ISD | Powering solutions to extremism and polarisation

STRONG CITIES

MULTI-AGENCY MODELS FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A GUIDEBOOK FOR BANGLADESH

About This Toolkit

The purpose of this multi-agency model (MAM) guidebook is to help local governments in Bangladesh implement a multi-stakeholder approach to the prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE). This toolkit therefore provides an entry-level overview of how MAMs for the purpose of countering extremism may look, and how to establish such a model. The toolkit draws from international best practice to inform a series of guidelines and tips for contextualising and applying local multi-agency approaches in Bangladesh.

The Strong Cities Network

The toolkit was designed by the Strong Cities Network (SCN), a global network of local leaders dedicated to combating hate, polarisation and extremism in all its forms. Launched at the UN General Assembly in 2015 and led by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), the SCN comprises 150 member cities across the world, providing mayors and local practitioners internationally with the expertise, models, tools, and resources needed to drive an effective grassroots response to hate, polarisation and extremism.

In Bangladesh, the City Corporations of Dhaka North, Dhaka South and Narayanganj are all members of the SCN.

Acknowledgements

Contents

Introduction

The SCN

Launched in 2015 at the United Nations General Assembly, the SCN mounts a city-led response against hate, polarisation and extremism. We support our members, currently comprised of 150 cities across the world, with the design and deployment of local, evidence-based responses to the complex challenges of hate and extremism. Through our city-exchange programmes, regional workshops and capacity-building, we make sure cities are equipped with international best practice as they design and deliver P/CVE initiatives.

Our Core Work Streams

Design: Policy & Strategy	**Build:** Local Prevention Infrastructure	**Train:** Training & Capacity-Building	**Inform:** Data & tools	**Connect:** Global & local partnerships

SCN in Bangladesh

In February 2019, SCN representatives travelled to Dhaka to conduct in-depth interviews and consultations with city mayors, local officials and partner organisations. The consultations included meetings with then-Mayor Khokon of Dhaka South City Corporation, Mayor Islam of Dhaka North City Corporation and Mayor Ivy of Narayanganj City Corporation, as well as relevant city officials responsible for social welfare, planning and peacebuilding. Discussions centred on the nature of localised extremism challenges and the existing capabilities of the three City Corporations to develop and enact prevention mechanisms with government and non-government partners. The SCN also met with a number of Bangladeshi NGO and civil society actors delivering relevant programming in these areas, as well as regional SCN partners. Since then, SCN has worked with its local coordinator and local partners to conduct research about the scope and scale of online extremism in the country, to support civil society with small grants initiatives, and to liaise with P/CVE stakeholders on strengthening local capacity to build resilience.

Why Cities?

Cities are at the frontline against hate and extremism. Not only are cities disproportionately affected by a combination of hybrid threats, an estimated 68% of the world's population will live in urban areas by 2050.[1] This speaks to the urgent and ongoing need to equip local authorities with the tools required to build the resilience of their communities against hate and extremism.

P/CVE has traditionally been considered a national security issue and therefore lay within the remit of national government. However, increased recognition of local drivers of radicalisation and extremism, and that a holistic P/CVE strategy incorporates non-securitised, early prevention and intervention, has developed growing responsibility for P/CVE at the local level. Indeed, cities are uniquely placed to drive P/CVE through leveraging the following vantage points:

Contextual Understanding: Local leaders know their communities best and thus have the potential to effectively coordinate activities. By coordinating this work, municipal-level actors can positively influence the development of their communities.

Trust: Trust is essential to the credibility and impact of local prevention efforts. By virtue of their proximity, accessibility and responsibility for daily public service delivery, local leaders and stakeholders may be better able to harness trust and confidence than other national security actors. Equally, community-based service providers may have a more wide-reaching partnership already established with various local government units than they do with other parts of government.

Access: Local governments are able to convene and coordinate a variety of formal and informal local services. In many cases, there are pre-existing, credible and effective community-based services that can be leveraged for P/CVE. They often work in isolation, however, lacking a coordinating body that can connect them with related services and resources. Local governments are well-placed to facilitate such coordination and can help ensure prevention is integrated with, rather than separate to, existing services.

> **This MAM guidebook is designed for local P/CVE efforts and is informed by the SCN's experience creating local prevention infrastructure in diverse contexts.**

Chapter One	What are Multi-Agency Models?

Radicalisation and extremism are complex and multi-dimensional processes "best served by multi-level and multi-disciplinary solutions."[2] Accordingly, multi-stakeholder approaches to the prevention and countering of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism are increasingly regarded as best practice. Government and civil society-led approaches to P/CVE in places like the UK, the Netherlands and Canada all deploy multi-agency frameworks to this end, leveraging diverse disciplines to best understand and mitigate individual- and communal-level vulnerabilities. In the UK, for example, the Channel Programme requires all local authorities to establish multi-agency panels comprised of a local government representative and various professional services.[3] These panels are referred to in cases of individual-level radicalisation - representatives of the various professions jointly identify and roll out bespoke multi-disciplinary support packages designed to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation on a case-by-case basis. **In short, a MAM for P/CVE is a partnership between stakeholders of diverse backgrounds for the purpose of designing and deploying P/CVE efforts.**

Why MAMs?

Multi-agency collaboration for P/CVE reflects the complexity of extremism and that it can affect anyone - there is no conclusive profile of an extremist, nor is there a single pathway into or out of extremism. Multi-agency frameworks account for this by facilitating diverse stakeholder participation and input into a shared issue that has individual and community- level impacts. Importantly, it can build collaboration between potentially isolated services, uniting them within an established structure and with a shared cause while fostering a more streamlined and holistic response to hate and extremism than ad hoc or disconnected service provision would allow.

The MAM in Bangladesh

Bangladesh already takes a multi-disciplinary approach to P/CVE. The National Committee on Militancy, Resistance and Prevention comprises diverse actors including the intelligence services, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and has sought to adopt a holistic approach to P/CVE that includes religious education, communications campaigns, revising Madrasa curricula, and more.[4] However, P/CVE at the local level remains limited - initiatives that do exist lack coordination and a clearly defined strategy. A local MAM can fill this gap and provide much needed, streamlined P/CVE efforts within local communities.

