behavior to the police, around a quarter (26.8%) are not.²⁴ Of those who reported in the negative, the most common reasons given were “fear of being victimized by criminals/violent extremists” (25.6%) and “concerns about police protecting the confidentiality of information given” (15%). Respondents indicated they were less likely to fail to report because of “lack of follow up [by the police]” (11.3%) or “lack of concern or interest” (9.8%).


Almost half (49.6%) of the HH survey respondents believe that community members in Nakuru report suspected cases of terrorism or radicalization or recruitment of youth by violent extremist groups. About one-third (32.1%) do not think so, while 18.3% do not know.²⁵ When asked whom they believed people report to, 35.3% of the respondents said the police. They are followed by chiefs (10.5%) and less than 5% each for

other actors, including Nyumba Kumi committees (2.5%), village elders (3%), and peace committees (3%).

Public perceptions of policing, human rights, and VE in Nakuru

More than half (55.1%) of the HH survey respondents believe that the police in Nakuru use unnecessary force when dealing with citizens in the county. Around 37.3% believe they do not use unnecessary force, while 7.8% stated that they did not know. A total of 57.3% of respondents in Nakuru believe that the police do not engage well with citizens (Figure 13). However, 42.6% believe they engage *very well, well, or fairly* with citizens.

Figure 13 Perceptions about quality of police-citizens engagement—Nakuru.



Public perceptions of VE, organized crime, and conflict and social cohesion

Violent crimes are perceived as the most important security problem by respondents of the HH survey in Nakuru, followed by GBV and political violence. A 2018 study on urban violence carried out in Nakuru Municipality and Naivasha and Molo sub-counties also singled out crime and violence committed by gangs as the most significant security issues, followed by GBV and political violence.²⁶

Regarding the perception that poor socioeconomic conditions facilitate radicalization, researchers were interested in the existing programs to address these challenges. Less than half (38%) of respondents in Nakuru believe that young people have access to vocational training.

Table 5 Public perceptions about key security and conflict issues in Nakuru.

Rating	Violent crimes	Gender-based violence	Electoral political violence
7	46.6	34.8	27.1
6	30.3	35.6	21.8
5	4.5	5.5	9.8
4	3.8	4.3	8.3
3	6.8	7.5	16.5
2	7.3	9.8	12.8
1	0.8	2.5	3.8

Support, rehabilitation, and mental health and psychosocial support facilities and services

The available MHPSS facilities in Kwale and Nakuru counties provide a substantial foundation to be built upon and supported technically, financially, and through policy, to better address the needs of persons affected by VE. However, Isiolo County has insufficient MHPSS facilities and services available to support persons affected by VE, and indeed, any other category of persons. The study mapped 10 MHPSS facilities in Kwale and established that eight of them have some capacities that can be strengthened or retooled to provide mental healthcare services to persons affected by VE. In Nakuru, nine of the facilities mapped appeared to be viable in this respect. All of the facilities indicated that they have safe and secure storage of physical client files but have no clear information security policies for the management of electronic files.

The facilities in the three counties are a mix of government, NGO, faith-based, and private sector institutions, which specialize in providing care and support to psychiatric patients, GBV and IPV survivors, other clients affected by trauma, youth-in-conflict with the law, and substance abusers. Approaches used include individual counseling, family counseling, group therapy (e.g., trauma healing circles), community outreach, substance abuse treatment, and referral services. Three of the facilities in Kwale have a specific focus on alleged returnees, delinquent and at-risk youth, and families affected by VE.

Coast Education Center (COEC), Likoni Community Development Program (LICODEP), Mercy Corps, and Samba Sports Youth Agenda are some of the most prominent institutions providing MHPSS services that are tailored to the needs of people affected by VE in Kwale. Notable examples of approaches are COEC's women's focused trauma healing circles and Mercy Corp's intergenerational guidance and counseling approach. COEC's initiative focuses on supporting women experiencing VE-related trauma, including the loss of family members to al-Shabaab, through "trauma healing circles" facilitated by a professional psychologist. The trauma healing circles have helped participants to address their psychological distress and heal in preparation for reintegration into their communities. Mercy Corps work with local communities in Ukunda through mentors and community leaders

to provide guidance and counseling to individual alleged returnees. Its initiative also aims to help alleged returnees engage better with people in the community by addressing the fear and concerns people have about associating with them and/or their families. A Kwale County government facility administers methadone to recovering drug addicts.

