In response to major concerns around disinformation attacks during the 2022 French elections, the Online Election Integrity Watch Group brought together a group of researchers to monitor information manipulation online meant to sway public opinion. These were our findings.
This report outlines networks of Somali, Kiswahili and Arabic pages and profiles on Facebook which are supportive of al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. It serves as a a case study into the moderation blind spots of the platform in languages outside of English, and illustrates how terrorist supporters are exploiting these gaps.
Deny, Deceive, Delay: Documenting and Responding to Climate Disinformation at COP26 & Beyond – Summary
We outline the most prominent discourses identified around COP26. Looking ahead, we also list recommendations for governments, multilateral bodies, tech platforms and the media.
This report is a collective effort to quantify the problem and establish concrete responses for the months and years ahead.
Cash for Comments: How YouTube’s Super Chats Enable the Platform & Creators to Profit from Conspiracies, Misinformation & Calls for Violence
This report features research examining the use and misuse of YouTube Super Chats that enables the platform and creators to profit from live chat feeds promoting violence, conspiracies, misinformation and hate.
This briefing note is intended to understand the origins of the #IstandwithRussia campaign, the accounts behind it, and the parallels and linkages it has to pro-Kremlin media and narratives on social media platforms.
This research documents how YouTube’s algorithmic recommendations contribute to promoting misogynistic, anti-feminist and other extremist content to Australian boys and young men.
Multi-Stakeholder Models for Local Prevention: Technical Evaluation and Learnings from Kumanovo, North Macedonia
A technical evaluation which captures the achievements, challenges and lessons learned from local programming aimed at enhancing local multi-agency coordination.
This baseline report was produced by ISD and its partner Act! to study and evaluate community-based P/CVE interventions in the Kenyan counties of Isiolo, Nakuru and Kwale.
This briefing outlines the mechanics, narratives, and linkages of the pro-Putin power users — those that produce content at a high-rate day in and day out since the start of the invasion — on Facebook to pro-Kremlin groups and pages, painting a picture of a coordinated, seemingly inauthentic campaign intended to buttress the image of Putin in a range of languages and geographies.