MAMs typically leverage existing services and institutions, which means the make-up of a MAM for P/CVE is dependent on the context within which it operates. **In Bangladesh, an effective local MAM for P/CVE will ideally operate within the City Corporation structure** and bring in representation from, among others, other local and national government agencies and services, including law enforcement, CSOs and community-based bodies like youth groups, and education and faith leaders. See **Chapter Five** for what a City Corporation-led MAM might look like.

What Does the MAM do?

Multi-agency frameworks for P/CVE seek to build community resilience and facilitate, if not directly provide, early support for individuals and/or communities potentially vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism. This can be achieved through various activities, including:

Local risk and needs assessments	By providing a formal structure through which community-based and other services can share experiences and raise concerns about potential vulnerabilities to radicalisation, the City Corporation and MAM will already be able to build a more accurate profile of the threat of extremism. These efforts can be furthered by training MAM members on extremism risk factors, so they can better recognise it and inform the local threat profile.
Awareness-raising	Community-based awareness-raising is essential to ensure citizens feel confident and empowered to report concerns to the MAM (or other signposted forums). MAMs can deploy its civil society representatives and/or others to develop and deliver communications campaigns that raise awareness about hate and extremism, for example.
Local stakeholder engagement and capacity-building	Similar to broader communal awareness-raising about extremism, targeted trainings for community and/or youth influencers, teachers and caregivers can help ensure a strong on-the-ground foundation of resilience and understanding. A **Training of Trainers** model, in which MAM members are equipped with the knowledge and tools to broach the topic of extremism safely and constructively and to pass their learnings to others, can cascade the MAM's local P/CVE efforts.
Interventions	While some models only deliver community interventions (e.g. interventions in local communities through community-based organisations), others like the UK's Channel Programme[5], the Danish Schools-Social Services-Police (SSP) model[6] and the Dutch Safety House Model[7] all deliver **one-to-one interventions**, in which the respective MAMs receive potential safeguarding concerns from the public or elsewhere, assess their relevance for intervention and design and deploy intervention packages accordingly, identifying the best-placed lead agency on a case-by-case basis. Direct interventions carry significant ethical considerations that MAMs should be mindful of if they incorporate this into their remit and strategy.

Policy Engagement	MAMs can also strive for policy engagement and change. Local and national prevention policy and legal frameworks for P/CVE are important to embed and scale robust P/CVE efforts across the country. Policymakers need a well-rounded understanding of hate and extremism locally and nationally to formulate effective policy. Local MAMs for P/CVE can try to advocate for policymakers to take holistic and evidence-based action, especially where cities do not already have constitutional or official mandates to work on P/CVE. In Bangladesh, for example, local MAMs can be a vocal and informed advocate for formally incorporating P/CVE into the mandate of City Corporation structures.
Trust Building	MAMs can organise and deploy trust-building activities within and between communities, as well as between communities and local service providers, local authorities and law enforcement. These can be informal and implicit, for example through arranging inter-communal sporting activities, or more explicit, through hosting moderated dialogue sessions.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)	M&E should form a core part of the MAM's strategy. Where possible, any activities deployed by a MAM should have an appropriate M&E strategy. This is important to ensure MAM-affiliated activities are having their desired impact, to identify any potential counterproductive effects (and to mitigate those appropriately) and to identify which activities should be scaled, and which might need adapting to increase and sustain their impact.

"*Considering violent extremism to be a mere security issue can be misleading. It is a multi-faceted problem that requires multi-disciplinary and multi-institutional responses*"
- Global Counterterrorism Forum

Local-National Cooperation and Coordination	MAMs are well-placed to serve as a channel between local communities and national government.

Drawing from the [GCTF Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in P/CVE Conducive to Terrorism](#), which was co- developed by the SCN, local MAMs should seek to:

- **Account for national policy and/or strategies for P/CVE.** In Bangladesh, local level P/CVE efforts should align with, or at least account for, existing efforts by the National Committee on Militancy, Resistance, and Prevention, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and others. They should also consider national strategy and action plan efforts.
- **Make local actors and stakeholders aware of existing national policy and/or strategies for P/CVE.** This enables such actors to deliver P/CVE-related activities in a manner that compliments, rather than duplicates, national P/CVE efforts.
- **Provide feedback to national counterparts to inform national strategy and decision-making about P/CVE**. Similar to the policy engagement point on the previous page, local-national coordination helps ensure national strategies and frameworks for P/CVE, including questions around funding and investment, are informed by on-the-ground, localised P/CVE efforts. Among others, this can help national stakeholders identify which local practices and MAM structures they should try to replicate elsewhere.
- **Convene and liaise with counterparts across Bangladesh**. Extremism and extremist movements generally operate across localities. Equally, the increasing internet penetration across Bangladesh means extremists are able to distribute their narratives across the country and the wider region, leveraging social media to amplify their ideologies and worldviews.[8] **This makes subnational coordination and information-sharing essential.** MAMs that operate out of the City Corporation structure should therefore liaise with counterparts in other City Corporations across Bangladesh.

Who is Involved?

The composition of a multi-agency team depends on its remit and objectives. Even in the field of P/CVE, multi-agency approaches differ, with some rooted in local government and others driven entirely by community-based service providers. However, a review of existing, good practice multi-agency approaches to P/CVE suggests they generally comprise a mix of the following agencies and disciplines:[9]

Local government - the driving force of city-led responses to P/CVE. Through their access to and influence with local service providers, local government representatives are well-placed to design and lead MAMs for P/CVE. The benefit of local authorities leading MAMs for P/CVE is also that it reflects the multi-level nature of extremism by ensuring the responsibility for local prevention does not fall on a specific professional service nor singularly on law enforcement.