In Nakuru, the Mid-Rift Human Rights Network and DIGNITY are implementing the Intersectoral Urban Violence Prevention (IUVP) Project, which has a significant focus on harnessing intersectoral MHPSS capacities and resources to support survivors of crime and violence.²⁷ The IUVP project is operating in several parts of Nakuru County, including Nakuru Town and Naivasha Town municipalities. One of the main lessons learned in the project's implementation is that many survivors of violence and trauma do not complete the recommended treatment regimen of five psychosocial support sessions with counselors. Societal stigma, prioritization by survivors and families of the physical health aspects of violence, and lack of resources to travel to the sessions explain the non-compliance.

Despite the growing drug problem there (see section 2.1), Isiolo does not have any rehabilitation or counseling centers. People seeking substance abuse rehabilitation and other forms of MHPSS have to travel to the neighboring counties of Meru and Laikipia to access services. However, two government staff consulted (key informants) told the study that the national and county governments are currently consulting on the strengthening of MHPSS systems and infrastructure in the county, which includes establishing a rehabilitation center. Notwithstanding the gaps and challenges, Isiolo CAP and CEF stakeholders are moving ahead and have established an initiative that works with religious leaders and other actors to provide informal counseling sessions to families, alleged returnees, and at-risk youth.

3.1 Challenges and sustainability of mental health and psychosocial support services

Except for COEC, LICODEP, Samba Sports Youth Agenda in Kwale, officials in nearly all MHPSS told the study that they could benefit from technical assistance in capacity building on VE and methods of assisting and handling alleged returnees and at-risk youth. The institutions also reported other significant challenges. For example, clients present with complex, multifaceted psychological and psychosocial conditions, family problems, and a lack of resources. MHPSS services also tend to be expensive and remain out of the reach of most people.

Several institutions indicated that they do not have sufficient numbers of trained counselors and support staff, and have to rely quite substantially on volunteers. They also do lack sufficient equipment and space. Funding gaps limit the quality and coverage of services they can provide. In terms of sustainability, most non-profit institutions cannot operate on their own in the absence of donor support.

Valued for its cost-effectiveness, community-level peer-to-peer counseling is an approach that has not been sufficiently explored. In addition, working more through institutional partnerships, such as the Nakuru County Mental Health Technical Working Group can enhance coverage of services, skills transfer and sharing of resources. Others recommended the need to exploit the capacity of the Ministry of Health's community health volunteers, who have been trained to provide psychosocial support, trauma counseling, and make MHPSS-related referrals.

MHPSS practitioners indicated that there is a low level of official and public acknowledgment of the need for MHPSS and investment in this sub-sector.²⁸ Communities still stigmatize people with mental health conditions and illness, and the resulting shame prevents them and their families from seeking treatment and support. Overall, MHPSS has not been a major medical and public health priority of the government as evidenced by its low level of funding.

Conclusion

Non-state actors are among the most important P/CVE actors in all the program counties. The coordination of CAPs is done via the CEFs as there is some donor funding for CSOs, making CSOs the face of the programs. Many of them cannot mobilize sufficient resources to implement P/CVE interventions on their own. Despite having significant technical capacities, community-level security and conflict management mechanisms, including Nyumba Kumi committees, village elders, and sub-county peace forums, are largely ineffective in Isiolo and Kwale. Lack of funds to facilitate their work and concerns about the security of members affect the impact of these mechanisms in Kwale, even though they can play an important P/CVE role.

The data shows that public concern about ordinary crime and violence outweighs issues of radicalization and VE in all the program counties. Therefore, there is the risk that the public, whose support and cooperation programs such as PROACT depend on, perceive P/CVE programs as elitist initiatives with limited connection to people's lived experience of crime and violence. This disconnect could affect community ownership of P/CVE programs. In addition, the nexus between crime and VE in **Kwale** and **Nakuru** is a matter of concern that requires further exploration. While it has been more firmly established in the context of Isiolo there continue to be gaps in understanding it well. Perhaps what the public is missing, something that the study should have mined, is the nexus between unresolved conflicts and VE.

Online recruitment by al-Shabaab (and possibly other international terrorist groups) is emerging as a significant challenge in all the program counties that is difficult to address because of the challenges and concerns involved in monitoring the communications of individuals. There are no clear guidelines for schools, parents, or other caregivers, nor has there been sufficient public education on the issue.

There is a limited understanding and appreciation of the dynamics of radicalization and VE among parents, caregivers, teachers, etc., in all the program counties. Important opportunities to address and prevent the problem could slip by if they are not equipped with the right information and tools. This concern is also tied to the perceived association of dysfunctional family settings and poor parenting on the one hand, and vulnerability to radicalization and VE on the other.