Law enforcement - a representative from law enforcement is helpful in case the MAM comes across a safeguarding concern or security incident that requires police response. Increased dialogue between local government and law enforcement can also facilitate better coordination in places where local police units do not already report to city leaders. Where MAMs deliver interventions, law enforcement can also support with receiving referrals and safeguarding concerns from the public, and with information-gathering (e.g. criminal histories) about the individuals concerned. Critically, strengthening and upholding **human rights-based policing** is essential for law enforcement to be an effective partner in MAMs.

Community and/or religious leaders - community and/or religious leaders can be called upon to support early prevention efforts, like community awareness-raising about extremism. Where necessary, they can also support community and one-to-one interventions. If, for example, an individual is assessed as requiring religious mentorship, having local religious representation on the MAM will help facilitate prompt identification of the best way to arrange this mentorship.

> "*A comprehensive approach requires contributions from all levels of actors to adequately address the complex set of drivers, whether global or local in nature, that give rise to violent extremism conducive to terrorism.*" - Global Counterterrorism Forum

Social workers - depending on the agreed activities of the MAM, social workers, particularly those with a counseling background, may be well-placed to lead community and one-to-one interventions. Social workers with such a background are also well-placed to support the families of potentially vulnerable individuals with counseling and guidance on how to facilitate the individual's long term rehabilitation and resilience against harm.

Mental health professionals - for MAMs that deliver one-to-one interventions, mental health professionals can play an integral role in both risk and needs assessments, as well as service provision for individuals where mental health concerns are identified as a vulnerability that needs to be addressed.

Educators - the inclusion of educational professionals is important to ensure awareness-raising about P/CVE trickles down into the school environment, both amongst teachers (to build their confidence to recognise and raise potential safeguarding concerns) and students (to build their resilience to radicalisation). Equally, where MAMs deliver interventions, educators can provide valuable input should educational pursuit and skills-training form part of the support package designed for vulnerable individuals and communities.

Children's services - professionals in child welfare and other children's services are essential for programs that work with minors. If a minor is referred to a MAM that delivers one-to-one interventions, child services may be able to check whether they have worked with that individual and their family before and in what capacity. If a child is deemed eligible for intervention, a child welfare professional can ensure the support package created for them is age-appropriate and considerate of their specific developmental and other needs.

Youth groups - the inclusion of youth representatives helps facilitate peer-to-peer awareness-raising and capacity-building. MAMs can equip youth representatives with the knowledge and skills to recognise, counter and stay resilient against hate and extremism, which they, in turn, can teach their peers.

> Members of MAMs partake not necessarily as experts in (counter) extremism, but as experts in their respective professions, enabling a constructive environment that learns from experience both explicitly and implicitly related to P/CVE.

In Practice: the UK Channel Programme

The UK's Channel Programme "provides a multi-agency approach to support people vulnerable to the risk of radicalisation"[10]. It forms part of the country's nationwide Prevent policy, the aim of which is to stop people from becoming radicalised, joining extremist or terrorist movements, and committing extremist or terrorist violence. Channel provides early support for individuals deemed potentially vulnerable to radicalisation. It operates at the local level, where police or local authorities coordinate a "Prevent Multi-Agency Panel" (PMAP, also referred to as the "Channel Panel"), which is a body of local service providers that are convened to assess potential cases of radicalisation and provide the required support to mitigate vulnerabilities. This generally looks as follows:

*The Panel Chair is a designated officer from within the local authority.[11] The role of the Chair is to oversee all Channel cases in their jurisdiction, ensure that Panel members and any external representatives (on an as-needed basis) are invited to each meeting, facilitate constructive and effective relationships between Panel members to enhance coordination and cooperation, ensure an effective support plan is in place per case in their jurisdiction, and to ensure information-sharing agreements are in place between Panel members and between the Panel and external services, and more. **Having a designated multi-agency lead, like the Panel Chair, ensures there is ownership over the activities and trajectory of the multi-agency framework,** and that there is a "go-to" person for Panel members and national and local governments to contact should they have enquiries or concerns.

In Practice: the SCN Local Prevention Network Model

The SCN has tested and proven **a local prevention network (LPN) model that unites city leaders, local public services and grassroots communities to build a coordinated response to hate and extremism.** SCN's LPN model comprises representatives from existing professional services that work at the community-level, trains them up on extremism and polarisation, and gives them the practical skills to support their prevention.

The image provided visualises the SCN's LPNs established in Lebanon and Jordan. In these contexts, the LPNs bring together national government (through input and buy-in from the National PVE Coordinator), municipal representation, subject-matter and regional expertise (through inclusion of the SCN's local team), and various local stakeholders ranging from education to youth activists.[12]

The LPNs established in Jordan and Lebanon serve a range of overarching functions, all of which facilitate holistic and sustainable local prevention. These include:

- Informing national P/CVE strategy and policy formulation;
- Identifying general and local causes of risk behaviour and/or broader vulnerabilities;
- Raising awareness about extremist and terrorist propaganda and recruitment tactics;
- Motivating and inspiring other institutions and professionals to work with prevention;
- Developing yearly action plans for the prevention of radicalisation and extremism at the local level; and
- Designing, deploying and overseeing local activities to increase communal resilience.

Importantly, while the LPNs have similar overarching functions, specific priorities to be able to achieve these differs from network to network. For example, the LPN of Saida in Lebanon has historically focused on training school staff and scout leaders, while other LPNs have worked directly with local youth.

Specific activities depend on contextual vulnerabilities and needs. For example, the LPN of Majdal Anjar in Lebanon organised a 3-day "PVE camp" to train Syrian and Lebanese youth on social cohesion and non-violent communication, while the LPN of Tripoli developed a "PVE Through Arts" initiative to work with underprivileged youth. The LPN of Saida is also establishing a psychosocial support unit, while the LPN of Tripoli is equipping ex-prisoners with employment skills.