MHPSS services for at-risk populations are weak in **Kwale** and **Nakuru** and almost non-existent in Isiolo. The facilities suffer from a lack of adequately trained personnel and operating resources. Moreover, the study established that MHPSS communities in **Isiolo** and **Kwale** do not have strong functional linkages to organizations and practitioners supporting at-risk youth. However, **Nakuru** is an exception as the Mid-Rift Human Rights Network, and other CSOs, are working together with the Nakuru County Mental Health Technical Working Group to address the link between violence and mental health.

There are gaps in the understanding of gendered dimensions of radicalization and recruitment by violent extremist groups in all the program counties, notable in the paucity of relevant studies. Although this study attempted to uncover these dynamics, PROACT and other P/CVE programs could benefit from more nuanced analyses of the gendered dimensions of radicalization and VE.

Drug abuse has been widely associated with vulnerability to VE in all the program counties. Yet the data and analysis demonstrate that the links between the two issues have not been established in the Kenyan context. The linkages between the two issues require more attention from P/CVE practitioners and researchers, psychologists, and law enforcement.

The success of P/CVE efforts in all the program counties depends significantly on the quality of police-citizen relations. However, the persistence of police abuses and poor police-citizen relations and engagement undermines the ongoing police reforms process and P/CVE efforts. Fear and the dislike of the police cause the public not to engage them and share critical information on crime and VE.

CAPS in the three counties are not being implemented as envisioned. This stems from the fact that governments in all the program counties are not fully invested in the idea of the CAPs. Although a latecomer, the Isiolo CAP appears to have gained the most traction, while those of **Kwale** and **Nakuru** are relatively stagnant.

Programs and initiatives such as Kazi Mtaani and Affirmative Action Funds that have been established to address youth unemployment and marginalization are relatively small in scale compared to the extent of the need.²⁹ While P/CVE stakeholders in all the program counties view them as key to addressing the deprivations that make young people vulnerable to crime and terrorist recruitment, they are not designed as a diversion or exit programs and therefore cannot effectively target the hard-to-reach segment of youth who may be most vulnerable.

While poverty and unemployment are common factors in Kenya and other developing countries, their existence does not necessarily lead young people towards VE. It can therefore be concluded that other critical factors – divisive religious and ideological narratives—are also at play, especially in **Isiolo** and **Kwale**.

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- 2 The Conversation, [Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined al-Shabaab](#), 2021.
- 3 UNDP, [Journey to Violent Extremism in Africa](#), 2017.
- 4 Human Rights Watch, [Kenya Fails to Honor Human Rights Promises to UN](#), 2019.
- 5 There are two categories of sub-grants. 1. Main partners i.e. Act Change Transform (Act!) that is a research, monitoring and evaluation partner; Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) – leading PROACT activities in Kwale county; Midrift Hurinet – Nakuru county lead and Isiolo Peace Link (IPL) – Isiolo county led. 2. Innovation grantees (six in total supporting grassroots early prevention work targeting youth and women-focused interventions). They are: Youth Bila Noma (YBN) & Nakuru County Youth Bunge Forum (NCYBF) in Nakuru county; Sponsored Arts For Education (SAFE) Kenya & Jamii Action Centre (JAC) in Kwale and Pastoralists Women Livelihood Support (PWLS) & Isiolo Women of Faith (IWOF) in Isiolo county.
- 6 SCN supports the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism that addresses violent extremism by strengthening local-level civil society prevention efforts and supporting the reintegration of former violent extremist offenders into society.
- 7 Kwale: Bongwe-Gombato and Kibundani (Msambweni Sub-County) and Waa and Ng’ombeni (Matuga Sub-County). The adjoining Maweni-Likoni Sub-County, Mombasa County is also affected. Isiolo: Wabera Ward and Bulla Pesa Ward in Isiolo Sub-County, Cherab Ward in Merti Sub-County, and Kinna Ward in Garba Tula Sub-County. Nakuru: Kaptembwo Ward and Kivumbini Ward.
- 8 Anneli B. (2014), Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom (2015), Anderson & McKnight (2015) and UNDP (2017).
- 9 UNDP, [Journey to violent extremism in Africa](#), 2017.
- 10 The Republic of Kenya and Human Rights Agenda, [Kwale County action plan for countering violent extremism](#), 2017.
- 11 Shifta was a secessionist armed group that wanted Somali-inhabited regions in Kenya to join greater Somalia. They were labelled shifta, a local name for bandits, by the Kenyan government.
- 12 State P/CVE actors in Isiolo. Government: Isiolo County Government-Peace and Cohesion Department, National Government Administration Office, National Police Service, and Kenya Defense Forces. Donor Programs: Building Resilience in Civil Societies (BRICS) (UK Government, Building Resilience against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) (US Government and The Peace Center of the Center for Sustainable Conflict Resolution), Peace, Security, and Stabilization Program (PSS) (Embassy of Denmark/Danida, and Act!) Program to Address Polarization, Radicalization, and Extremism (PROACT) (USDOS, ISD, and Act!), and the Niwajibu Wetu Program (USAID and DAI). Other actors: British Army.
- 13 Non-state P/CVE actors in Isiolo. CBOs, NGOs, and faith-based organizations (FBOs): Council of Imams and Madrassa Teachers, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Interfaith and Women of Faith Networks, Inter-Religious Council of Kenya, Isiolo Council of Elders, Isiolo Peace Link, Isiolo Nasib Youth Merti, Integrated Development Program, Nomadic Women for Sustainable Development, Program for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa, and the Strong Cities Network.
- 14 The Likert scale is a psychometric scale widely used in research through questionnaires. In this scale, 1 denotes the lowest and 7 the highest in terms of priority or causal factor.
- 15 MRC is not seen as a terrorist but a violent group.
- 16 Divisive religious ideologies are the sum of religious ideologies (19%) and religious divisions (6.5%).
- 17 State P/CVE actors in Kwale. Government: Kwale County Government-Countering Violent Extremism Desk, National Government Administration Office, National Police Service, and National Counterterrorism Center.