Overall, the agreed-upon activities of LPNs, and MAMs more broadly, need to be contextually-appropriate, accounting for local sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Risks and needs differ per community, so what makes for a relevant P/CVE activity also differs. Activities need to consider who is best-placed to work with certain communities, and the tone with which they want to deliver P/CVE. For example, MAMs that work with youth might have greater impact if they seek to empower, rather than lecture, their youth participants. The SCN's LPNs are therefore directly based on local needs assessments, allowing the LPNs to design and deploy **catered and informed P/CVE activities.**

Key recommendations[13] from the SCN's experience with establishing several such LPNs include to:

- Facilitate the sustainability of local prevention by providing LPNs or MAMs with thematic and practical training on extremism;
- Consider how best to incentivise existing services to participate - is coordination with other services and training enough to foster involvement?
- **Always operate with and communicate the "Do No Harm" principle** - all activities by the LPN or MAM as entities, and by individual members, must prioritise the safety of the individuals or communities the network or MAM works with;
- Be realistic in what you can apply from other contexts;
- **Develop very localised approaches that account for the specific context in which you operate**.

Chapter Two | Setting Up a Multi-Agency Model

This chapter guides you through the different steps for setting up multi-agency frameworks for P/CVE. These are informed by desk-based research, consultations with multi-disciplinary P/CVE programme designers in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Lebanon and the US, and the SCN's own experience establishing multi-agency prevention networks in Lebanon, Jordan and the Balkans. **See also Appendix D for a checklist of these steps.**

Step One - Define MAM Remit and Objectives

Having clear objectives and a defined remit for the MAM will help you identify the most appropriate services to approach and invite to the framework. Is it appropriate for this MAM to deliver all or just some of the following? Refer back to the activities listed on pages 9 to 11 for a reminder of what these might entail.

- Research and local/national risk assessment
- Awareness-raising and capacity-building
- Policy engagement and advocacy
- Community interventions
- Direct (one-to-one) interventions
- Local-national coordination

A clear idea about the remit and scope of the MAM should help you determine who best to include. If, for example, you want to conduct research into local drivers for, and manifestations of, radicalisation, consider looking for local research organisations. If you seek to deliver interventions, are there any mental health or other behavioural practitioners you can include?

Resources like the Association for Social Work in Bangladesh and the Bangladesh CSO NGO Coordination Process can also guide your thinking.

The MAM should fill a gap in local P/CVE service provision. A preliminary community needs assessment can therefore help inform the objectives of the MAM. Consult with an expert in extremism and local stakeholders to understand local manifestations of hate and extremism.

Step Two - Stakeholder Mapping

Next, conduct a mapping exercise to locate local services and identify which are relevant for the MAM and its remit. This is an important step in establishing a well-rounded MAM with representation from appropriate and diverse professional and community-based services.

Consider, among others:
- At the City Corporation level - elected representatives, city officials
- Government service institutions - law enforcement agencies, district offices
- CSOs - NGOs and local branches of INGOs
- Community-based leaders and institutions - from the education sector, faith leaders, other professions as deemed appropriate, cultural organisations, youth organisations and activists, etc.

Step Three - Stakeholder Outreach and Induction

Now that you've identified who is most appropriate to include in your MAM, you can start with outreach. Reach out to each of your identified stakeholders, being sure to communicate the purpose and remit of the MAM, as well as their envisioned role and why they are included.

Once an appropriate representative per service has been identified, begin with their induction. Consider preparing:
- an induction pack that puts in writing the remit and scope of the MAM;
- a Memorandum of Understanding and Non-Disclosure Agreements (if necessary);
- a Code of Conduct and Ethics, making clear the behavioural conduct expectations of members, regarding how they engage with each other and with community members;
- an encrypted email per agency/group, to avoid personal or other professional emails being used to discuss work related to the MAM.

> "*National and local government, civil society, private sector, and international, regional, and subregional bodies can all have* **complementary roles** *due to their comparative advantages, which they should seek to leverage, as appropriate, taking steps to prevent pre-existing work or relationships from being negatively affected.*"
> - Global Counterterrorism Forum

Step Four - MAM Training

Once the MAM's participants have been secured, **assess the existing knowledge, skills and capacities that MAM members have on P/CVE.** This can be done through a survey during or immediately after induction. Develop training modules accordingly. Much of the content for P/CVE trainings can be sourced online, including via the SCN's online resource hub.

The importance of this step should not be underestimated. A training needs assessment will help inform where capacity-building for the MAM as a whole, and for specific members individually, is necessary. Training, in turn, ensures all the MAM's members have the same baseline of thematic and practical understanding of P/CVE.

> Add the training modules produced (or sourced online) to the induction package/process for new members. This ensures new MAM members in the future achieve the same baseline of understanding as existing members.

Step Five - Formulate MAM Strategy

With MAM members onboarded and the multi-agency network loosely established, it is time to revisit your original objectives and scope. Allow MAM members to input and feedback according to their professional background and newly gained P/CVE knowledge. Consider the following principles as you develop a more widely-informed strategy:

- **Sustainability** - the strategy should account for the long-term. Ideally, activities will be designed with the sustainability of their impact in mind.
- **Transparency** - P/CVE is a contentious and often daunting topic for the public to grasp. Being transparent about the structure, strategy and services of the MAM will help to de-stigmatise and demystify P/CVE and will make for stronger communal engagement with your services.
- **Human Rights** - always abide by a "Do No Harm" principle. All activities and any engagement with law enforcement should prioritise the human rights and safety of all individuals involved.
- **Local / National Cooperation and Coordination** - the strategy and MAM activities should account for national policy and strategy towards P/CVE.

Role of the MAM Lead

For a MAM to function effectively and to serve the essential coordination role that is often missing at the local level, there needs to be a designated "chair" or "lead" responsible for overseeing activities and convening the MAM.

MAM Lead	Summary of Role
	The MAM Lead usually sits within the local authority. In Bangladesh, **this role could be someone embedded in the City Corporation structure.** The remit of this role may include: • convening and chairing meetings of the MAM • overseeing all MAM activities and requesting the necessary updates and reporting from MAM members • communicating progress and status of activities to other stakeholders (e.g. local leaders, national government, the National Committee on Militancy, Resistance, and Prevention) • resolving disputes between MAM members as necessary • leading strategic-thinking and sustainability of the MAM • driving political buy-in and policy change to embed MAMs more formally into the City Corporation structure (or other local authority)
	Background and Qualifications
	Given this remit, the MAM Lead will ideally have the following qualifications: • networking experience and the professionalism and adaptability required to engage stakeholders of different professional and political backgrounds • assertive and able to lead a large team • demonstrable knowledge of extremism in Bangladesh and the wider region • experience with P/CVE or a related field. At the very least, a good understanding of the local context, including potential well-being vulnerabilities and of grassroots responses to local issues • an understanding of local and national governance structures, and of policy related to P/CVE or social safety more broadly • clear communications and public-speaking skill • connected with national government stakeholders

Chapter Three	Managing the Multi-Agency Model

Setting up the multi-agency framework is only the beginning. Before you start delivering the agreed-upon activities of the MAM, there are a number of considerations to bear in mind. This chapter runs through these considerations and categorises them as follows:

- Practical considerations (e.g. convening the MAM)
- Data security and privacy
- Relationship management
- Considerations for specific activities

This is not an exhaustive list of considerations - rather, these are core considerations based on consultations with P/CVE programme designers and international best practice recommendations.

Practical considerations

Meeting Frequency

- How frequently should the MAMs meet? If we follow the structure proposed in **Chapter Five**, should meeting frequency differ between Committees? Should there also be regular meetings between all Committees? What is the expectation (and capacity) of MAM members to meet e.g. fortnightly or monthly?
- How are ad hoc meetings convened?
- Is there a meeting quorum, or number of MAM members that need to be present to arrange a formal convening of the MAM?

Meeting Setting and Format

- Will meetings take place in person, virtually, or will the MAM operate with a hybrid model? Consider potential ongoing implications of COVID-19 on this.
- If meetings take place in person, where will this be? Choose a secure and private location accessible to all members.
- If they take place virtually, be sure to have an encrypted conferencing system available.

Meeting Etiquette

- To ensure MAM members prepare appropriately, set expectations for regular meetings. Prepare either a standing agenda that will be followed in all regular meetings, or send bespoke agendas prior to each meeting.

- Where updates are expected from a specific member (e.g. because they're leading an intervention or community-based activity), consider informing them in advance so they can prepare their updates accordingly.

- It is good practice to take detailed minutes per meeting. This ensures there is a record to refer to if there is ever disagreement or misunderstanding between MAM members. Consider either having a designated minute-taker or delegating this to a different member per meeting.

- Where there are clear action points, ensure MAM members get a copy of the minutes or that the action points are reiterated and confirmed in writing (e.g. via email), again to ensure record of any decisions made during the meeting.

Data Security and Privacy

Data-Recording and Storing

- Thorough data-recording is important. Meeting minute-taking, recording key decisions made by the MAM, progress-reporting and written communication between MAM members, particularly regarding agreed-upon action steps, all help ensure there is a trail of decision-making to refer back to as activities progress.

- Given the sensitivity of P/CVE and the stigmatisation that comes with being affiliated with extremism, any MAM that deals with individual-level and/or community interventions must ensure it has secure and encrypted data storage policies. Consider setting up an encrypted drive that the most active MAM members have access to. Carefully consider who should be able to access identifiable data and why.

Never underestimate the importance of thorough data-recording and storing. If the MAM ever runs into issues during delivery, you need to be able to refer back to past meeting notes and decisions. Keeping and circulating thorough notes also helps manage expectations across the MAMs' membership.

Information-Sharing

- In the instance that members of the MAM come across a concern that suggests an immediate threat of harm to self or others, they will be expected to escalate this concern to the appropriate authorities. There should, therefore, be referral and escalation procedures with clear thresholding criteria for when something should be communicated to law enforcement. Information-sharing agreements must also be in place to ensure any transfer of data or communication between MAM members, or the MAM and other services, is done in a data privacy-compliant manner.

- Consider also whether there are any legal considerations for information-sharing. When is information-sharing (e.g. with law enforcement) legally obligated? What would be considered a breach of data privacy and confidentiality? This is especially important if you expect the MAM to do interventions - affiliations with extremism can stigmatise and isolate, so it is essential that community and individual interventions are handled with the utmost care.

> Consulting with a lawyer can help you determine what constitutes a breach of confidentiality versus when information-sharing is legally obligated and to who.

Relationship Management

Receiving and Responding to Complaints

- **Externally** - How will the MAM receive complaints and other feedback from the stakeholders with which it works?
- **Internally** - There should be clear processes for resolution in the instance of dispute or conflict between MAM members. Usually, the MAM lead serves as mediator. If we follow the structure proposed in **Chapter Five**, this may be the responsibility of Committee Leads.

Relationship with National Stakeholders

- National-local coordination is essential to facilitate a holistic and consistent subnational response to P/CVE. Reporting progress, lessons learnt and recommendations to national government stakeholders can help improve national responses and local efforts elsewhere. It is important that national government has oversight over what works at the local level versus what doesn't, as well as where there is programming and where there are gaps.

Delivery Considerations

Awareness-Raising and Capacity-Building

- Leverage the credibility and experience MAM members and other service providers have with local communities to understand the types of capacity-building and educational activities that are most needed, as well as who is most suited to deliver these.
- Local awareness-raising campaigns, whether digital or in person, should be led by **credible** voices that have the trust of local communities.
- Avoid using securitised, sensational and fear-mongering language and imagery in any public communications campaigns the MAM designs and delivers. You do not want the public to associate the MAM and P/CVE with fear and superstition. **Local communities need to trust they are in safe hands.**

Direct Interventions

If individual-level interventions form part of the MAM's remit, there are numerous important safety and delivery considerations to account for. Among others, consider:

- **Intake** - how will the MAM come to learn about potential safeguarding concerns? Is this through MAM members or through a designated channel (e.g. a hotline)? Will the MAM receive referrals from law enforcement?
- **Risk and needs assessment** - what tools will the MAM use to determine the vulnerabilities of the individual? Leverage any behavioural and/or social work practitioners that are part of the MAM to provide a multi-disciplinary understanding of an individual's needs, and to create a multi-sectoral support package
- **Intervention** - who is the lead intervention provider? Ideally this is someone with a social work or counselling background, or perhaps a faith leader. Ideally, the core ideological intervention will be supplemented with support from other disciplines as needed. Interventions should always be bespoke and cater to the specific needs of the individual, as identified during the risk assessment stage
- **Aftercare** - what happens when an individual completes their interventions? How will they be supported to apply their learnings in "real life" for the long-term?