Donors Programs: Assisted Voluntary Return and Integration Program (AVRI) (International Organization for Migration), BRICS II (UK Government, Mercy-Corp, and Wasafiri), BRAVE (US Government and the Peace Center of the Center for Sustainable Conflict Resolution), Kenya NIWETU Program (USAID, Search for Common Ground, and Haki Africa), PSS (Danida and Act!), and PROACT (USDOS, ISD, and Act!).
- 18 Non-state P/CVE actors in Kwale. CBOs, NGOs, and FBOs: Amadia Muslim Mission, Coast Education Center, Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, Gombato Youth Focus, Haki Africa, Human Development Agenda, Human Rights Agenda, Jamii Action Center, Kenya Red Cross.
- 19 UNDP, [Journey to violent extremism in Africa](#), 2017.
- 20 Mungiki and Kamjesh are criminal gangs that have existed and operated in Nairobi and Nakuru and other parts of the country for around two decades. Both gangs have been linked to violent crimes, including murders, kidnappings, political violence, and are reportedly heavily involved in extorting public transport sector operators.

- 21 It is likely that the large minorities that believe radicalization is taking place and is on the rise, have either been keenly following media reports of arrests of people suspected to be involved in terrorism or also misunderstood the relevant question, equating the grooming of young people by gangs to the phenomenon of terrorist radicalization. That most people believe there is no radicalization is taking place in the country resonates with the fact that there is scant information available to the public about the activities of violent extremists in the country, but people working at the intersections of crime, violence, and religion know otherwise.
- 22 State P/CVE actors in Nakuru. Government: Nakuru County Government-Countering Violent Extremism Desk, National Government Administration Office, National Police Service, and National Counterterrorism Center. Donors Programs: Peace, Security, and Stabilization Program-PSS (Danida and Act!), and Program to Address Polarization, Radicalization, and Extremism-PROACT (USDOS, ISD, and Act!).
- 23 Non-state P/CVE and conflict actors in Kwale. CBOs, NGOs, and FBOs: Center for Conflict Resolution, Center for Transformational Leadership, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Mid-Rift Human Rights Network/DIGNITY, Psychiatric Disability Organization, Peace, Reconciliation, and Rehabilitation Initiative, Resource Conflict Institute, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, and SCN. Private sector: Nakuru Business Association.
- 24 These findings show there is a high reporting rate. However, it is likely respondents who answered affirmatively were probably affected by social desirability bias i.e., wanting to be viewed favorably by researchers.
- 25 As indicated elsewhere in this section, it is highly probable that respondents equated "suspected cases of terrorism" to the crime and violence committed by gangs and "suspected cases of radicalization" to the grooming processes gangs use to recruit members when responding to the relevant survey question.
- 26 Danish Institute Against Torture, [Urban Violence in Nakuru County, Kenya, 2018](#).
- 27 Danish Institute Against Torture, [Urban Violence in Nakuru County, Kenya, 2018](#).
- 28 Republic of Kenya/Office of the Auditor General, [Performance audit report on provision of mental healthcare services in Kenya, 2017](#).
- 29 National Hygiene program that has been designed to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic by improving hygiene in the communities and providing youth with incomes to cushion them from the economic impacts of the pandemic.
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