Chapter Four | M&E

MAM activities should be monitored and evaluated to enable MAM members to identify which activities are having their desired impact and which aren't. M&E also facilitates better learning exchange and decision-making about which activities to scale and/or replicate elsewhere. This chapter takes you through considerations for monitoring and evaluating the MAM as a whole, as well as its individual activities.

Key Concepts - Theory of Change

A theory of change (ToC) explains the connections between planned activities and desired outcomes. This can be displayed as a process of change in a flow chart, which is sometimes called a logic model. The ToC that the SCN recommends using contains six levels. The top three levels ("Goal", "Intermediate Outcomes" and "Immediate Outcomes") outline the changes you expect to occur as a result of MAM activities, and the bottom three ("Outputs," "Activities," and "Inputs") reflect the actions through which you plan to produce these changes. ToCs are arranged in this order to encourage you to work backwards, beginning with your ultimate goal.

Goal	The ultimate long-term aim of a project and the highest-level change that it intends to contribute towards, but may not achieve alone.
Intermediate Outcomes	The medium-term results of a project that are expected to be obtained by the end of the implementation period. They usually include changes in behaviour, practice and performance.
Immediate Outcomes	The short-term effects of a project on its beneficiaries. These consist of changes in capacity such as increases in knowledge, skills, awareness, attitudes or access.
Outputs	The direct product or services delivered at the project level by the execution of activities. Outputs lead to outcomes, but are not themselves the changes expected to occur.
Activities	What a project actually does. These are the actions taken or work performed through which inputs are turned into project outputs.
Inputs	The human, financial, organisational and community resources required to implement a project

ToCs are often structured in the form of a pyramid. This shape helps to illustrate the cause-and-effect logic that underpins this type of framework. In order to move up the logic model towards the goal, a group of lower level components must first be completed or achieved.

Key Concepts - Data Collection Methods

Drafting a ToC where you work backwards from the MAM's overarching goal will help you identify the outputs and activities needed to achieve that goal. This in turn should provide a sense as to the types of data collection methods you can deploy to monitor and evaluate the MAM's activities. Consider the following approaches and **see Appendix D for more information**:

Source: Adapted from Marchant 2000.

Chapter Five | Multi-Agency Models in Bangladesh

Chapters One to Four provide an overview of what a MAM for P/CVE might look like, how to set one up and how to manage it, as well as the activities it can deliver. This chapter takes that foundation of knowledge and applies it by considering what a multi-agency framework for P/CVE might look like in Bangladesh.

Potential MAM for P/CVE in Bangladesh

Building on lessons learned from developing multi-disciplinary local prevention infrastructure in contexts like Jordan and Lebanon, and drawing from international good practice examples like Channel, MAMs for P/CVE in Bangladesh will ideally operate out of existing local infrastructure. Given the current remit of City Corporations, which is primarily the provision of socioeconomic and civic functions,[14] incorporating P/CVE into its scope is a natural fit. This would embed P/CVE at the local level within an existing structure, thus being able to leverage existing processes and networks, and adding P/CVE to an existing remit of work.

MAMs operating out of the City Corporation can be composed of specific committees per level of local administration - at its most local, there could be **Ward** Coordination Committees, followed by the **Zonal** Coordination Committees and the overarching **City Coordination Committee**. This facilitates micro to macro-level delivery of P/CVE activities.

Committees at the **Ward** level, to facilitate hyper-local activities.

Committees at the **Zonal** level, to help oversee activities in each ward and organise P/CVE efforts (like communications campaigns) across wards.

Committee at the **City Corporation** level, to oversee activities deployed across local divisions and to liaise with national (government) counterparts.

*Map of Dhaka South City Corporation from MediaBangladesh.net*

In regards to the composition of each Committee, this could take shape as outlined in the table below. This composition is for reference only - the actual composition of local city-led MAMs will depend on the relevant services available per level of local administration, among others.

Agency/Body	Ward Coordination Committee	Zonal Coordination Committee	City Coordination Committee
Local Authority (potential Committee lead)	A Ward official	Representatives from key wards, Zone official	Representative per zone, Official from the City Corporation
Government Service Institutions	Law enforcement	Law enforcement	Local government, Law enforcement, District office
CSOs	NGOs	NGOs INGOs	NGOs INGOs
Community-based Organisations	Youth organisations	Youth organisations	Cultural organisations, Youth organisations
Community Leaders	Faith leaders Youth influencers	Faith leaders	Faith leaders
Caregiving Services	Education Mental healthcare Social work Child welfare	Education Mental healthcare Social work Child welfare	Education Mental healthcare Social work Child welfare

Local MAMs will ideally have some form of communication channel open with national government stakeholders, to facilitate local-national coordination for P/CVE.

Ultimately, this model would leverage comprehensive, existing local infrastructure at the sub-city level in Bangladesh, and could operate as follows:

Small, multi-agency teams per **ward** would be led by a designated Ward Committee Lead. The Ward Committee would organise hyper-local, on-the-ground programming to address potential vulnerabilities and specific needs of their communities. Each activity should be monitored to inform an ongoing evaluation of the Ward Committee's strategy and delivery plan.

Ward Committee Leads report to the Zonal Committee.

The Zonal Committee would keep track of different activities being delivered per ward, helping to identify where activities should be replicated (and adapted) in other wards, and designing and delivering Zone-wide P/CVE efforts, like public communications campaigns.

Zonal Committee Leads report to the City Coordination Committee.

The City Coordination Committee would keep track of P/CVE across the City Corporation, maintaining an overarching "birds-eye view" of P/CVE across its jurisdiction. City Coordination Leads would also liaise with City Corporations across Bangladesh to facilitate subnational coordination, and liaise with national government counterparts to ensure national public safety policy and strategy are informed by localised efforts.

Other responsibilities of the Committee Leads may be to:

- Rally local services to support P/CVE efforts;

- Serve as a touchpoint or public-facing ambassador for P/CVE or for the broader multi-agency framework amongst local communities, services and officials. City Coordination Leads can strive to serve as such with national government stakeholders, providing informed guidance on, and advocating for, local P/CVE based on the activities and progress of the Wards and Zones in their jurisdiction;

- Formally convene meetings between committee members;

- Represent their respective Committee and the activities deployed in their division in meetings of the broader multi-agency structure - this facilitates learning exchange between e.g. wards in the same zone and zones in the same City Corporation;

- Arrange pre- and post-meeting documentation, including agendas and post-meeting follow-up;

- Liaise with the designated Leads of other committees to ensure coordination of activities and to organise, where relevant, inter-ward or inter-zone activities.

Appendices | A - Glossary of Useful Terms

- **Community Interventions**
  Actions to address identified needs of communities deemed potentially at risk of radicalisation.

- **Direct Interventions**
  In P/CVE, initiatives that seek "to prevent or reverse radicalisation through contact (either face to face or through a communications medium) with individuals who may have been or are at risk of being radicalised."

- **Extremism (ISD definition)**
  Extremism is the advocacy of a system of belief that claims the superiority and dominance of one identity-based "in-group" over all "out-groups", and promotes a dehumanising "othering" mind-set that is antithetical to pluralism and the universal application of human rights. Extremist groups pursue and advocate a systemic political and societal change that reflects their world view. They may do this through non-violent and more subtle means, as well as through violent or explicit means. Extremism can be advocated by state and non-state actors alike.

- **Multi-agency Model (MAM)**
  A multi-disciplinary framework that brings together different agencies, professions, institutions and groups for a shared purpose/activity.

- **Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)**
  Efforts to prevent and minimise and mitigate risk of violent extremism. Such efforts can be led by a diverse range of actors, including but not limited to national/local government, civil society organisations, community leaders, educators, law enforcement, multinational corporations and institutions.

- **Protective factors**
  Factors that make an individual more resilient to a given outcome, or that decrease the likelihood of a negative outcome.

- **Radicalisation vs. mobilisation**
  In P/CVE, radicalisation is the complex process by which an individual adopts extremist beliefs and ideology. Mobilisation refers to when an individual prepares to engage in violent extremist or terrorist activity, for example facilitating or committing an attack, or traveling for violent extremist or terrorist purposes.

- **Risk factors**
  Factors that amplify or increase the likelihood of a specific outcome. In the case of P/CVE, factors that increase the likelihood of radicalisation and extremist violence.

- **Safeguarding concern**
  In the case of P/CVE, a safeguarding concern is a worry or perception that an individual or community is potentially at risk of radicalisation, violent extremism and/or terrorism.

Appendix B - Sample MAM Structure

The following structure visualises typical P/CVE MAMs. This is based on existing MAMs led at the city-level, including the UK Channel Programme, the Danish Aarhus model and the Dutch Safety House Model.

MAM Lead

Ideally sitting within local government

Law enforcement

Criminal justice (particularly if the MAM operates in the post-crime space)

Mental healthcare

Faith leaders

Education

Community leaders

Social work and child safeguarding

Regular meetings	Ad hoc meetings	National-Local Meetings
Who? Ideally with all MAM members -- Why? For regular progress updates and forward-planning	Who? With MAM members as necessary -- Why? For urgent risk mitigation or crisis management	Who? MAM lead(s) and national stakeholders -- Why? For coordination/ learning exchange between different local MAMs

Appendix C - Further Reading Recommendations

International MAM examples:

- **Channel Duty Guidance**
  By the UK Government - statutory guidance for Channel Panel members and partners of local panel.

- **Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons on Early Intervention from the UK's Channel Program**
  By Talene Bilazarian of George Washington University's Program on Extremism - a useful run through of the Channel Program.

- **The Danish Aarhus Model**
  By the European Forum for Urban Security - an overview of the highly regarded Aarhus multi-disciplinary intervention model.

- **The Dutch Safety House Model**
  Summary by the Confederation of European Probation

- **The Local Prevention Network Policy and Practice Model**
  By the SCN - an overview of establishing local prevention networks, based on the SCN's experience doing so in Lebanon and Jordan

  See also the Radicalisation Awareness Network's compendium of inspiring practices, which lists a series of multi-agency approaches.

General:

- **Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism**
  By the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF) - good practice recommendations for government-led CVE

- **Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide to Good Practice**
  By the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) - a snapshot of good CVE practice

- **Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in P/CVE Conductive to Terrorism** by the GCTF

- **Reframing CVE as a Multidisciplinary Approach to Promoting Community Safety**
  By the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism - framework for multidisciplinary CVE efforts

- **Strengthening Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism**
  By the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute - good practices and lessons learnt from existing CVE efforts

Appendix D - Checklists and Tools

Provided are checklists with key considerations for setting up and managing a MAM. These lists are not exhaustive but can be used to track the MAM development process.

D.1 Setting up a MAM - Checklist

☐   Objectives defined

☐   Local services mapped, relevant services identified

☐   Relevant services engaged to gauge interest and feasibility

☐   Appropriate documentation prepared. Consider:

- **MAM charter** clearly stating, among others:
    - *the role and remit of the MAM, including whether the MAM will work with communities and individuals, or just the former or latter*
    - *membership criteria, including term of service, the induction and exit process*
- **MAM code of conduct and ethics**
- **Non-disclosure agreements** (NDAs) and **memorandums of understanding** (MOUs).

☐   Necessary documentation completed by each MAM member

☐   Roles and responsibilities per MAM member defined (including meeting minute-taking, meeting convenor)

☐   Training needs assessment conducted - general training needs identified, as well as any specific training requirements per member

☐   Each member trained

☐   First meeting arranged

D.2 Managing a MAM - Checklist

☐ Frequency of meetings decided

☐ Meeting structure (e.g. agenda and attendees) decided

☐ Meeting format decided and agreed to (e.g. in person, virtual). Consider also:

☐ Ad hoc meeting protocols created. Consider:

- Establishing a clear process for members to call for ad hoc meetings of the MAM - this would ideally go through the designated MAM lead or meeting convenor
- Meeting quorum - is there a minimum amount of members that need to be available per meeting?

☐ Digital communication protocols created and agreed to. Consider:

- How best to share members' preferred contact details with each other
- Whether emails should be set up specifically for MAM-related communications

☐ M&E strategy designed. Consider:

- Creating a ToC for the MAM
- Data collection methods per activity. Refer to Appendix E.3 for a list of common data collection methods.

D.3 MAM Development Tracker

Service (agency and representative):	Level (e.g. ward, zone, city corporation)	Role Confirmed?	Forms Completed?	Training Completed?
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
Notes:				

MAM Development Tracker

Service (agency and representative):	Level (e.g. ward, zone, city corporation)	Role Confirmed?	Forms Completed?	Training Completed?
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐
		☐	☐	☐

Notes:

D.4 - Data Collection Methods

Surveys

Surveys are the most common M&E tool. They can be used to gather both quantitative and qualitative data. Surveys typically ask respondents to report back on their demographics, attitudes, confidence, knowledge-confidence and behaviours. They are particularly useful when a project calls for you to collect readily comparable information from large groups of people that can be disaggregated down to an individual level, such as participants at a workshop. Surveys can be handed out in paper format or sent to respondents digitally using online surveying platforms like SurveyMonkey. While surveys represent a valuable tool for M&E, they do have a number of shortcomings. Surveys are limited by the questions they contain and may not be sensitive enough to pick up on issues that are important for the continued delivery of a project. Equally, self-reported information is not always the most reliable type of data because it can be easily corrupted by biases injected by both the respondents and the researchers themselves.

Knowledge surveys

Knowledge surveys or tests are a sub-category of surveying that seek to gather objective data on knowledge acquisition and can be very helpful for demonstrating the impact of capacity-building projects. Tracking changes in the behaviour of project beneficiaries poses a consistent challenge in P/CVE that is very difficult to overcome. As a result, understanding how an individual's knowledge and their ability to apply it may have changed takes on extra importance. Combined with attitudinal data, this can help to develop a more robust understanding of project impact and avoid an over-reliance on self-reported behavioural change.

Focus groups

This data collection method consists of holding small group discussions between a facilitator and beneficiaries or stakeholders to uncover information relevant to a project. The questions asked in focus group discussions can largely be split into two categories: generative questions, which are broad and open-ended; and probing questions, which seek to explore the group's responses in greater depth and home in on points of interest for project staff. Focus groups are predominantly a means of gathering qualitative data, though quantitative measures can also be introduced through the use of tailored questions and handouts.

Interviews

Like focus groups, interviews rely on discussions between an interviewer and a beneficiary or stakeholder to gather insights about a project. While there are many similarities between the two methods, such as the question format and the fact that they predominantly capture qualitative insights, there are also some important differences. Interviews typically require far more time and resources to organise, and so are best saved for discussions with key beneficiaries or stakeholders.

Observation

Also known as an observational study, this is one of the most basic approaches available in M&E and is usually carried out in concert with other data collection methods. Observation consists of project staff watching beneficiaries and recording and analysing what they do.

Case study

Case studies are not a data collection tool per se, but a descriptive piece of work that can help to provide a detailed examination of a subject or topic. They will typically be based on information collected through a range of tools and serve to create a highly detailed picture of a specific portion of a project that can speak to the wider impact of the initiative as a whole. Case studies usually focus on a single unit of analysis such as an individual, family, community, location or organisation.

Endnotes

1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "68% of the world population projected to live in urban areas by 2050, says UN", 16 May 2018. Available online at:
https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html

2 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, "Lessons Learned from Mental Health and Education: Identifying Best Practices for Addressing Violent Extremism", October2015. Available online at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_LessonsLearnedfromMentalHealthAndEducation_FullReport_Oct2015.pdf

3 HM Government, "Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism", 2020. Available online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/964567/6.6271_HO_HMG_Channel_Duty_Guidance_v14_Web.pdf

4 Strong Cities Network, "Regional Assessment Report: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism at the Local Level in South Asia," 2020. Available online at:
https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/03/South-Asia-Regional-Assessment-Report_final.pdf

5 For more about the Channel programme, read the Channel Duty Guidance. Available online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/964567/6.6271_HO_HMG_Channel_Duty_Guidance_v14_Web.pdf.

6 For more about the Danish SSP model, read the RAN summary. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7488_en.

7 For more about the Dutch Safety House model, read this overview by the European Network of Occupational Therapy in Higher Education (ENOTHE). Available online at:
http://www.enothe.eu/cop/the_safety_house.pdf

8 Muggah, Robert, "The Radicalization of Bangladeshi Cyberspace," November 2020. Available online at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/27/bangladesh-islamist-terrorist-networks-internet-extremism/

9 The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, "Staffing Intervention Programs", February 2021. Available online at: https://www.mccaininstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/staffing-read-ahead-materials.pdf

10 "Channel Duty Guidance", ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Strong Cities Network, "Policy and Practice Model", 2019. Available online at: https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/03/ENG-SCN-Policy-and-Practice-Model.pdf

13 McCain Institute, "Staffing Intervention Programs", YouTube, February 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16BJ1WKIq-0&feature=youtu.be

14 Mustafa K. Mujeri and Lisa S. Singh, "Case Studies: on Decentralization in Bangladesh", 1997. Available online at: http://www.fao.org/3/am163e/am163e00.pdf

ISD | Powering solutions to extremism and polarisation

STRONG CITIES

www.strongcitiesnetwork.org